Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Physics Today

Quantum properties in the mechanical world

Published Mar 18, 2010• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1063/pt.5.024169

Related papers

Classical Properties in a Quantum-Mechanical World

Alberto Cordero

•Dec 1, 2002•0 citations

What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us

Ulrich Mohrhoff

This article presents a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics. It extends the meaning of “measurement” to include all property-indicating facts. Intrinsically, space is undifferentiated: There are no points on which a world of locally instantiated physical properties could be built. Instead, reality is built on facts, in the sense that the properties of things are extrinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. The actual extent to which the world is spatially and temporally differentiated (that is, the extent to which spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by the facts) is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding that the state vector does nothing but assign probabilities, quantum mechanics affords a complete understanding of the actual world. If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the actual world, but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more detailed than the actual world. Two deep-seated misconceptions are responsible for the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics: the notion that the spatial and temporal aspects of the world are adequately represented by sets with the cardinality of the real numbers, and the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time. The latter is an unwarranted (in fact, incoherent) projection of our apparent “motion in time” into the world of physics. Equally unwarranted, at bottom, is the use of causal concepts. There nevertheless exists a “classical” domain in which language suggestive of nomological necessity may be used. Quantum mechanics not only is strictly consistent with the existence of this domain but also presupposes it in several ways.

arXiv:quant-ph/9903051•American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 2000•41 citations

Quantum Mechanical Phenomena

Martin Pieper

Essentials•Jan 1, 2021•0 citations

Does Quantum Mechanics Establish the Final Failure of Causality

MacGregor Malloy

In the wake of relativistic field theories in physics, all of our most fundamental physical theories shared three properties regarding the way that they described the world. First, properties of objects were always determined. Second, systems always evolved deterministically. Thirdly, no causal relationship between two separate regions in space was immediate or had superluminal effect. These properties of theories are called determinacy, determinism and local causality, respectively. These properties all correspond to classical metaphysical principles about the structure of the world. It will be shown that the theory of quantum mechanics has none of these properties and so therefore introduces a tension between the classical metaphysical description of the world and the descriptions given by our most fundamental physical theories. John Stewart Bell showed that no entirely correct theory of quantum mechanics has the property of local causality. I argue that this implies that local causality is metaphysically untenable.

•May 3, 2017•0 citations

Dispositions, Relational Properties and the Quantum World

Bruno Gnassounou, Max Kistler

In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality namely contextuality and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the widespread, monistic ontological thesis about the reducibility of dispositional properties to categorical properties in the context of the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I conclude that with the exception of Bohmian mechanics, the other minimally realist views of quantum mechanics require essential dispositions, i.e., dispositions of a non-reducible kind. Interestingly, seen behind the lenses of dispositionalism, Bohr's and Bohm's interpretations of quantum mechanics are much closer than it is usually recognized, a fact that could teach us something about the way the quantum world is.

Routledge eBooks•May 23, 2016•19 citations

Engineering Quantum Mechanics

Jung Ho Kim

광학과 기술•Apr 1, 2014•0 citations
This article presents a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics. It extends the meaning of “measurement” to include all property-indicating facts. Intrinsically, space is undifferentiated: There are no points on which a world of locally instantiated physical properties could be built. Instead, reality is built on facts, in the sense that the properties of things are extrinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. The actual extent to which the world is spatially and temporally differentiated (that is, the extent to which spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by the facts) is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding that the state vector does nothing but assign probabilities, quantum mechanics affords a complete understanding of the actual world. If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the actual world, but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more detailed than the actual world. Two deep-seated misconceptions are responsible for the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics: the notion that the spatial and temporal aspects of the world are adequately represented by sets with the cardinality of the real numbers, and the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time. The latter is an unwarranted (in fact, incoherent) projection of our apparent “motion in time” into the world of physics. Equally unwarranted, at bottom, is the use of causal concepts. There nevertheless exists a “classical” domain in which language suggestive of nomological necessity may be used. Quantum mechanics not only is strictly consistent with the existence of this domain but also presupposes it in several ways.
In the wake of relativistic field theories in physics, all of our most fundamental physical theories shared three properties regarding the way that they described the world. First, properties of objects were always determined. Second, systems always evolved deterministically. Thirdly, no causal relationship between two separate regions in space was immediate or had superluminal effect. These properties of theories are called determinacy, determinism and local causality, respectively. These properties all correspond to classical metaphysical principles about the structure of the world. It will be shown that the theory of quantum mechanics has none of these properties and so therefore introduces a tension between the classical metaphysical description of the world and the descriptions given by our most fundamental physical theories. John Stewart Bell showed that no entirely correct theory of quantum mechanics has the property of local causality. I argue that this implies that local causality is metaphysically untenable.
In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality namely contextuality and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the widespread, monistic ontological thesis about the reducibility of dispositional properties to categorical properties in the context of the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I conclude that with the exception of Bohmian mechanics, the other minimally realist views of quantum mechanics require essential dispositions, i.e., dispositions of a non-reducible kind. Interestingly, seen behind the lenses of dispositionalism, Bohr's and Bohm's interpretations of quantum mechanics are much closer than it is usually recognized, a fact that could teach us something about the way the quantum world is.