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Kagaku tetsugaku

ファン・フラーセンの量子論解釈について

東 克明

Published Jan 1, 1999• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper deals with van Fraassen's 'no-collapse' interpretation, or 'modal interpretation'. In this interpretation he avoids 'collapse' by supposing that quantum mechanical states, unlike classical states, specify possibilities rather than actualities. But my argument will show that van Fraassen's interpretation is confronted with some difficulties concerning values of observables.

DOI
10.4216/jpssj.32.2_81

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This paper deals with van Fraassen's 'no-collapse' interpretation, or 'modal interpretation'. In this interpretation he avoids 'collapse' by supposing that quantum mechanical states, unlike classical states, specify possibilities rather than actualities. But my argument will show that van Fraassen's interpretation is confronted with some difficulties concerning values of observables.
In this paper, I examine van Fraassen's original version of modal interpretations, which have the increasing significance in the foundational research concerning elementary quantum mechanics. I argue that although van Fraassen's modal interpretation has a salient advantage over the standard Dirac-von Neumann interpretation with the projection postulate, it is confronted with two kinds of interpretive difficulties stemmed from one and the same fact of experience, repeatability of the first kind measurement.
Although there has been some discussion in the literature of Bas van Fraassen's modal interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, it has for the most part been concentrated on difficulties that van Fraassen's viewpoint shares with those of some other authors, including Kochen, Dieks, and Healey. van Fraassen's approach has, however, some problems of its own; in this note we want to focus on what seems to us to be one of the most serious of these. The difficulty concerns immediately repeated non-disturbing measurements of the same observable on a single system. As is well known, von Neumann's Projection Postulate guarantees that such measurements will always give the same outcome; likewise, in the approaches of the “modalists” mentioned above, such ‘consilience of repeated measurements’ is in one way or another built into the formalism. By contrast, we shall argue, van Fraassen's modal interpretation neither guarantees this result nor adequately explains why it is unnecessary to do so.
Bas van Fraassen in [4] has recently tried to use modal logic to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. His model is based on a method of expressing quantum states developed by Hugh Everett [1] called the “relative state formulation.” Unfortunately, Everett's mathematics cannot be generalized as van Fraassen requires. The difficulty itself is elementary enough. But a revision of van Fraassen's postulates (such as the one he adopted on p. 341 after he had been told of the problem) can save the mathematics only on pain of making the whole study irrelevant to the physics. I shall explain the dilemma in this note. In a later paper [5], van Fraassen avoids this dilemma by developing an abstract modal interpretation which does not rely on any expression for quantum states.
There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory. Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, orobservables(position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know thestateof the system.
Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics admit two kinds of state: physical states, which specify the values of observables on a system, and theoretical states, which specify a probability distribution over possible physical states. They appear to use this distinction to deny the projection postulate, claiming that collapse corresponds only to a change from discussing the theoretical state to discussing the physical state. I argue that modal interpretations should adopt a projection postulate at the level of the theoretical state. However, other features of modal interpretations might render the projection postulate immune from the usual objections.