Among the very architects of the recent reemergence of emergentism in the physical sciences, Robert B. Laughlin certainly occupies a prominent place. Through a series of works beginning as early as his Nobel lecture in 1998, he relentlessly advocated a strongly anti-reductionist view of physics. In spite of this, rare are the philosophers who have paid serious attention to Laughlin’s insights, even among those sympathetic to the idea of emergence. The starting point of this chapter is a willingness to remedy this situation by taking seriously Laughlin’s emergentism. More specifically, reflecting on Laughlin’s idea, according to which “one of the things an emergent phenomenon can do is create new particles,” the authors propose an exploration of the way in which emergence can shed light on the ontological status of some quantum entities—more particularly, so-called quasiparticles—that would come into being on the occasion of certain physical transformations.
Among the very architects of the recent reemergence of emergentism in the physical sciences, Robert B. Laughlin certainly occupies a prominent place. Through a series of works beginning as early as his Nobel lecture in 1998, he relentlessly advocated a strongly anti-reductionist view of physics. In spite of this, rare are the philosophers who have paid serious attention to Laughlin’s insights, even among those sympathetic to the idea of emergence. The starting point of this chapter is a willingness to remedy this situation by taking seriously Laughlin’s emergentism. More specifically, reflecting on Laughlin’s idea, according to which “one of the things an emergent phenomenon can do is create new particles,” the authors propose an exploration of the way in which emergence can shed light on the ontological status of some quantum entities—more particularly, so-called quasiparticles—that would come into being on the occasion of certain physical transformations.
According to classical physics, particles are basic constituents of the physical world. Quantum theory is much less friendly to particles; in particular, relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) creates serious obstacles for the idea that particles are fundamental. Apparently, when moving from the domain of RQFT to that of classical mechanics (CM), particles have to emerge at some stage. It is standard to assume that this emergence has been completed at the level of quantum mechanics, halfway between RQFT and CM, even though particles of the same kind in many-particle quantum mechanics have the curious feature of being ‘entities without identity’. Against this ‘Received View’ about the nature of quantum particles we outline and defend an Alternative View (AV), in which the emergent character of particles is emphasized. According to this AV, the step to a particle theory has not yet been made in quantum mechanics: conditions have still to be satisfied in order to make the particle concept applicable. If these conditions are met, the quantum particles that emerge are distinguishable individuals possessing physically defined identities, in stark contrast to what the Received View asserts. We will compare and contrast the two Views, both from a physical and a logical/conceptual point of view. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.
The philosophy of science in general, and the philosophy of physics in particular, have increasingly focused on cases of reduction and emergence in recent decades. While the paradigmatic examples arise in the context of thermodynamics and classical statistical mechanics, relevant cases have also emerged in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, such as that of quasiparticles. Traditionally, these entities have been regarded as mere mathematical tools that do not contribute to the construction of quantum ontology. However, this position has recently been challenged, and frameworks have been proposed in which some of these objects acquire a significant ontological status. In particular, phonons have been considered a case of emergence that may have either an epistemic or an ontological character. In this paper, we further enrich the discussion by emphasizing that quantum mechanics only refers to entities in the real world through the adoption of a specific interpretation. A century after the development of quantum theory, there is still no consensus on how to interpret it, and multiple competing interpretations are currently proposed. Consequently, the outcome may vary depending on the interpretation adopted. Based on this, we will show that the choice of interpretation not only influences the conceptual understanding of quantum mechanics but also determines the identification of its fundamental entities. Specifically, we will argue that, under the Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation, phonons acquire a fundamental status, challenging the standard reading of their emergence and their relationship to quantum ontology.
THE GREAT CHAIN OF QUANTUM BEING: WHAT THE PHYSICISTS ARE TELLING US / Louis Gallo listen: there's a hell of a good universe next door; let's go —cummings Max Planck's announcement in 1900 that energy flows in discrete bundles rather than uniformly, as energy "should," did not instantly destroy the foundations of a classical world view that had prevailed since Newton's day. It took physicists nearly a quarter of a century to grasp the full significance of quantum theory. But 1900 is too convenient a date to ignore, and without distorting the history of ideas unduly we can refer to it as the point in time when science launched its relentless assault upon reason and common sense, an assault that continues to this day. This is nothing new, of course. Everyone knows how weird quantum theory is, how it toppled the Newtonian clockwork and so on. The purpose of this essay is to explain in ordinary language, if such a thing can be done, why physicists are saying some of the outrageous things we read about in the popular media. Because new particles, along with new theories to account for them, are being created at such a prodigious rate today, it has become extraordinarily difficult for non-scientists to keep up with the latest breakthroughs. The deluge of popular books on black holes and particle physics, outmoded before they go to press, reflects this information gap. I can hardly expect to beat the popularizers at their own game, but my intention is nevertheless to present a non-technical overview of the great chain of quantum being according to current theory. It can be suggested by way of preliminary assessment that the Theater of the Absurd did not die at some point in the early 1970s; its greatest production is and may always have been our meditations on the cosmos itself. We begin, however, with some thoughts on common sense rather than absurdity. Physicists have traditionally linked common sense with the twin doctrines of causality and determinism. Given thorough enough information about prior conditions, causality guarantees the predictability of all events and states ofbeing. French mathematician Pierre Laplace actually believed that such knowledge could be used to chart the entire history of the universe. Causality, then, is a way of thinking about individual events; determinism, a way of thinking about events 264 · The Missouri Review cumulatively. Both doctrines presume the existence of an objective, quantifiable external world populated by observers (ourselves). One cannot overemphasize the importance of the term "objective." It haunts modern physics at every turn. Indeed, the crucial difference between classical and quantum physics lies in their respective acceptance or rejection of objective reality. The early giants of quantum physics had a hard time accepting the implications of their own mathematics. Max Planck and Einstein—who is not, strictly speaking, a quantum physicist but who contributed much to the theory—refused to accept them. Yet the fate of objectivity may be traced by moving from Planck's position on the subject to that of Erwin Schrödinger, whose work culminated in the late 1920s. This chronology roughly reflects the order in which quantum theory emerged. Here is what Planck had to say in his book The New Science: "A science that starts off by predicating the denial of objectivity has already passed sentence on itself"; and "the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality." Einstein spent most of his life searching for that "exact expression" and failed. Werner Heisenberg offered a similar but highly qualified version of Planck's statement. In Across the Frontiers Heisenberg says that quantum measurements do in fact measure objective states but also intrude upon those states. "It is," he writes, "no longer the objective states but rather the probabilities for the occurrence of certain events that can be stated in mathematical formulae." Schrödinger, in Mind and Matter, comes right out with it: "Mind has erected the objective outside world of the natural philosophers out of its own stuff." He means this literally, and the equations he contributed to quantum theory imply as much. Bohr...
There are deep similarities between Whitehead's idea of the process by which nature unfolds and the ideas of quantum theory. Whitehead says that the world is made of ''actual occasions'', each of which arises from potentialities created by prior actual occasions. These actual occasions are happenings modeled on experiential events, each of which comes into being and then perishes, only to be replaced by a successor. It is these experience-like happenings that are the basic realities of nature, according to Whitehead, not the persisting physical particles that Newtonian physics took be the basic entities. Similarly, Heisenberg says that what is really happening in a quantum process is the emergence of an actual from potentialities created by prior actualities. In the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory the actual things to which the theory refer are increments in ''our knowledge''. These increments are experiential events. The particles of classical physics lose their fundamental status: they dissolve into diffuse clouds of possibilities. At each stage of the unfolding of nature the complete cloud of possibilities acts like the potentiality for the occurrence of a next increment in knowledge, whose occurrence can radically change the cloud of possibilities/potentialities for the still-later increments in knowledge. The fundamental difference between these ideas about nature and the classical ideas that reigned from the time of Newton until this century concerns the status of the experiential aspects of nature. These are things such as thoughts, ideas, feelings, and sensations. They are distinguished from the physical aspects of nature, which are described in terms of quantities explicitly located in tiny regions of space and time. According to the ideas of classical physics the physical world is made up exclusively of things of this latter type, and the unfolding of the physical world is determined by causal connections involving only these things. Thus experiential-type things could be considered to influence the flow of physical events only insofar as they themselves were completely determined by physical things. In other words, experiential-type qualities. insofar as they could affect the flow of physical events, could--within the framework of classical physics--not be free: they must be completely determined by the physical aspects of nature that are, by themselves,sufficient to determine the flow of physical events.
Metaphysical models by which we understand the fundamental make-up of our universe are all the more plausible when informed by empirically confirmed scientific theory. I have argued that contemporary physics tells us that there are no elementary particles , in any metaphysically serious sense of the word “particle”. Quantum phenomena are not concrete particular entities. The replacement of quantum mechanics by quantum field theory has major consequences for our metaphysics, in that it calls into question the tradition of according categorial priority to particular entities. Instead, categorial priority should be accorded to generic processes. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.