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International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Effective Agent Quantum Private Data Query against Malicious Joint Attack with Blind Quantum Computing

Yuguang Xu, Liwei Wang, Chaonan Wang, Hongfeng Zhu

Published Apr 1, 2022• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10773-022-05104-y

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As a kind of practical protocol, quantum-key-distribution (QKD)-based quantum private queries (QPQs) have drawn lots of attention. However, joint-measurement (JM) attack poses a noticeable threat to the database security in such protocols. That is, by JM attack a malicious user can illegally elicit many more items from the database than the average amount an honest one can obtain. Taking Jacobi et al.'s protocol as an example, by JM attack a malicious user can obtain as many as 500 bits, instead of the expected 2.44 bits, from a ${10}^{4}$-bit database in one query. It is a noticeable security flaw in theory, and would also arise in application with the development of quantum memories. To solve this problem, we propose a QPQ protocol based on a two-way QKD scheme, which behaves much better in resisting JM attack. Concretely, the user Alice cannot get more database items by conducting JM attack on the qubits because she has to send them back to Bob (the database holder) before knowing which of them should be jointly measured. Furthermore, JM attack by both Alice and Bob would be detected with certain probability, which is quite different from previous protocols. Moreover, our protocol retains the good characters of QKD-based QPQs, e.g., it is loss tolerant and robust against quantum memory attack.

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Universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) is a new secure quantum computing protocol which allows a user Alice who does not have any sophisticated quantum technology to delegate her computing to a server Bob without leaking any privacy. Using the features of UBQC, we propose a protocol to achieve symmetrically private information retrieval, which allows a quantum limited Alice to query an item from Bob with a fully fledged quantum computer; meanwhile, the privacy of both parties is preserved. The security of our protocol is based on the assumption that malicious Alice has no quantum computer, which avoids the impossibility proof of Lo. For the honest Alice, she is almost classical and only requires minimal quantum resources to carry out the proposed protocol. Therefore, she does not need any expensive laboratory which can maintain the coherence of complicated quantum experimental setups.

Physical Review A•May 4, 2015•21 citations
As a kind of practical protocol, quantum-key-distribution (QKD)-based quantum private queries (QPQs) have drawn lots of attention. However, joint-measurement (JM) attack poses a noticeable threat to the database security in such protocols. That is, by JM attack a malicious user can illegally elicit many more items from the database than the average amount an honest one can obtain. Taking Jacobi et al.'s protocol as an example, by JM attack a malicious user can obtain as many as 500 bits, instead of the expected 2.44 bits, from a 104{10}^{4}104-bit database in one query. It is a noticeable security flaw in theory, and would also arise in application with the development of quantum memories. To solve this problem, we propose a QPQ protocol based on a two-way QKD scheme, which behaves much better in resisting JM attack. Concretely, the user Alice cannot get more database items by conducting JM attack on the qubits because she has to send them back to Bob (the database holder) before knowing which of them should be jointly measured. Furthermore, JM attack by both Alice and Bob would be detected with certain probability, which is quite different from previous protocols. Moreover, our protocol retains the good characters of QKD-based QPQs, e.g., it is loss tolerant and robust against quantum memory attack.
Universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) is a new secure quantum computing protocol which allows a user Alice who does not have any sophisticated quantum technology to delegate her computing to a server Bob without leaking any privacy. Using the features of UBQC, we propose a protocol to achieve symmetrically private information retrieval, which allows a quantum limited Alice to query an item from Bob with a fully fledged quantum computer; meanwhile, the privacy of both parties is preserved. The security of our protocol is based on the assumption that malicious Alice has no quantum computer, which avoids the impossibility proof of Lo. For the honest Alice, she is almost classical and only requires minimal quantum resources to carry out the proposed protocol. Therefore, she does not need any expensive laboratory which can maintain the coherence of complicated quantum experimental setups.