Scientific theories and methods developed within the framework of quantum and relativistic physics are the most representative paradigmatic instantiations of non-classical science. The profile of non-classical science is exposed through the analysis of a set of epistemic ideals and methodological principles. The adoption of the principle of operational relativity of phenomenal descriptions showed that a reference to the means of observation had become an intrinsic part of scientific description strategies. The transformation of the concept of objectivity can be seen in a specific combination of operationalism with interactional phenomenalism and constructivism. The introduction of the principle of complementarity marked the deviation from the standards of a monologic and linear description of the objects under study. This principle provides the operational basis for the integration of different parts of our knowledge with regard to non-trivial cognitive situations featured by the indeterminacy relations. Another prominent methodological trend is the reconsideration of the value of strict deterministic explanation strategies in favour of probabilistically oriented approaches. Scientists have encountered a new class of regularities that are typically analysed in terms of various types of statistical and non-causal determination. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that any probabilistic account of natural phenomena implies indeterminism.
Scientific theories and methods developed within the framework of quantum and relativistic physics are the most representative paradigmatic instantiations of non-classical science. The profile of non-classical science is exposed through the analysis of a set of epistemic ideals and methodological principles. The adoption of the principle of operational relativity of phenomenal descriptions showed that a reference to the means of observation had become an intrinsic part of scientific description strategies. The transformation of the concept of objectivity can be seen in a specific combination of operationalism with interactional phenomenalism and constructivism. The introduction of the principle of complementarity marked the deviation from the standards of a monologic and linear description of the objects under study. This principle provides the operational basis for the integration of different parts of our knowledge with regard to non-trivial cognitive situations featured by the indeterminacy relations. Another prominent methodological trend is the reconsideration of the value of strict deterministic explanation strategies in favour of probabilistically oriented approaches. Scientists have encountered a new class of regularities that are typically analysed in terms of various types of statistical and non-causal determination. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that any probabilistic account of natural phenomena implies indeterminism.
A short exposition is given of the foundation of the causal description in classical physics and the failure of the principle of causality in coping with atomic phenomena. It is emphasized that the individuality of the quantum processes excludes a separation between a behaviour of the atomic objects and their interaction with the measuring instruments denning the conditions under which the phenomena appear. This circumstance forces us to recognize a novel relationship, conveniently termed complementarity, between empirical evidence obtained under different experimental conditions. An appropriate tool for a complementary mode of description is provided by the quantum-mechanical formalism which allows us to account for regularities of definite or statistical character beyond the grasp of classical physical explanation. – N. B.
The aim of the article is to analyze the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics and the relationship of various interpretations of quantum mechanics with the question of truth in scientific knowledge. The theoretical material (various interpretations of quantum mechanics) was analyzed. The research methods were analysis, comparative-historical and institutional approaches. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that physicists are only able to predict the probabilities of physical phenomena or processes, without any knowledge of the structure of entity in itself. The study helps to complement the theoretical picture of the ontology of quantum mechanics and to get an idea about the development prospects of the methodology of physical sciences. We should not ascribe properties that are unobservable in experience to the entity because science can truly interpret only the representation of entity in itself in experience and the ways of dealing with it, not future events or possible states of the entity. Otherwise, science “slides” down to the level of dialectical (rhetorical) exercises based not on true premises, but on generally accepted or “authoritative” biases, which gives room to extreme forms of relativism and takes natural scientists away from studying nature to inventing empirically unsupported hypotheses. When, in accordance with the Cartesian ontology, the scientist assumes that the entity is as the “subject” observes it (that is, the “reflection” of the entity in consciousness is identified with entity in itself), this assumption leads the scientist to attempts to “scientifically” describe the future events or the possible states of the entity. The criterion for the truth of a scientific theory put forward by Einstein in his dispute with Bohr remains a fundamentally unattainable ideal. Cognition of nature is probabilistically and fundamentally incomplete since a person can consciously comprehend natural phenomena only within the framework of their representation in the existing being. The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is due to the impossibility of knowing things as they exist by themselves, that is, as they exist outside of representation in the mind of the observer. This does not mean that physical entities did not exist before their knowledge: they existed potentially, but were not valid for the observer, that is, conscious. Quantum physics is as incomplete as any other physical theory when compared with an unattainable ideal, but this fact does not negate its truth for modern scientists since quantum theory is based on the results of verified experiments.
Measurement is an important scientific activity. In most of science, including classical physics, is may be understood as a way of finding out about the physical world and representing the results numerically. No-go theorems show that measurement of quantum observables is not like that: the recorded outcome is typically created rather than revealed in a quantum measurement, in which case there is no objective fact about the observable's prior value. Other no-go theorems show that unitary quantum theory can generally neither explain nor even represent a unique recorded outcome, thereby threatening that outcome's objectivity. Methodological norms inherent in quantum physical practice nevertheless institute the objectivity, not only of unique recorded outcomes of quantum measurements, but also of non-quantum features of the world that physicists and other scientists take their models to represent.
Heelan argues that the philosophy of complementarity, although successful in providing physicists with a common language with which to describe quantum phenomena, also contains a theory about scientific method and about human knowing which is open to criticism. Heelan here criticises the following points arising out of the philosophy of complementarity: psycho-physical parallelism; the view that quantum mechanical properties are to be defined classically; and the perturbation theory of measurement. In the course of the criticism, he elaborates the distinction between two types of concepts with different logical structures; viz., operational or observational concepts which state a similarity between things judged on the basis of appearance or utility to us, and explanatory concepts which state a similarity between things judged on the basis of a self-defining set of different relations between things. Heelan thus shows how a physical concept is definable by any appropriate measuring-process. The description of the measuringprocess and, hence, the definition of the physical property involve the two classes of concepts described above, but in different ways. Thus one may regard the Indeterminacy Relations, not as stating limitations of our knowledge, but as describing more exactly the behaviour of individual systems.
From the preceding exposition it follows that the quantum statistical representation of an individual atomic system does not imply any renunciation regarding further knowledge about the system. On the contrary the statistical character of quantum physics directly reflects the fundamental non-causal appearance of quantal recordings, and through the discovery of the complementarity of quantal phenomena a complete but necessarily statistical description of the atom has been accomplished. Furthermore quantum physics has afforded a statistical description of macroscopic bodies through their representation as assemblies of huge numbers of identical atomic systems, and, apart from accounting in a more fundamental way for the properties already described in classical physics(the correspondence principle, p. 36), quantum statistics explains several macroscopic phenomena which cannot be understood within the conceptual frame of classical physics only. It must be maintained, however, that when observing the properties of individual atomic objects the macroscopic observational apparatus cannot be represented in terms of atomic constituents because this would destroy the unambiguity of the description. The observational apparatus fulfils its basic function of being the spacetime frame of reference for the quantal recordings precisely through its description in classical physics alone. However, when refraining from the analysis of individual quantal processes it is possible to apply quantum statistics to macroscopic phenomena, that is, the causality of classical physical phenomena can be interpreted in the quantum formalism as the statistical result of the interplay of enormous numbers of atomic processes. It is possible, then, to talk of statistical causality as a fundamental aspect of physical reality.
Traditionally, to be a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms about what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of an ontology that is scientifically informed. But according to some philosophers, the realistic attitude must go beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics.