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철학

Zhang Hwe-Ik’s Lectures on Natural Philosophy

Daihyun Chung

Published Feb 28, 2022• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Now it’s the time to hear lots of talks about crisis of philosophy and disappearance of humanities. One can assume that the trend of such dialogues is related to a culture that conviction on the modernistic absolute truth is waning and belief’s on postmodernistic pluralism gets strong. How could postmodoernism gain such a strong momentum? I could offer a hypothesis for the question, that is, that philosophy of quantum mechanics played an important role. In my mind, Zhang Hwe-Ik’s book explains how postmodernistic quantum philosophy can replace Newton’s modernistic mechanics and it tries to offer a philosophical paradigm by his own Seoul interpretation on the quantum mechanics, paradigm which is comparable to the role of Kant’s philosophy toward Newton’s classic mechanics. Zhang seems to be successful to lead to be able to get a holistic world view and yet to have tasks to struggle with, one of which is how to offer a grammar of understanding of quantum mechanics without employing Newton-Kant’s notions like individual, identity, causality. Philosophy (CHEOLHAK, Korean Philosophical Association), 150(2022.02): PP. 333-343.

DOI
10.18694/kjp.2022.2.150.333

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There are many important questions that do not fall neatly into any one discipline; rather, their full investigation requires the integration of two or more distinct fields. This book is about just such a question – one that arises at the intersection of physics, philosophy, and history. The question can be simply stated as “What is the relation between classical and quantum mechanics?” The simplicity of the question, however, belies the complexity of the answer. Classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are two of the most successful scientific theories ever developed, and yet how these two very different theories can successfully describe one and the same world – the world we live in – is far from clear. One theory is deterministic, the other indeterministic; one theory describes a world in which chaotic behavior is pervasive, and the other a world in which it is almost entirely absent. Did quantum mechanics simply replace classical mechanics as the new universal theory? Do they each describe their own distinct domains of phenomena? Or is one theory really just a continuation of the other? In the philosophy literature, this sort of issue is known as the problem of intertheoretic relations. Currently, there are two accepted philosophical frameworks for thinking about intertheoric relations: the first is reductionism, and the second, pluralism. As we shall see, these labels each actually describe a family of related views.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Oct 2, 2008•0 citations

Problems of Quantum Mechanics (UET7B)

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This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}

•May 1, 2017•0 citations

More on the quantum measurement problem

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Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•2 citations

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Journal of Korean Sundo Culture•Aug 30, 2023•0 citations
Now it’s the time to hear lots of talks about crisis of philosophy and disappearance of humanities. One can assume that the trend of such dialogues is related to a culture that conviction on the modernistic absolute truth is waning and belief’s on postmodernistic pluralism gets strong. How could postmodoernism gain such a strong momentum? I could offer a hypothesis for the question, that is, that philosophy of quantum mechanics played an important role. In my mind, Zhang Hwe-Ik’s book explains how postmodernistic quantum philosophy can replace Newton’s modernistic mechanics and it tries to offer a philosophical paradigm by his own Seoul interpretation on the quantum mechanics, paradigm which is comparable to the role of Kant’s philosophy toward Newton’s classic mechanics. Zhang seems to be successful to lead to be able to get a holistic world view and yet to have tasks to struggle with, one of which is how to offer a grammar of understanding of quantum mechanics without employing Newton-Kant’s notions like individual, identity, causality. Philosophy (CHEOLHAK, Korean Philosophical Association), 150(2022.02): PP. 333-343.
There are many important questions that do not fall neatly into any one discipline; rather, their full investigation requires the integration of two or more distinct fields. This book is about just such a question – one that arises at the intersection of physics, philosophy, and history. The question can be simply stated as “What is the relation between classical and quantum mechanics?” The simplicity of the question, however, belies the complexity of the answer. Classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are two of the most successful scientific theories ever developed, and yet how these two very different theories can successfully describe one and the same world – the world we live in – is far from clear. One theory is deterministic, the other indeterministic; one theory describes a world in which chaotic behavior is pervasive, and the other a world in which it is almost entirely absent. Did quantum mechanics simply replace classical mechanics as the new universal theory? Do they each describe their own distinct domains of phenomena? Or is one theory really just a continuation of the other? In the philosophy literature, this sort of issue is known as the problem of intertheoretic relations. Currently, there are two accepted philosophical frameworks for thinking about intertheoric relations: the first is reductionism, and the second, pluralism. As we shall see, these labels each actually describe a family of related views.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
In this magisterial work, Roland Omnès takes us from the academies of ancient Greece to the laboratories of modern science as he seeks to do no less than rebuild the foundations of the philosophy of knowledge. One of the world's leading quantum physicists, Omnès reviews the history and recent development of mathematics, logic, and the physical sciences to show that current work in quantum theory offers new answers to questions that have puzzled philosophers for centuries: Is the world ultimately intelligible? Are all events caused? Do objects have definitive locations? Omnès addresses these profound questions with vigorous arguments and clear, colorful writing, aiming not just to advance scholarship but to enlighten readers with no background in science or philosophy. The book opens with an insightful and sweeping account of the main developments in science and the philosophy of knowledge from the pre-Socratic era to the nineteenth century. Omnès then traces the emergence in modern thought of a fracture between our intuitive, commonsense views of the world and the abstract and--for most people--incomprehensible world portrayed by advanced physics, math, and logic. He argues that the fracture appeared because the insights of Einstein and Bohr, the logical advances of Frege, Russell, and Gödel, and the necessary mathematics of infinity of Cantor and Hilbert cannot be fully expressed by words or images only. Quantum mechanics played an important role in this development, as it seemed to undermine intuitive notions of intelligibility, locality, and causality. However, Omnès argues that common sense and quantum mechanics are not as incompatible as many have thought. In fact, he makes the provocative argument that the "consistent-histories" approach to quantum mechanics, developed over the past fifteen years, places common sense (slightly reappraised and circumscribed) on a firm scientific and philosophical footing for the first time. In doing so, it provides what philosophers have sought through the ages: a sure foundation for human knowledge. Quantum Philosophy is a profound work of contemporary science and philosophy and an eloquent history of the long struggle to understand the nature of the world and of knowledge itself.
지금 물리학은 새롭게 형이상학과 동양의 철학으로 그 눈을 돌리고 있다. 우주의 등방성과 상호 싸안음의 세계를 단테의 신곡에서 구하거나, 오늘 양자론(量子論)의 기원을 데모크리토스의 원자론에서 찾는 것이다. 보이지 않는 근원, 이에 관하여 과거와 현재, 동양과 서양 그리고 과학과 철학의 만남을 통해 과연 또 다른 이해는 가능할 것인가.‘meta-physics’란 물리학 아니 물질 너머의 본질에 관해 묻는다. 그리고 지금 양자(量子)라는 새로운 차원과 상태에 대한 이해는 현대물리학의 핵심적인 과제로 등장하고 있다. 하지만 ‘양자란 무엇인가?’라는 질문에, 그 누구도 이를 안다고 말하지 못하는 상황이다. 그런데도 현대문명의 90% 이상은 양자역학에 의존한다. 하지만 양자론에서 말하는 양자상태는 그 자체로 일반적인 논리와 현실적 합리성을 넘어서 있다. 양자터널에 양자 점프, 얽힘과 중첩의 이중성 및 대칭의 문제 등등, 모든 것이 멀게만 느껴진다. 물리학 내에서도 상당한 논란이 있다. 그것은 양자를 소립자로 보는 그룹과 끈으로 보는 연구진과의 충돌이다. 여기에 정보라는 개념 또한 주된 쟁점으로 떠오르지만, 아직은 그 무엇도 확실하게 알고 있지 못하다. 이럼에도 전통적인 형이상학은 물리학적 양자론에 오히려 그 자리를 내주고 있다. 합리적 상황과 다른 본질의 세계가 있다는 양자 세계관이 자리 잡은 것이다.이에 동양의 세계 이해에 나타난 태극ㆍ음양(太極ㆍ陰陽)의 개념을 말해본다. 대칭(Symmetry)이란 양자물리학의 주제와 많은 유사성을 지니기 때문이다. 더하여 양자(量子)가 지닌 이중성과 불확정성 그리고 얽힌 상태 등은 『역』 「계사(繫辭)」에서 말하는 ‘사(辭)ㆍ변(變)ㆍ상(象)ㆍ점(占)’의 이해와 연결해볼 수도 있다. 따라서 단순히 철학과 물리학의 용어 차이를 넘어, 세계관의 측면에서 상호 검토해볼 필요를 느끼는 것이다. 이는 세계의 본질과 현상을 올바로 이해하기 위해서라도 필요하다고 생각된다. 물질문명의 발전은 앞으로도 물리학의 발전과 공학적 응용에 의존할 것이다. 하지만 인간 삶의 이유와 근원에 대한 이해는 결국 철학의 세계에 기댈 수밖에 없다. 아무쪼록 과학적 발견들이 보편 상식으로 변하여, 많은 사람이 과학과 철학의 만남이 불가능하지 않음을 이해하는 계기가 되기를 바란다.