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Cambridge University Press eBooks

The Theorem of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen

Franck Laloë

Published Feb 1, 2019• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1017/9781108569361.006

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Quantum cryptography without Bell’s theorem

Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard A, N. David Mermin

Ekert has described a cryptographic scheme in which Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs of particles are used to generate identical random numbers in remote places, while Bell's theorem certifies that the particles have not been measured in transit by an eavesdropper. We describe a related but simpler EPR scheme and, without invoking Bell's theorem, prove it secure against more general attacks, including substitution of a fake EPR source. Finally we show our scheme is equivalent to the original 1984 key distribution scheme of Bennett and Brassard, which uses single particles instead of EPR pairs.

Physical Review Letters•Feb 3, 1992•2,467 citations
Ekert has described a cryptographic scheme in which Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs of particles are used to generate identical random numbers in remote places, while Bell's theorem certifies that the particles have not been measured in transit by an eavesdropper. We describe a related but simpler EPR scheme and, without invoking Bell's theorem, prove it secure against more general attacks, including substitution of a fake EPR source. Finally we show our scheme is equivalent to the original 1984 key distribution scheme of Bennett and Brassard, which uses single particles instead of EPR pairs.