Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE Wireless Communications Letters

Hardware-Impaired PHY Secret Key Generation With Man-in-the-Middle Adversaries

Mehdi Letafati, Hamid Behroozi, Babak Hossein Khalaj, Eduard Axel Jorswieck

Published Jan 31, 2022• 30 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this letter, we examine the PHY layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) scheme in the presence of man-in-the-middle (MiM) adversary, while legitimate parties suffer fromhardware impairments(HIs). Different from previous works on PHY-SKG that consider adversaries who simply try to make an interference in the communication link, the MiM aims to deceive legitimate entities about the source of common randomness. To conquer the MiM attack, legitimate parties utilize randomized pilots (RPs) in our proposed scheme. We analyze the effect of HIs on the performance of system by deriving the achievable secret key rate (SKR). Our results highlight a fundamental limit, as a ceiling phenomena, on the SKR when having practical imperfections. Top-level guidelines for selecting impairment levels along the transceiver chains is also provided to maximize the performance of the PHY-SKG protocol. Our numerical results verify the analytic expressions derived, while providing insights on system design. We show that by properly considering the HIs, about 25% improvement in the SKR is achievable.

DOI
10.1109/lwc.2022.3147952

Related papers

Deep Learning for Hardware-Impaired Wireless Secret Key Generation with Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Mehdi Letafati, Hamid Behroozi, Babak Hossein Khalaj +1 more

Wireless secret key generation (WSKG) allows efficient key agreement protocols for securing the sixth generation (6G) wireless networks. Nevertheless, due to external adversaries or internal impairments, WSKG schemes might become vulner-able during the randomness distillation, where the legitimate nodes try to observe their source of common randomness. In this paper, we investigate the WSKG scheme with legitimate parties suffering from hardware impairments (HIs), while an active adversary acts as a man-in-the-middle (MiM) via injecting fake pilot signals. We first utilize randomized pilots to overcome the MiM. We also leverage the concept of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) to further enhance the randomness distillation. More specifically, the long short-term memory networks (LSTMs)-as a well-established type of RNNs-are implemented to learn the long-term dependencies between the observations of legitimate parties. The achievable secret key rate (SKR) and the impact of MiM on system's performance are analyzed. Our numerical results verify the performance gain of our proposed learning-based approach compared with the state-of-the-art methods and provide useful insights on system design. We show that our RNN-based approach achieves 30% and 15% improvement in terms of observation mismatches compared with the naïve scheme and the fully-connected benchmarks, respectively.

Globecom•Dec 1, 2021•29 citations

Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks

Miroslav Mitev, Arsenia Chorti, E. Veronica Belmega +1 more

Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial "advantage distillation" phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers.

Entropy•Jul 27, 2021•24 citations

Man-in-the-Middle and Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Secret Key Generation

Miroslav Mitev, Arsenia Chorti, E. Veronica Belmega +1 more

Wireless secret key generation (W-SKG) from shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading realizations), is a well established scheme that can be used for session key agreement. W-SKG approaches can be of particular interest in delay constrained wireless networks and notably in the context of ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) in beyond fifth generation (B5G) systems. However W- SKG schemes are known to be malleable over the so called "advantage distillation" phase, during which observations of the shared randomness are obtained at the legitimate parties. As an example, an active attacker can act as a man-in- the-middle (MiM) by injecting pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the form of jamming. This paper investigates the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks in W-SKG. First, it is demonstrated that injection attacks can be reduced to - potentially less harmful - jamming attacks by pilot randomization; a novel system design with randomized QPSK pilots is presented. Subsequently, the optimal jamming strategy is identified in a block fading additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channel in the presence of a reactive jammer, using a game theoretic formulation. It is shown that the impact of a reactive jammer is far more severe than that of a simple proactive jammer.

arXiv:2003.12034•Globecom•Dec 1, 2019•25 citations

Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface-Assisted PHY Key Generation: A Tradeoff Analysis

Huici Wu, Yi Fang, Zhiqing Wei +2 more

Reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) has been widely studied as a promising approach in improving secret key rate (SKR) for physical layer (PHY) secret key generation (SKG). Existing RIS-assisted PHY SKG studies mainly focus on improving the SKR by optimizing RIS phase. However, RIS can also be exploited by active attackers to contaminate the channel probing. As a result, there is a trade-off between the increased randomness and the improved correlation between legitimate channels and eavesdropping channels in a RIS-assisted SKG system under channel contamination. In this paper, we study the impact of RIS on PHY SKG by analyzing the SKR performance. A closed-form expression for the lower-bound of secret key capacity is obtained. Theoretical analysis shows that gains of legitimate channel, eavesdropping channel, and RIS-induced channels are key parameters in determining whether the assisting RIS is beneficial or harmful to the PHY SKG. Further, a SKR maximization problem under channel contamination is proposed and solved. Results show that the assisting RIS is definitely harmful to the SKG when the gain ratio of legitimate channel and eavesdropping channel is reduced with the leverage of RIS, while it can significantly improve the SKR with an optimized RIS phase when the gain ratio is improved with the help of RIS.

IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology•Dec 26, 2024•2 citations

MIMO-Based Secret Key Generation Strategies

Kan Chen, Balasubramaniam Natarajan

Over the last decade, physical layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) techniques that exploit reciprocity of wireless channels have attracted considerable interest among researchers in the field of wireless communication. Compared to traditional cryptographic methods, PHY-SKG techniques offer the following advantages: a computationally bounded adversary does not need to be assumed; PHY-SKG avoids the requirement of key management, and secret keys can be dynamically replenished. Additionally, PHY-SKG can enhance existing security schemes because it operates independently of higher layer security schemes. However, a key drawback of PHY-SKG is low secret key generation rate (SKGR), a critical performance metric. Therefore, the role of advanced network technologies (e.g., multiple input multiple output (MIMO) and cooperative MIMO) must be explored to enhance SKGR. This paper describes how MIMO and cooperative MIMO techniques can enhance SKGR.

International Journal of Mobile Computing and Multimedia Communications•Jul 1, 2014•7 citations

Is Adversarial RIS Harmful to Physical Layer Secret Key Generation

Yi Fang, Huici Wu, Zhiqing Wei +1 more

Reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) is acknowledged as a promising technique in improving physical layer (PHY) secret key generation (SKG) performance by enhancing the randomness of radio electromagnetic environment. However, RIS can also be adopted by illegal eavesdropper to destroy the channel reciprocity between key-sharing parties. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the enhanced randomness and the decreased channel reciprocity with the application of RIS. This paper aims to answer the question that whether the adversarial RIS is harmful to SKG by studying the SKG performance in the RIS scenario where Alice and Eve each applies a RIS. To this end, the closed-form expression for the upper bound of secret key rate (SKR) and expressions for the autocorrelation coefficients of two probing channel samples within a coherent duration are provided. Results show that the relative positions of Eve and adversarial RIS to Alice and Bob play a key role in determining whether the adversarial RIS is harmful or beneficial to the PHY SKG system.

Globecom•Dec 4, 2023•2 citations
In this letter, we examine the PHY layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) scheme in the presence of man-in-the-middle (MiM) adversary, while legitimate parties suffer fromhardware impairments(HIs). Different from previous works on PHY-SKG that consider adversaries who simply try to make an interference in the communication link, the MiM aims to deceive legitimate entities about the source of common randomness. To conquer the MiM attack, legitimate parties utilize randomized pilots (RPs) in our proposed scheme. We analyze the effect of HIs on the performance of system by deriving the achievable secret key rate (SKR). Our results highlight a fundamental limit, as a ceiling phenomena, on the SKR when having practical imperfections. Top-level guidelines for selecting impairment levels along the transceiver chains is also provided to maximize the performance of the PHY-SKG protocol. Our numerical results verify the analytic expressions derived, while providing insights on system design. We show that by properly considering the HIs, about 25% improvement in the SKR is achievable.
Wireless secret key generation (WSKG) allows efficient key agreement protocols for securing the sixth generation (6G) wireless networks. Nevertheless, due to external adversaries or internal impairments, WSKG schemes might become vulner-able during the randomness distillation, where the legitimate nodes try to observe their source of common randomness. In this paper, we investigate the WSKG scheme with legitimate parties suffering from hardware impairments (HIs), while an active adversary acts as a man-in-the-middle (MiM) via injecting fake pilot signals. We first utilize randomized pilots to overcome the MiM. We also leverage the concept of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) to further enhance the randomness distillation. More specifically, the long short-term memory networks (LSTMs)-as a well-established type of RNNs-are implemented to learn the long-term dependencies between the observations of legitimate parties. The achievable secret key rate (SKR) and the impact of MiM on system's performance are analyzed. Our numerical results verify the performance gain of our proposed learning-based approach compared with the state-of-the-art methods and provide useful insights on system design. We show that our RNN-based approach achieves 30% and 15% improvement in terms of observation mismatches compared with the naïve scheme and the fully-connected benchmarks, respectively.
Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial "advantage distillation" phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers.
Wireless secret key generation (W-SKG) from shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading realizations), is a well established scheme that can be used for session key agreement. W-SKG approaches can be of particular interest in delay constrained wireless networks and notably in the context of ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) in beyond fifth generation (B5G) systems. However W- SKG schemes are known to be malleable over the so called "advantage distillation" phase, during which observations of the shared randomness are obtained at the legitimate parties. As an example, an active attacker can act as a man-in- the-middle (MiM) by injecting pilot signals and/or can mount denial of service attacks (DoS) in the form of jamming. This paper investigates the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks in W-SKG. First, it is demonstrated that injection attacks can be reduced to - potentially less harmful - jamming attacks by pilot randomization; a novel system design with randomized QPSK pilots is presented. Subsequently, the optimal jamming strategy is identified in a block fading additive white Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channel in the presence of a reactive jammer, using a game theoretic formulation. It is shown that the impact of a reactive jammer is far more severe than that of a simple proactive jammer.
Reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) has been widely studied as a promising approach in improving secret key rate (SKR) for physical layer (PHY) secret key generation (SKG). Existing RIS-assisted PHY SKG studies mainly focus on improving the SKR by optimizing RIS phase. However, RIS can also be exploited by active attackers to contaminate the channel probing. As a result, there is a trade-off between the increased randomness and the improved correlation between legitimate channels and eavesdropping channels in a RIS-assisted SKG system under channel contamination. In this paper, we study the impact of RIS on PHY SKG by analyzing the SKR performance. A closed-form expression for the lower-bound of secret key capacity is obtained. Theoretical analysis shows that gains of legitimate channel, eavesdropping channel, and RIS-induced channels are key parameters in determining whether the assisting RIS is beneficial or harmful to the PHY SKG. Further, a SKR maximization problem under channel contamination is proposed and solved. Results show that the assisting RIS is definitely harmful to the SKG when the gain ratio of legitimate channel and eavesdropping channel is reduced with the leverage of RIS, while it can significantly improve the SKR with an optimized RIS phase when the gain ratio is improved with the help of RIS.
Over the last decade, physical layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) techniques that exploit reciprocity of wireless channels have attracted considerable interest among researchers in the field of wireless communication. Compared to traditional cryptographic methods, PHY-SKG techniques offer the following advantages: a computationally bounded adversary does not need to be assumed; PHY-SKG avoids the requirement of key management, and secret keys can be dynamically replenished. Additionally, PHY-SKG can enhance existing security schemes because it operates independently of higher layer security schemes. However, a key drawback of PHY-SKG is low secret key generation rate (SKGR), a critical performance metric. Therefore, the role of advanced network technologies (e.g., multiple input multiple output (MIMO) and cooperative MIMO) must be explored to enhance SKGR. This paper describes how MIMO and cooperative MIMO techniques can enhance SKGR.
Reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) is acknowledged as a promising technique in improving physical layer (PHY) secret key generation (SKG) performance by enhancing the randomness of radio electromagnetic environment. However, RIS can also be adopted by illegal eavesdropper to destroy the channel reciprocity between key-sharing parties. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the enhanced randomness and the decreased channel reciprocity with the application of RIS. This paper aims to answer the question that whether the adversarial RIS is harmful to SKG by studying the SKG performance in the RIS scenario where Alice and Eve each applies a RIS. To this end, the closed-form expression for the upper bound of secret key rate (SKR) and expressions for the autocorrelation coefficients of two probing channel samples within a coherent duration are provided. Results show that the relative positions of Eve and adversarial RIS to Alice and Bob play a key role in determining whether the adversarial RIS is harmful or beneficial to the PHY SKG system.