Shinagawa and Iwata are considered quantum security for the sum of Even-Mansour (SoEM) construction and provided quantum key recovery attacks by Simon's algorithm and Grover's algorithm. Furthermore, quantum key recovery attacks are also presented for natural generalizations of SoEM. For some variants of SoEM, they found that their quantum attacks are not obvious and left it as an open problem to discuss the security of such constructions. This paper focuses on this open problem and presents a positive response. We provide quantum key recovery attacks against such constructions by quantum algorithms. For natural generalizations of SoEM with linear key schedules, we also present similar quantum key recovery attacks by quantum algorithms (Simon's algorithm, Grover's algorithm, and Grover-meet-Simon algorithm).
Shinagawa and Iwata are considered quantum security for the sum of Even-Mansour (SoEM) construction and provided quantum key recovery attacks by Simon's algorithm and Grover's algorithm. Furthermore, quantum key recovery attacks are also presented for natural generalizations of SoEM. For some variants of SoEM, they found that their quantum attacks are not obvious and left it as an open problem to discuss the security of such constructions. This paper focuses on this open problem and presents a positive response. We provide quantum key recovery attacks against such constructions by quantum algorithms. For natural generalizations of SoEM with linear key schedules, we also present similar quantum key recovery attacks by quantum algorithms (Simon's algorithm, Grover's algorithm, and Grover-meet-Simon algorithm).
The Sum of Even-Mansour (SoEM) construction, proposed by Chen et al. at Crypto 2019, has become the basis for designing some symmetric schemes, such as the nonce-based MAC scheme nEHtMp and the nonce-based encryption scheme CENCPP∗. In this paper, we make the first attempt to study the quantum security of SoEM under the Q1 model where the targeted encryption oracle can only respond to classical queries rather than quantum ones. Firstly, we propose a quantum key recovery attack on SoEM21 with a time complexity of O~(2n/3) along with O(2n/3) online classical queries. Compared with the current best classical result which requires O(22n/3) time, our method offers a quadratic time speedup while maintaining the same number of queries. The time complexity of our attack is less than that observed for quantum exhaustive search by a factor of 2n/6 . We further propose classical and quantum key recovery attacks on the generalized SoEMs1 construction (consisting of s≥2 independent public permutations), revealing that the application of quantum algorithms can provide a quadratic acceleration over the pure classical methods. Our results also imply that the quantum security of SoEM21 cannot be strengthened merely by increasing the number of permutations.
With the development of quantum technology, quantum computing has an increasingly significant impact on cryptanalysis. Several quantum algorithms, such as Simon’s algorithm, Grover’s algorithm, the Bernstein–Vazirani algorithm, Shor’s algorithm, and the Grover-meets-Simon algorithm, have been proposed successively. However, almost all cryptanalysis is based on the quantum chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) model. This paper focuses on a powerful cryptanalytic model, quantum related-key attack (qRKA), and proposes a strategy of qRKAs against symmetric ciphers using Simon’s algorithm. We construct a periodic function to efficiently recover the secret key of symmetric ciphers if the attacked symmetric ciphers satisfy Simon’s promise, and present the complexity analysis on specific symmetric ciphers. Then, we apply qRKA to the Even–Mansour cipher and SoEM construction, recover their secret keys, and show their complexity comparison in the distinct attack models. This work is of great significance for the qRKA cryptanalysis of existing provably secure cryptographic schemes and the design of future quantum secure cryptographic schemes.
It has been said that security of symmetric key schemes is not so much affected by quantum computers, compared to public key schemes. However, recent works revealed that, in some specific situations, symmetric key schemes are also broken in polynomial time by adversaries with quantum computers. These works contain a quantum distinguishing attack on 3-round Feistel ciphers and a quantum key recovery attack on the Even-Mansour cipher by Kuwakado and Morii, in addition to the quantum forgery attack on CBC-MAC which is proposed independently by Kaplan et al., and by Santoli and Schaffner. Iterated Even-Mansour cipher is a simple but important block cipher, which can be regarded as an idealization of AES. Whether there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that can break iterated Even-Mansour cipher with independent subkeys is an important problem from the viewpoint of analyzing post-quantum security of block ciphers. Actually there is an efficient quantum attack on iterated Even-Mansour cipher by Kaplan et al., but their attack can only be applied in the case that all subkeys are the same. This paper shows that there is a polynomial time quantum algorithm that recovers partial keys of the iterated Even-Mansour cipher with independent subkeys, in a related-key setting. The related-key condition is somewhat strong, but our algorithm can recover subkeys with two related oracles. In addition, we also show that our algorithm can recover all keys of the i-round iterated Even-Mansour cipher, if we are allowed to access i related quantum oracles. To realize quantum related-key attacks, we extend Simon's quantum algorithm so that we can recover the hidden period of a function that is periodic only up to constant. Our technique is to take differential of the target function to make a double periodic function, and then apply Simon's algorithm.
Quantum Cryptanalysis on IBM Quantum Hardware: Extending Even--Mansour Period Recovery from N=4 to N=10
We report genuine-un-compiled, textbook-faithful-quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric-cipher structures executed on real IBM quantum hardware (ibm\_kingston, Heron generation). Using Simon's algorithm we recover the hidden period of the Even-Mansour cipher up to security parameter N = 10 on real hardware, beyond the largest previously reported real-hardware key recovery of N = 4, and we cleanly recover the periods of a 3-round Feistel (DES-family) construction at block sizes 6 and 8; a 21-qubit block-10 instance is verified in simulation and submitted to hardware. We further provide a breadth-first benchmark of five genuine quantum attacks spanning four symmetric-cipher design paradigms -- Bernstein-Vazirani (linear structure, single query), Grover (SPN key search, quadratic), and Simon (Even-Mansour, CBC-MAC forgery, and Feistel; exponential-to-polynomial in query complexity) -- validated to the classical-simulation ceiling of 25 qubits. We are deliberately explicit about scope: these attacks target reduced or structured constructions in the Q2 (quantum-query) model, asymptotically follow the birthday bound and therefore do not constitute quantum advantage over classical collision-finding, do not break full AES/RSA or 16-round DES, and rely on error mitigation rather than fault-tolerant error correction. Our contribution is the real-hardware demonstration at record structure sizes, the breadth of genuine algorithmic coverage across four paradigms, and an honest, reproducible benchmark with public artifacts.
Simon's algorithm is a polynomial period-finding algorithm that has been used to exploit the algebraic structure of specific symmetric ciphers, showing that exponential speedups in their cryptanalysis are theoretically possible. While the theoretical framework for an attack using Simon's algorithm on the Even-Mansour cipher is well-established, practical implementations on noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) hardware remain limited. This paper presents a proof of concept quantum cryptanalysis of the Even-Mansour cipher using Simon's period-finding algorithm on NISQ hardware. For N = 3 and N = 4, we successfully demonstrate secret key recovery for N-bit constructions on the ibm_miami processor. Our experiments also identify a scaling limitation in the classical pre-processing stage: The DORCIS circuit optimization tool encountered a memory bottleneck at N = 5, preventing the generation of optimized circuits for larger key lengths. Our results suggest firstly that Simon's algorithm is effective for the Even-Mansour cipher for short bit lengths on current quantum hardware. Secondly, while DORCIS is effective for the small-scale S-boxes for which it was designed, there remains a need for the investigation of more scalable and efficient synthesis tools capable of handling larger and more general permutations in the context of Even-Mansour ciphers.