Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Physics Conference Series

Unambiguous state discrimination and joint measurement attacks on passive side channel of the light source in BB84 decoy-state protocol

Бабухин Данила Валерьевич, Сыч Денис Васильевич

Published Dec 1, 2021• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) has a promise of unconditionally secure communication between the remote sides. The real-world QKD implementations, however, have numerous loopholes, both of engeneering and physical origin, and compromise the security promise. In this work, we investigate two attack strategies on the passive side channel of the light source along with the optimal cloning attack on the BB84 protocol with decoy-states. We calculate an upper bound of a secret key rate for these situations and show that the joint measurement attack on the signal and side channel degree of freedom is more effective to the adversary.

DOI
10.1088/1742-6596/2086/1/012130

Related papers

Explicit attacks on passive side channels of the light source in the BB84 decoy state protocol

Бабухин Данила Валерьевич, Сыч Денис Васильевич

Abstract Various imperfections of the hardware in quantum key distribution (QKD) lead to discrepancies between the theory and real-world devices. An eavesdropper can use these discrepancies to compromise the QKD security, thus legitimate sides need to estimate the influence of imperfections to prevent the loss of security. Here we investigate explicit eavesdropping attacks on passive side channels of the light source for a BB84 decoy states QKD protocol. We consider an optimal phase-covariant cloning attack, followed by unambiguous state discrimination and a joint measurement. Our calculations provide a hint that for state-of-the-art light sources the inherent presence of passive side channels still allows the protocol to be secure, albeit with the reduced secret key rates.

Journal of Physics Conference Series•Jul 1, 2021•4 citations

Intercept-resend attack on passive side channel of the light source in BB84 decoy-state protocol

Бабухин Данила Валерьевич, Сыч Денис Васильевич

Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communication based on fundamental laws of physics, though practical realizations of QKD may have loopholes and side channels, thus their security can be compromised. We analyze the intercept-resend attack on the BB84 decoy-state protocol under the presence of a passive side channel of the light source. We derive an upper bound for the secret key rate and show that it does not significantly deviate from the ideal side-channel-free case.

Journal of Physics Conference Series•Dec 1, 2020•3 citations

Joint Eavesdropping on the BB84 Decoy State Protocol with an Arbitrary Passive Light-source Side Channel

Бабухин Данила Валерьевич, Сыч Денис Васильевич

Abstract Passive light-source side channel in quantum key distribution (QKD) provides additional information to an eavesdropper via various non-operational degrees of freedom of the optical signal. The currently known explicit eavesdropping strategies aimed at additional information gain from the passive light-source side channel were limited to the attack on the side channel and the operational degree of freedom separately. As a result, their efficiency is far from being optimal. Here we provide the joint eavesdropping strategy on both operational degree of freedom and the passive light-source side channel of the generic form, and develop a method to calculate the corresponding secret key rate. In particular, we use the optimal phase-covariant cloning of the signal photon state followed by a joint collective measurement of the side channel and the operational degree of freedom. To estimate security under the explicit attack strategy, we develop an ‘‘effective error’’ method and demonstrate it on the BB84 protocol with decoy states. Our work extends the practical analysis of QKD protocols with the light-source side channels and can be used as a tool for the analysis of realistic eavesdropping methods.

arXiv:2211.13669•Lobachevskii Journal of Mathematics•Jun 1, 2024•2 citations

Finite-key security analysis of the decoy-state BB84 QKD with passive measurement

Akihiro Mizutani, Shun Kawakami, Go Kato

The decoy-state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is widely regarded as the de facto standard for practical implementations. On the receiver side, passive basis choice is attractive because it significantly reduces the need for random number generators and eliminates the need for optical modulators. Despite these advantages, a finite-key analytical security proof for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, where the basis is chosen passively with a biased probability, has been lacking. In this work, we present a simple analytical finite-key security proof for this setting, yielding a closed-form secret-key rate formula that can be directly evaluated using experimentally accessible parameters. Numerical simulations show that the key rates of passiveand active-measurement implementations are nearly identical, indicating that passive measurement does not compromise key-generation efficiency in practical QKD systems.

quant-pharXiv:2511.21253•Quantum Science and Technology•Nov 27, 2025•2 citations

Explicit attacks on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol with partially distinguishable photons

Бабухин Данила Валерьевич, Dmitry Anatolevich Kronberg, Сыч Денис Васильевич

The distinguishability of photons in nonoperational degrees of freedom compromises the unconditional security of quantum key distribution since an eavesdropper can improve attack strategies by exploiting this distinguishability. However, the optimal eavesdropping strategies in the presence of light-source side channels are not known. Here we provide several explicit attack strategies on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol with partially distinguishable photons. In particular, we consider the phase-covariant cloning attack, which is optimal in the absence of side channels, and show that there are even better strategies in the presence of side channels. The improved strategies exploit a measurement of the side-channel state followed by an attack on the signal photon. Our results explicitly demonstrate a reduction of the critical error rate and set an upper bound on the practical secret key rate.

arXiv:2205.15964•Physical Review A•Oct 3, 2022•8 citations

Bounding passive light-source side channels in quantum key distribution via Hong-Ou-Mandel interference

Alexander Duplinskiy, Сыч Денис Васильевич

Passive side-channel attacks in quantum key distribution (QKD) aim at obtaining information about the quantum signals without disturbing them and hence compromise real-world QKD security. Currently, there are no reliable tools for the assessment of QKD signal generation imperfections. In this work we propose a generic experimental method which allows to upper-bound QKD light-source imperfections and directly integrate them into the modern security proofs. The method relies on Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between different emitted signals: the maximum interference visibility reveals overall signal distinguishability that could lead to passive side-channel information leakage. We apply it for the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol and calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for realistic values of interference visibility. The method can be readily implemented in practical QKD setups and is especially relevant for multiple-laser QKD systems such as the one installed on the Micius satellite.

Physical Review A•Jul 6, 2021•17 citations
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) has a promise of unconditionally secure communication between the remote sides. The real-world QKD implementations, however, have numerous loopholes, both of engeneering and physical origin, and compromise the security promise. In this work, we investigate two attack strategies on the passive side channel of the light source along with the optimal cloning attack on the BB84 protocol with decoy-states. We calculate an upper bound of a secret key rate for these situations and show that the joint measurement attack on the signal and side channel degree of freedom is more effective to the adversary.
Abstract Various imperfections of the hardware in quantum key distribution (QKD) lead to discrepancies between the theory and real-world devices. An eavesdropper can use these discrepancies to compromise the QKD security, thus legitimate sides need to estimate the influence of imperfections to prevent the loss of security. Here we investigate explicit eavesdropping attacks on passive side channels of the light source for a BB84 decoy states QKD protocol. We consider an optimal phase-covariant cloning attack, followed by unambiguous state discrimination and a joint measurement. Our calculations provide a hint that for state-of-the-art light sources the inherent presence of passive side channels still allows the protocol to be secure, albeit with the reduced secret key rates.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communication based on fundamental laws of physics, though practical realizations of QKD may have loopholes and side channels, thus their security can be compromised. We analyze the intercept-resend attack on the BB84 decoy-state protocol under the presence of a passive side channel of the light source. We derive an upper bound for the secret key rate and show that it does not significantly deviate from the ideal side-channel-free case.
Abstract Passive light-source side channel in quantum key distribution (QKD) provides additional information to an eavesdropper via various non-operational degrees of freedom of the optical signal. The currently known explicit eavesdropping strategies aimed at additional information gain from the passive light-source side channel were limited to the attack on the side channel and the operational degree of freedom separately. As a result, their efficiency is far from being optimal. Here we provide the joint eavesdropping strategy on both operational degree of freedom and the passive light-source side channel of the generic form, and develop a method to calculate the corresponding secret key rate. In particular, we use the optimal phase-covariant cloning of the signal photon state followed by a joint collective measurement of the side channel and the operational degree of freedom. To estimate security under the explicit attack strategy, we develop an ‘‘effective error’’ method and demonstrate it on the BB84 protocol with decoy states. Our work extends the practical analysis of QKD protocols with the light-source side channels and can be used as a tool for the analysis of realistic eavesdropping methods.
The decoy-state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is widely regarded as the de facto standard for practical implementations. On the receiver side, passive basis choice is attractive because it significantly reduces the need for random number generators and eliminates the need for optical modulators. Despite these advantages, a finite-key analytical security proof for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, where the basis is chosen passively with a biased probability, has been lacking. In this work, we present a simple analytical finite-key security proof for this setting, yielding a closed-form secret-key rate formula that can be directly evaluated using experimentally accessible parameters. Numerical simulations show that the key rates of passiveand active-measurement implementations are nearly identical, indicating that passive measurement does not compromise key-generation efficiency in practical QKD systems.
The distinguishability of photons in nonoperational degrees of freedom compromises the unconditional security of quantum key distribution since an eavesdropper can improve attack strategies by exploiting this distinguishability. However, the optimal eavesdropping strategies in the presence of light-source side channels are not known. Here we provide several explicit attack strategies on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol with partially distinguishable photons. In particular, we consider the phase-covariant cloning attack, which is optimal in the absence of side channels, and show that there are even better strategies in the presence of side channels. The improved strategies exploit a measurement of the side-channel state followed by an attack on the signal photon. Our results explicitly demonstrate a reduction of the critical error rate and set an upper bound on the practical secret key rate.
Passive side-channel attacks in quantum key distribution (QKD) aim at obtaining information about the quantum signals without disturbing them and hence compromise real-world QKD security. Currently, there are no reliable tools for the assessment of QKD signal generation imperfections. In this work we propose a generic experimental method which allows to upper-bound QKD light-source imperfections and directly integrate them into the modern security proofs. The method relies on Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between different emitted signals: the maximum interference visibility reveals overall signal distinguishability that could lead to passive side-channel information leakage. We apply it for the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol and calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for realistic values of interference visibility. The method can be readily implemented in practical QKD setups and is especially relevant for multiple-laser QKD systems such as the one installed on the Micius satellite.