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Lecture notes in computer science

Multi-Client Verifiable Computation with Stronger Security Guarantees

Steven Gordon, Jonathan I. Katz, Feng-Hao Liu, Elaine Shi, Hong-Sheng Zhou

Published Jan 1, 2015• 53 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-46497-7_6

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Multi-Client Verifiable Computation with Stronger Security Guarantees.

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Choi et al. (TCC 2013) introduced the notion of multi-client verifiable computation (MVC) in which a set of clients outsource to an untrusted server the computation of a function f over their collective inputs in a sequence of time periods. In that work, the authors defined and realized multi-client verifiable computation satisfying soundness against a malicious server and privacy against the semi-honest corruption of a single client. Very recently, Goldwasser et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) provided an alternative solution relying on multi-input functional encryption. Here we conduct a systematic study of MVC, with the goal of satisfying stronger security requirements. We begin by introducing a simulation-based notion of security that provides a unified way of defining soundness and privacy, and automatically captures several attacks not addressed in previous work. We then explore the feasibility of achieving this notion of security. Assuming no collusion between the server and the clients, we demonstrate a protocol for multi-client verifiable computation that achieves strong security in several respects. When server-client collusion is possible, we show (somewhat surprisingly) that simulation-based security cannot be achieved in general, even assuming semi-honest behavior.

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Choi et al. (TCC 2013) introduced the notion of multi-client verifiable computation (MVC) in which a set of clients outsource to an untrusted server the computation of a function f over their collective inputs in a sequence of time periods. In that work, the authors defined and realized multi-client verifiable computation satisfying soundness against a malicious server and privacy against the semi-honest corruption of a single client. Very recently, Goldwasser et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) provided an alternative solution relying on multi-input functional encryption. Here we conduct a systematic study of MVC, with the goal of satisfying stronger security requirements. We begin by introducing a simulation-based notion of security that provides a unified way of defining soundness and privacy, and automatically captures several attacks not addressed in previous work. We then explore the feasibility of achieving this notion of security. Assuming no collusion between the server and the clients, we demonstrate a protocol for multi-client verifiable computation that achieves strong security in several respects. When server-client collusion is possible, we show (somewhat surprisingly) that simulation-based security cannot be achieved in general, even assuming semi-honest behavior.
We construct a multi-Client verifiable blind delegated quantum computing (VBDQC) protocol in which M classical Verifier Clients jointly delegate a public quantum circuit acting on their combined private inputs to two quantum-capable Provers sharing entanglement but having no direct communication channel. We begin by modifying the single-Client, entanglement-based CGJV Verifier-on-a-Leash protocol. We then prove simulator-based blind verifiability for the modified protocol using the abstract/constructive cryptography framework. We adapt the DFPR upward-reduction chain to the two-Prover setting, constructing a no-direct-communication simulator architecture. We then extend the CGJV protocol to M Clients using classical multiparty computation techniques, preserving the single-Client guarantees of completeness, soundness, and blindness while additionally guaranteeing input privacy between Clients. Security is analyzed under a threat model that allows a subset of Clients to collude with one but not both of the Provers, which do not communicate even after the protocol execution.
Blind quantum computing (BQC) allows a client to delegate quantum computations to a remote server without revealing the input, computation, or output. In addition to being blind, the client can sometimes also verify that the server has performed their instructions correctly, a property known as verifiability. A key part of realizing such verifiable BQC (VBQC) is choosing the design of the client device: many architectures have been proposed, each with different hardware requirements, security properties, and performance characteristics, making it difficult to identify which is most suitable for a given implementation. In this work, we present a comparative analysis of client architectures for VBQC with a matter-qubit server. We restrict our analysis to single-server, single-client protocols with information-theoretic security based on measurement-based quantum computation. We identify three main categories of client: emission-based, measurement-based, and rotation-based, each with multiple variants depending on how the client interacts with the server. We evaluate each across different dimensions: we compare guarantees of existing corresponding security proofs, we derive equations for the rate at which each client can execute a protocol, we provide an overview of each architecture's error behaviour, and discuss hardware cost and design considerations. Client architectures implementing measurement-based remote state preparation and reflection-based teleportation emerge as strong default candidates, but as the right choice remains context-dependent, we provide a framework for navigating considerations to guide the selection of the most suitable architecture for a given setting.