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On the Zitterbewegung

Elemér Elad Rosinger

Published Jul 1, 2011• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

An extension of the zitterbewegung phenomenon is suggested together with a solution to the measurement problem and the claimed incompleteness of quantum mechanics.

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•Mar 21, 2026•0 citations
It has been suggested that the measuring apparatus used to measure quantum systems ought to be idealized as consisting of an infinite number of quantum systems. Let us call this the infinity assumption. The suggestion that we ought to make the infinity assumption has been made in connection with two closely related but distinct problems. One is the problem of determining the importance of the limitations on measurement incorporated into the Wigner-Araki-Yanase quantum theory of measurement. The other is the measurement problem. These problems are not internal to the quantum mechanical formalism. They arise when we obtain particular formal results in applying the quantum mechanical formalism to measurement interactions. The formal results are problematic because they resist explanation. Various authors have claimed that by making the infinity assumption we can neglect the limitations on measurement. Bub (1988) and (1989) claims it allows us to solve the measurement problem. I will argue that both claims are unjustified.
Abstract Persistent disagreement among interpretations of quantum mechanics is widely acknowledged, yet there is no standard method for assessing which interpretive claims satisfy the structural preconditions of physical description and which remain incomplete. We introduce a claim-level diagnostic protocol comprising six applicability conditions (A1–A6) that classifies interpretive statements without adjudicating their truth. The protocol outputs standardised verdicts—PASS, OPEN, or Limit of Applicability (LoA)—together with specific reformulation directives for each deficit. We apply the protocol systematically to six major interpretations: Copenhagen, Many Worlds, QBism, Objective Collapse, Bohmian Mechanics, and Relational Quantum Mechanics. Three principal results emerge. First, no interpretation achieves an unrestricted PASS across all six conditions—the measurement problem is genuinely open, not merely contested. Second, deficit patterns organise into systematic trade-offs between formal consistency, posit commitments, and empirical accessibility. Third, and most consequentially, the protocol reaches the limit of its own presuppositions when applied to QBism, yielding a TYPE-SHIFT verdict that raises the question whether certain interpretive positions constitute physical claims or rationality-theoretic frameworks employing physical formalism.