Abstract The paper presents some secure optical network models. The security of the models is achieved using quantum cryptographic-key distribution. Both point-topoint and multiple-access broadcast networks are considered. In the modeling of these networks, the simplicity, generality and flexibility are highly maintained. This enables the efficient use of these models for software simulation purposes. Each secure optical communication network model is assumed to be composed of N communication nodes (stations) that are connected by fiber-optic links. Some hardware requirements are briefly explained. Also, samples of simulation results for these network models are presented.
Abstract The paper presents some secure optical network models. The security of the models is achieved using quantum cryptographic-key distribution. Both point-topoint and multiple-access broadcast networks are considered. In the modeling of these networks, the simplicity, generality and flexibility are highly maintained. This enables the efficient use of these models for software simulation purposes. Each secure optical communication network model is assumed to be composed of N communication nodes (stations) that are connected by fiber-optic links. Some hardware requirements are briefly explained. Also, samples of simulation results for these network models are presented.
In this thesis, several novel secure optical communication network models are presented. The security of these network models is achieved using quantum cryptographic-key distribution. Both point-to-point and multiple access broadcast networks are considered. Furthermore, in developing these models, the simplicity, generality and flexibility are highly maintained. Thus, it is possible to use these models efficiently for software simulation purposes. Each secure optical communication network model is assumed to be composed of N communication nodes (stations) that are connected by three types of fiber optic channels. These are the quantum, authenticated public, and timing channels.
Errors can occur in quantum transmission due to eavesdropping and system inefficiencies. Thus, an error elimination technique is implemented. In this technique, several rounds of random permutations and block parity comparisons are done between the transmitter and receiver. Then, another strategy of random subset parity comparisons is performed. Blocks or subsets of discordant parities are subjected to a bisective search to find error locations and eliminate them.
After all quantum transmission errors are discovered and discarded, an important mathematical technique called privacy amplification is implemented.
Using this technique, eavesdropper information about the final cryptographic key is reduced to an arbitrarily value smaller than one bit. This is essentially achieved by publicly choosing length-reducing transformations to apply to primary keys so that partial eavesdropper information about inputs conveys almost no knowledge of the outputs.
In the designing of secure models for multiple access broadcast networks, both of broadcasting and multicasting quantum transmission modes are enabled. This is done via introducing electro-optic switches in the implementation of quantum channels. Hence, the efficiency of quantum cryptography protocols can significantly be increased, in many situations.
All networks quantum cryptography protocols are simulated via the object oriented programming (OOP) approach using the Borland C ++ Compiler Version 4.5. Simulation results for both error elimination and privacy amplification stages are presented. It is important to mention that all the described protocols are secure even against an enemy possessing unlimited computing power.
The purpose of quantum key-distribution is for two or more correspondents, who share no secret information initially, to agree on random keys, which remain secret against attacks from more powerful analytic or computational tools. Quantum cryptography protocols can be designed to offer guaranteed security services in optical communication networks. The paper briefly outlines a general procedure for modeling and simulation of quantum key distribution protocols in multiple-access networks. Each communication network model is assumed to be composed of communication nodes (stations) that are connected by links. There are three basic communication node models, which are quantum transmission (QT), quantum reception (QR), and quantum transmission reception (QTR) nodes. In the models, fiber optic channels (links) are assumed to be used for connecting communication nodes.
Quantum cryptography has been shown to be an effective technique for the secure distribution of cryptographic keys on point-to-point communication links. The authors describe adaptations of the existing quantum cryptography protocols and equipment configurations that allow secure key distribution to be performed on a variety of multiuser passive optical network (PON) architectures. These adaptations enable the network controller on the PON to distribute individual secret keys to each user on the network, and hence to securely encrypt and authenticate subsequent data transmissions broadcast on the network.
Dense wavelength division multiplexing optical networks transport a huge aggregate traffic exceeding Tbps per single fiber, and passive optical network technology has been extended to include the residential and enterprise network layer with fiber-to-the premises. Because this network allows for multimedia and extremely high data rates to end-users, optical communications security is important not only on the client and the node management layers, but also on the physical layer. Thus, cyber-security becomes also important in optical networks, including unbreakable cipher keys, cipher key distribution, identification of malicious actors, source authentication, physical link signature, and countermeasure strategies. In this paper we overview the security of the WDM optical network. We discuss advanced cryptographic methods that stem from quantum mechanics, known as quantum cryptography, and we identify specific vulnerabilities. We also look into the security of the next-generation optical network.
It is well known that optical access networks are able to provide high data rates over long distances and to a reasonable number of users. Security and privacy are always a challenge for public accessible network infrastructures. Especially in time-division multiplexing passive optical networks (TDM-PONs), in which the downstream signal is broadcasted to all users connected via the same wavelength channel in a shared fiber link, privacy can be a critical concern. Although encryption at the application layer can provide a high level of security, this can be achieved only if the encryption key distribution is perfectly save. On the other hand, encryption on the physical layer such as quantum cryptography or, more precisely, quantum key distribution (QKD) is a very promising approach to achieve secure communication. However, there remain several issues that have to be solved before the quantum cryptography reaches the maturity level needed for a cost effective implementation in practical networks. In this paper, we address quantum key distribution (QKD) over passive optical access networks, which is an enabling technology required to cost efficiently deploy practical quantum encrypted data communication in the access area. We study different methods to integrate QKD systems in conventional optical access networks and quantitatively evaluate their suitability for a potential implementation.
Secure networks composed of optical networks and quantum key distribution (QKD) are considered in this paper. A network layer structure is defined to focus on issues important with respect to the QKD network layer that controls QKD links and supplies a secure key for message transmission. A multiple-user QKD network layer can be constructed with timing synchronization, secure key sharing between indirectly connected nodes with switched QKD systems and key relays, and key management to control the volume of key generation and supply in response to the demand from optical network nodes.