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Lecture notes in computer science

Forward-Secure Group Encryptions from Lattices

Jing Pan, Xiaofeng Chen, Fangguo Zhang, Willy Susilo

Published Jan 1, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-90567-5_31

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Motivated by an identity-based broadcast encryption scheme from lattice(1) and a forward-secure identity-based encryption scheme(2), we propose a forward-secure identity-based broadcast encryption scheme from lattice by adding the forward-security mechanism on broadcast encryption scheme. Our scheme satisfies the security requirements of both the broadcast encrypt ion scheme and forward-security scheme, that is, it is forward-secure for the secret keys used previously, and we prove that it is semantic secure based on LWE (Learning With Error)assumption(3) in the random oracle model. In addition, our construction is believed to be secure against quantum computer.