Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Philosophy of Physics by Tim Maudlin Science & Nature

Tim Maudlin

Published Jul 22, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

To Be, Not To Be, Maybe

Tim Maudlin

Philosopher of science Tim Maudlin reviews a recent book on quantum theory and its implications for philosophy: Quantum Ontology: A Guide to the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics by Peter J. Lewis.

Inference International Review of Science•Nov 23, 2017•0 citations

The philosophy of physics

Max Planck, Walter Henry Johnston

•Nov 13, 2019•40 citations

The Philosophy of Physics

W. V. Houston

Science•Apr 30, 1937•1 citation

Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Theory

Tim Maudlin

In this book, Tim Maudlin, one of the world’s leading philosophers of physics, offers a sophisticated, original introduction to the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The briefest, clearest, and most refined account of his influential approach to the subject, the book will be invaluable to all students of philosophy and physics. Quantum mechanics holds a unique place in the history of physics. It has produced the most accurate predictions of any scientific theory, but, more astonishing, there has never been any agreement about what the theory implies about physical reality. Maudlin argues that the very term “quantum theory” is a misnomer. A proper physical theory should clearly describe what is there and what it does—yet standard textbooks present quantum mechanics as a predictive recipe in search of a physical theory. In contrast, Maudlin explores three proper theories that recover the quantum predictions: the indeterministic wavefunction collapse theory of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber; the deterministic particle theory of deBroglie and Bohm; and the conceptually challenging Many Worlds theory of Everett. Each offers a radically different proposal for the nature of physical reality, but Maudlin shows that none of them are what they are generally taken to be.

•Mar 19, 2019•50 citations

Philosophy of Physics (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science) 2 volume set

Jeremy Butterfield, John Earman, Dov M. Gabbay +2 more

North-Holland Publishing Company eBooks•Nov 1, 2006•4 citations

Time Symmetric Quantum Theory Without Retrocausality? A Reply to Tim Maudlin

Matthew Leifer

In arXiv:1707.08641, Tim Maudlin claims to construct a counterexample to the result of Proc. Roy. Soc. A vol. 473, iss. 2202, 2017 (arXiv:1607.07871), in which it was shown that no realist model satisfying a certain notion of time-symmetry (in addition to three other assumptions) can reproduce the predictions of quantum theory without retrocausality (influences travelling backwards in time). In this comment, I explain why Maudlin's model is not a counterexample because it does not satisfy our time-symmetry assumption. I also explain why Maudlin's claim that one of the Lemmas we used in our proof is incorrect is wrong.

arXiv:1708.04364•Aug 15, 2017•1 citation
In this book, Tim Maudlin, one of the world’s leading philosophers of physics, offers a sophisticated, original introduction to the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The briefest, clearest, and most refined account of his influential approach to the subject, the book will be invaluable to all students of philosophy and physics. Quantum mechanics holds a unique place in the history of physics. It has produced the most accurate predictions of any scientific theory, but, more astonishing, there has never been any agreement about what the theory implies about physical reality. Maudlin argues that the very term “quantum theory” is a misnomer. A proper physical theory should clearly describe what is there and what it does—yet standard textbooks present quantum mechanics as a predictive recipe in search of a physical theory. In contrast, Maudlin explores three proper theories that recover the quantum predictions: the indeterministic wavefunction collapse theory of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber; the deterministic particle theory of deBroglie and Bohm; and the conceptually challenging Many Worlds theory of Everett. Each offers a radically different proposal for the nature of physical reality, but Maudlin shows that none of them are what they are generally taken to be.
In arXiv:1707.08641, Tim Maudlin claims to construct a counterexample to the result of Proc. Roy. Soc. A vol. 473, iss. 2202, 2017 (arXiv:1607.07871), in which it was shown that no realist model satisfying a certain notion of time-symmetry (in addition to three other assumptions) can reproduce the predictions of quantum theory without retrocausality (influences travelling backwards in time). In this comment, I explain why Maudlin's model is not a counterexample because it does not satisfy our time-symmetry assumption. I also explain why Maudlin's claim that one of the Lemmas we used in our proof is incorrect is wrong.