Lecture notes in computer science

Two-Round Maliciously Secure Computation with Super-Polynomial Simulation

Amit Agarwal, James Bartusek, Vipul Goyal, Dakshita Khurana, Giulio Malavolta

Published Jan 1, 2021• 4 citations

Publisher

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-90459-3_22

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