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New Approaches for Quantum Copy-Protection.

Scott Aaronson, Jiahui Liu, Qipeng Liu, Mark Zhandry, Ruizhe Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2020• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

Quantum copy-protection uses the unclonability of quantum states to construct quantum software that provably cannot be pirated. copy-protection would be immensely useful, but unfortunately, little is known about achieving it in general. In this work, we make progress on this goal, by giving the following results: We show how to copy-protect any program that cannot be learned from its input-output behavior relative to a classical oracle. This construction improves on Aaronson (CCC 2009), which achieves the same relative to a quantum oracle. By instantiating the oracle with post-quantum candidate obfuscation schemes, we obtain a heuristic construction of copy-protection. We show, roughly, that any program which can be watermarked can be copy detected, a weaker version of copy-protection that does not prevent copying, but guarantees that any copying can be detected. Our scheme relies on the security of the assumed watermarking, plus the assumed existence of public-key quantum money. Our construction is publicly detectable and applicable to many recent watermarking schemes.

Related papers

New Approaches for Quantum Copy-Protection

Scott Aaronson, Jiahui Liu, Qipeng Liu +2 more

Quantum copy protection uses the unclonability of quantum states to construct quantum software that provably cannot be pirated. Copy protection would be immensely useful, but unfortunately little is known about how to achieve it in general. In this work, we make progress on this goal, by giving the following results: - We show how to copy protect any program that cannot be learned from its input/output behavior, relative to a classical oracle. This improves on Aaronson [CCC'09], which achieves the same relative to a quantum oracle. By instantiating the oracle with post-quantum candidate obfuscation schemes, we obtain a heuristic construction of copy protection. -We show, roughly, that any program which can be watermarked can be copy detected, a weaker version of copy protection that does not prevent copying, but guarantees that any copying can be detected. Our scheme relies on the security of the assumed watermarking, plus the assumed existence of public key quantum money. Our construction is general, applicable to many recent watermarking schemes.

arXiv:2004.09674•Apr 20, 2020•2 citations

Quantum Copy-Protection from Hidden Subspaces.

Scott Aaronson, Jiahui Liu, Ruizhe Zhang

Quantum copy-protection is an innovative idea that uses the no-cloning property of quantum information to copy-protect programs and was first put forward by [Aar09]. The general goal is that a program distributor can distribute a quantum state $|\Psi\rangle$, whose classical description is secret to the users; a user can use this state to run the program P on his own input, but not be able to pirate this program P or create another state with the same functionality. In the copy-protection with oracle setting, the user has access to a public oracle and can use the given quantum state and the oracle to compute on his/her own input for polynomially many times. However, the user is not able to produce an additional program(quantum or classical) that computes the same as P on almost all inputs. We present a first quantum copy protection scheme with a classical oracle for any unlearnable function families. The construction is based on membership oracles for hidden subspaces in $\mathbb{F}_2^n$, an idea derived from the public key quantum money scheme in[Aar12]. We prove the security of the scheme relative to a classical oracle, namely, the subspace membership oracle with the functionality of computing the secret function we want to copy-protect. The security proof builds on the quantum lower bound for the Direct-Product problem ([Aar12],[BDS16]) and the unlearnability of the copy-protected functions. We also show that existence of quantum copy protection and the quantum hardness of Learning-with-Errors (LWE) will imply publicly verifiable quantum money.

•Apr 20, 2020•6 citations

Quantum copy-protection of compute-and-compare programs in the quantum random oracle model

Andrea Coladangelo, Christian Majenz, Alexander Poremba

Copy-protection allows a software distributor to encode a program in such a way that it can be evaluated on any input, yet it cannot be "pirated" – a notion that is impossible to achieve in a classical setting. Aaronson (CCC 2009) initiated the formal study of quantum copy-protection schemes, and speculated that quantum cryptography could offer a solution to the problem thanks to the quantum no-cloning theorem. In this work, we introduce a quantum copy-protection scheme for a large class of evasive functions known as "compute-and-compare programs" – a more expressive generalization of point functions. A compute-and-compare program CC[f,y] is specified by a function f and a string y within its range: on input x , CC[f,y] outputs 1 , if f(x)=y , and 0 otherwise. We prove that our scheme achieves non-trivial security against fully malicious adversaries in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), which makes it the first copy-protection scheme to enjoy any level of provable security in a standard cryptographic model. As a complementary result, we show that the same scheme fulfils a weaker notion of software protection, called "secure software leasing", introduced very recently by Ananth and La Placa (eprint 2020), with a standard security bound in the QROM, i.e. guaranteeing negligible adversarial advantage. Finally, as a third contribution, we elucidate the relationship between unclonable encryption and copy-protection for multi-bit output point functions.

arXiv:2009.13865•Quantum•May 2, 2024•19 citations

Uncloneable Decryptors from Quantum Copy-Protection

Or Sattath, Shai Wyborski

Uncloneable decryptors are encryption schemes (with classical plaintexts and ciphertexts) with the added functionality of deriving uncloneable quantum states, called decryptors, which could be used to decrypt ciphers without knowledge of the secret key (Georgiou and Zhandry, IACR'20). We study uncloneable decryptors in the computational setting and provide increasingly strong security notions which extend the various indistinguishable security notions of symmetric encryption. We show that CPA secure uncloneable bit decryptors could be instantiated from a copy protection scheme (Aaronson, CCC'09) for any balanced binary function. We introduce a new notion of flip detection security for copy protection schemes inspired by the notions of left or right security for encryption schemes, and show that it could be used to instantiate CPA secure uncloneable decryptors for messages of unrestricted length. We then show how to strengthen the CPA security of uncloneable decryptors to CCA2 security using strong EUF-CMA secure digital signatures. We show that our constructions could be instantiated relative to either the quantum oracle used in [Aar09] or the classical oracle used in (Aaronson et al., CRYPTO'21) to instantiate copy protection schemes. Our constructions are the first to achieve CPA or CCA2 security in the symmetric setting.

arXiv:2203.05866•Mar 11, 2022•1 citation

A Note on Copy-Protection from Random Oracles

Prabhanjan Ananth, Fatih Kaleoglu

Quantum copy-protection, introduced by Aaronson (CCC'09), uses the no-cloning principle of quantum mechanics to protect software from being illegally distributed. Constructing copy-protection has been an important problem in quantum cryptography. Since copy-protection is shown to be impossible to achieve in the plain model, we investigate the question of constructing copy-protection for arbitrary classes of unlearnable functions in the random oracle model. We present an impossibility result that rules out a class of copy-protection schemes in the random oracle model assuming the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption and quantum hardness of learning with errors. En route, we prove the impossibility of approximately correct copy-protection in the plain model.

arXiv:2208.12884•Aug 26, 2022•1 citation

How to Use Quantum Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Andrea Coladangelo, Sam Gunn

Quantum copy protection, introduced by Aaronson, enables giving out a quantum program-description that cannot be meaningfully duplicated. Despite over a decade of study, copy protection is only known to be possible for a very limited class of programs. As our first contribution, we show how to achieve "best-possible" copy protection for all programs. We do this by introducing quantum state indistinguishability obfuscation (qsiO), a notion of obfuscation for quantum descriptions of classical programs. We show that applying qsiO to a program immediately achieves best-possible copy protection. Our second contribution is to show that, assuming injective one-way functions exist, qsiO is concrete copy protection for a large family of puncturable programs --- significantly expanding the class of copy-protectable programs. A key tool in our proof is a new variant of unclonable encryption (UE) that we call coupled unclonable encryption (cUE). While constructing UE in the standard model remains an important open problem, we are able to build cUE from one-way functions. If we additionally assume the existence of UE, then we can further expand the class of puncturable programs for which qsiO is copy protection. Finally, we construct qsiO relative to an efficient quantum oracle.

arXiv:2311.07794•ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•Jun 10, 2024•10 citations
Quantum copy-protection uses the unclonability of quantum states to construct quantum software that provably cannot be pirated. copy-protection would be immensely useful, but unfortunately, little is known about achieving it in general. In this work, we make progress on this goal, by giving the following results:
We show how to copy-protect any program that cannot be learned from its input-output behavior relative to a classical oracle. This construction improves on Aaronson (CCC 2009), which achieves the same relative to a quantum oracle. By instantiating the oracle with post-quantum candidate obfuscation schemes, we obtain a heuristic construction of copy-protection.
We show, roughly, that any program which can be watermarked can be copy detected, a weaker version of copy-protection that does not prevent copying, but guarantees that any copying can be detected. Our scheme relies on the security of the assumed watermarking, plus the assumed existence of public-key quantum money. Our construction is publicly detectable and applicable to many recent watermarking schemes.
Quantum copy protection uses the unclonability of quantum states to construct quantum software that provably cannot be pirated. Copy protection would be immensely useful, but unfortunately little is known about how to achieve it in general. In this work, we make progress on this goal, by giving the following results: - We show how to copy protect any program that cannot be learned from its input/output behavior, relative to a classical oracle. This improves on Aaronson [CCC'09], which achieves the same relative to a quantum oracle. By instantiating the oracle with post-quantum candidate obfuscation schemes, we obtain a heuristic construction of copy protection. -We show, roughly, that any program which can be watermarked can be copy detected, a weaker version of copy protection that does not prevent copying, but guarantees that any copying can be detected. Our scheme relies on the security of the assumed watermarking, plus the assumed existence of public key quantum money. Our construction is general, applicable to many recent watermarking schemes.
Quantum copy-protection is an innovative idea that uses the no-cloning property of quantum information to copy-protect programs and was first put forward by [Aar09]. The general goal is that a program distributor can distribute a quantum state ∣Ψ⟩|\Psi\rangle∣Ψ⟩, whose classical description is secret to the users; a user can use this state to run the program P on his own input, but not be able to pirate this program P or create another state with the same functionality. In the copy-protection with oracle setting, the user has access to a public oracle and can use the given quantum state and the oracle to compute on his/her own input for polynomially many times. However, the user is not able to produce an additional program(quantum or classical) that computes the same as P on almost all inputs. We present a first quantum copy protection scheme with a classical oracle for any unlearnable function families. The construction is based on membership oracles for hidden subspaces in F2n\mathbb{F}_2^nF2n​, an idea derived from the public key quantum money scheme in[Aar12]. We prove the security of the scheme relative to a classical oracle, namely, the subspace membership oracle with the functionality of computing the secret function we want to copy-protect. The security proof builds on the quantum lower bound for the Direct-Product problem ([Aar12],[BDS16]) and the unlearnability of the copy-protected functions. We also show that existence of quantum copy protection and the quantum hardness of Learning-with-Errors (LWE) will imply publicly verifiable quantum money.
Copy-protection allows a software distributor to encode a program in such a way that it can be evaluated on any input, yet it cannot be "pirated" – a notion that is impossible to achieve in a classical setting. Aaronson (CCC 2009) initiated the formal study of quantum copy-protection schemes, and speculated that quantum cryptography could offer a solution to the problem thanks to the quantum no-cloning theorem. In this work, we introduce a quantum copy-protection scheme for a large class of evasive functions known as "compute-and-compare programs" – a more expressive generalization of point functions. A compute-and-compare program CC[f,y] is specified by a function f and a string y within its range: on input x , CC[f,y] outputs 1 , if f(x)=y , and 0 otherwise. We prove that our scheme achieves non-trivial security against fully malicious adversaries in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), which makes it the first copy-protection scheme to enjoy any level of provable security in a standard cryptographic model. As a complementary result, we show that the same scheme fulfils a weaker notion of software protection, called "secure software leasing", introduced very recently by Ananth and La Placa (eprint 2020), with a standard security bound in the QROM, i.e. guaranteeing negligible adversarial advantage. Finally, as a third contribution, we elucidate the relationship between unclonable encryption and copy-protection for multi-bit output point functions.
Uncloneable decryptors are encryption schemes (with classical plaintexts and ciphertexts) with the added functionality of deriving uncloneable quantum states, called decryptors, which could be used to decrypt ciphers without knowledge of the secret key (Georgiou and Zhandry, IACR'20). We study uncloneable decryptors in the computational setting and provide increasingly strong security notions which extend the various indistinguishable security notions of symmetric encryption. We show that CPA secure uncloneable bit decryptors could be instantiated from a copy protection scheme (Aaronson, CCC'09) for any balanced binary function. We introduce a new notion of flip detection security for copy protection schemes inspired by the notions of left or right security for encryption schemes, and show that it could be used to instantiate CPA secure uncloneable decryptors for messages of unrestricted length. We then show how to strengthen the CPA security of uncloneable decryptors to CCA2 security using strong EUF-CMA secure digital signatures. We show that our constructions could be instantiated relative to either the quantum oracle used in [Aar09] or the classical oracle used in (Aaronson et al., CRYPTO'21) to instantiate copy protection schemes. Our constructions are the first to achieve CPA or CCA2 security in the symmetric setting.
Quantum copy-protection, introduced by Aaronson (CCC'09), uses the no-cloning principle of quantum mechanics to protect software from being illegally distributed. Constructing copy-protection has been an important problem in quantum cryptography. Since copy-protection is shown to be impossible to achieve in the plain model, we investigate the question of constructing copy-protection for arbitrary classes of unlearnable functions in the random oracle model. We present an impossibility result that rules out a class of copy-protection schemes in the random oracle model assuming the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption and quantum hardness of learning with errors. En route, we prove the impossibility of approximately correct copy-protection in the plain model.
Quantum copy protection, introduced by Aaronson, enables giving out a quantum program-description that cannot be meaningfully duplicated. Despite over a decade of study, copy protection is only known to be possible for a very limited class of programs. As our first contribution, we show how to achieve "best-possible" copy protection for all programs. We do this by introducing quantum state indistinguishability obfuscation (qsiO), a notion of obfuscation for quantum descriptions of classical programs. We show that applying qsiO to a program immediately achieves best-possible copy protection. Our second contribution is to show that, assuming injective one-way functions exist, qsiO is concrete copy protection for a large family of puncturable programs --- significantly expanding the class of copy-protectable programs. A key tool in our proof is a new variant of unclonable encryption (UE) that we call coupled unclonable encryption (cUE). While constructing UE in the standard model remains an important open problem, we are able to build cUE from one-way functions. If we additionally assume the existence of UE, then we can further expand the class of puncturable programs for which qsiO is copy protection. Finally, we construct qsiO relative to an efficient quantum oracle.