Mermin habitually answers opinions, real and abstract
Philip Pearle
David Mermin cautions against taking our “most successful abstractions to be real properties of our world.” I think he has set up a straw man. To me, the tenable realist position is not that our concepts are real but rather that they have a correspondence to reality: There can be many such correspondences, each with its utility, none capturing reality—whatever that is.I am not surprised he uses that argument to bolster the position “that quantum states are calculational devices.” In the vein of the disagreement about reality he cites, between Bishop Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, I recall a similar disagreement, between Mermin and John Bell, concerning the foundations of quantum theory. It took place at a meeting in Erice, Italy, in August 1989. Bell had finished his now famous talk “Against ‘Measurement,’ “ in which he argued that there is something wrong with quantum theory, that its rules of application are ill-defined. 1 1. J. Bell, Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty, A. Miller, ed., Plenum, New York (1990), p. 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-8771-8_3 reproduced in Phys. World 3, 33 (August 1990). He introduced the acronym FAPP, meaning that quantum theory is good “for all practical purposes” but insufficient for a truly fundamental theory. In the question-and-answer session, Mermin gave an argument not unlike the one in his Reference Frame. When he was done, Bell replied, “FAPPtrap,” and that was that.Mermin says that if one takes his view, it “can diminish the motivation for theoretical or experimental searches for a ‘mechanism’ underlying … the ‘collapse of the wavefunction’—searches that make life harder than it needs to be.” But why would one want to diminish such motivation? Might not the deficiencies of quantum theory elucidated by Bell be a clue to some deeper theory? And is that not good for physics? Certainly, in this generation, in which we did not predict the acceleration of the universe nor know the nature of dark energy or dark matter, we should have the humility to think that perhaps we do not yet have the “final” quantum theory. For example, in standard quantum theory, how or why an event occurs is a complete mystery. Nature determines an outcome, but we are told it is impossible for us to understand that in terms of anything deeper. Things happen for no reason at all. Why should we follow Mermin’s advice and not try to do better?In my own work and that of Gian-Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber, we have developed what is called a dynamical theory of wave-function collapse (continuous spontaneous localization, or CSL). 2 2. Two reviews are P. Pearle in Open Systems and Measurement in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory, H. P. Breuer, F. Petruccionne, eds., Springer, Berlin (1999), p. 195 and A. Bassi, G. C. Ghirardi, Phys. Rep. 379, 257 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-1573(03)00103-0 To Schrödinger’s equation, a term is added that describes the interaction of matter with a randomly fluctuating field, so that a state vector in a superposition of macroscopically different states rapidly evolves to one of them. The final state describes the world as we see it. Therefore, the state vector can be said to correspond to reality and not be merely a computational device. Bell regarded CSL as an example of a well-defined theory, which overcomes his objections to standard quantum theory. Moreover, it provides a mechanism, a description, for the occurrence of events. And it makes some predictions that differ from those of standard quantum theory, so it is experimentally testable. Experiments so far have shown that the coupling of random field to matter must be mass proportional, but otherwise they have neither confirmed CSL nor denied it. This is a good thing, and that such attempts should not be discouraged, as Mermin’s article does, was underlined by Richard Feynman, who said in 1964,We have to find a new view of the world that has to agree with everything that is known, but disagree in its predictions somewhere, otherwise it is not interesting. And in that disagreement it must agree with nature. If you can find any other view of the world which agrees over the entire range where things have already been observed, but disagrees somewhere else, you have made a great discovery. It is very nearly impossible, but not quite, to find any theory which agrees with experiments over the entire range in which all theories have been checked, and yet gives different consequences in some other range, even a theory whose different consequences do not turn out to agree with nature. 3 3. R. Feynman, in The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1970), p. 171. REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. Bell, Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty, A. Miller, ed., Plenum, New York (1990), p. 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-8771-8_3 , Google ScholarCrossrefreproduced in Phys. World 3, 33 (August 1990). , Google Scholar2. Two reviews are P. Pearle in Open Systems and Measurement in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory, H. P. Breuer, F. Petruccionne, eds., Springer, Berlin (1999), p. 195 and , Google ScholarCrossref A. Bassi, G. C. Ghirardi, Phys. Rep. 379, 257 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-1573(03)00103-0 , , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI3. R. Feynman, in The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1970), p. 171. Google Scholar© 2009 American Institute of Physics.
Physics Today•Sep 1, 2009•0 citations