Abstract This paper develops a Fragmentalist theory of Presentism and shows how it can help to develop a interpretation of quantum mechanics. There are several fragmental interpretations of physics. In the interpretation of this paper, each quantum system forms a fragment, and fragment f1 makes a measurement on fragment f2 if and only if f2 makes a corresponding measurement on f1. The main idea is then that each fragment has its own present (or ‘now’) until a mutual quantum measurement—at which time they come (‘become’) to share the same ‘now’. The theory of time developed here will make use of both McTaggart’s A-series (in the form of future-present-past) and B-series (earlier-times to later-times). An example of an application is that a Bell pair of electrons does not take on definite spin values until measurement because the measuring system and the Bell pair do not share the same present (‘now’) until mutual quantum measurement, i.e. until they ‘become’ to share the same A-series. Before that point the ‘now’ of the opposing system is not in the reference system’s fragment. Relativistic no-signaling is preserved within each fragment, which will turn out to be sufficient for the general case. Several issues in the foundations of quantum mechanics are canvassed, including Schrodinger’s cat, the Born rule, modifications to Minkowski space that accommodate both the A-series and the B-series, and entropy.
Abstract This paper develops a Fragmentalist theory of Presentism and shows how it can help to develop a interpretation of quantum mechanics. There are several fragmental interpretations of physics. In the interpretation of this paper, each quantum system forms a fragment, and fragment f1 makes a measurement on fragment f2 if and only if f2 makes a corresponding measurement on f1. The main idea is then that each fragment has its own present (or ‘now’) until a mutual quantum measurement—at which time they come (‘become’) to share the same ‘now’. The theory of time developed here will make use of both McTaggart’s A-series (in the form of future-present-past) and B-series (earlier-times to later-times). An example of an application is that a Bell pair of electrons does not take on definite spin values until measurement because the measuring system and the Bell pair do not share the same present (‘now’) until mutual quantum measurement, i.e. until they ‘become’ to share the same A-series. Before that point the ‘now’ of the opposing system is not in the reference system’s fragment. Relativistic no-signaling is preserved within each fragment, which will turn out to be sufficient for the general case. Several issues in the foundations of quantum mechanics are canvassed, including Schrodinger’s cat, the Born rule, modifications to Minkowski space that accommodate both the A-series and the B-series, and entropy.
We motivate and develop a perspectival A-theory of time (future/present/past) and probe its implied interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will emerge that, as a first take, the time of relativity is a B-series (earlier-times to later-times) and the time of quantum mechanics is an A-series. There is philosophical motivation for the idea that mutual quantum measurement happens when and only when the systems’ A-series become one mutual A-series, as in the way qualia work in the Inverted Spectrum. This seems to account for certain quantum phenomena, including that the electrons of a Bell pair do not have definite spins until measurement, as ‘until’ here is a (perspectival) A-series notion. Various issues in the foundations of quantum mechanics are canvassed.
Modern quantum mechanics, despite its relativistic extensions, provides intriguing support for a present-centered view of time. This paper argues that quantum phenomena – indeterminacy, wavefunction collapse, the Born rule, and temporal asymmetries in measurement – challenge the static block universe of eternalism and instead elevate the present moment to ontological prominence. Remaining largely interpretation-neutral, we draw on a range of perspectives (from Einstein’s relativity to collapse models, and thinkers like Heisenberg, Rovelli, Maudlin and others) to show that quantum theory operationally distinguishes past, present, and future in a way classical physics did not. We examine how the measurement problem and the randomness of quantum outcomes resist a fully eternalist description, highlight how quantum mechanics introduces an arrow of time at a fundamental level, and consider proposals (e.g. GRW theory, delayed-choice experiments) that make a global present – or something akin to it – conceptually necessary. Classical philosophers and physicists from Einstein to Schrödinger are discussed alongside contemporary voices. While stopping short of endorsing any single ontology outright, we contend that the empirical success of quantum theory re-opens the case for presentism or related “A-theoretic” models of time. In closing, we introduce Existential Realism as a novel metaphysical framework aligning with these insights – one which preserves the special status of the present while accommodating the reality of past and future in a more dynamic ontology. The result is a rigorous yet accessible interdisciplinary inquiry: quantum physics, we conclude, prefers the present, suggesting time’s passage and the now are more than mere illusions.
Modern quantum mechanics, despite its relativistic extensions, provides intriguing support for a present-centered view of time. This paper argues that quantum phenomena – indeterminacy, wavefunction collapse, the Born rule, and temporal asymmetries in measurement – challenge the static block universe of eternalism and instead elevate the present moment to ontological prominence. Remaining largely interpretation-neutral, we draw on a range of perspectives (from Einstein’s relativity to collapse models, and thinkers like Heisenberg, Rovelli, Maudlin and others) to show that quantum theory operationally distinguishes past, present, and future in a way classical physics did not. We examine how the measurement problem and the randomness of quantum outcomes resist a fully eternalist description, highlight how quantum mechanics introduces an arrow of time at a fundamental level, and consider proposals (e.g. GRW theory, delayed-choice experiments) that make a global present – or something akin to it – conceptually necessary. Classical philosophers and physicists from Einstein to Schrödinger are discussed alongside contemporary voices. While stopping short of endorsing any single ontology outright, we contend that the empirical success of quantum theory re-opens the case for presentism or related “A-theoretic” models of time. In closing, we introduce Existential Realism as a novel metaphysical framework aligning with these insights – one which preserves the special status of the present while accommodating the reality of past and future in a more dynamic ontology. The result is a rigorous yet accessible interdisciplinary inquiry: quantum physics, we conclude, prefers the present, suggesting time’s passage and the now are more than mere illusions.[1] [1] https://quoteinvestigator.com/2024/03/18/stubborn-illusion/#:~:text=%3E%20On%20Michele%20Besso%20%281873,245
Some aspects of the interpretation of quantum theory are discussed.It is emphasized that quantum theory is formulated in a Cartesian coordinate system; in other coordinates the result obtained with the help of the Hamiltonian formalism and commutator relations between 'canonically conjugated' coordinate and momentum operators leads to a wrong version of quantum mechanics.In this connection the Feynman integral formalism is also discussed.In this formalism the measure is not well-defined and there is no idea how to distinguish between the true version of quantum mechanics and an incorrect one; it is rather a mnemonic rule to generate perturbation series from an undefined zero order term.The origin of time is analyzed in detail by the example of atomic collisions.It is shown that the time-dependent Schrödinger equation for the closed three-body (two nuclei + electron) system has no physical meaning since in the high impact energy limit it transforms into an equation with two independent time-like variables; the time appears in the stationary Schrödinger equation as a result of extraction of a classical subsystem (two nuclei) from a closed three-body system.Following the Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky experiment and Bell's inequality the wave function is interpreted as an actual field of information in the elementary form.The relation between physics and mathematics is also discussed.
We propose a reformulation of quantum mechanics in which the distinction between definite and indefinite becomes the fundamental primitive. Inspired by suggestions of Heisenberg, Schrodinger and Dyson that the past can't be described in terms of wavefunctions and operators, so that the uncertainty principle does not apply to past events, we propose that the distinction between past, present and future is derivative of the fundamental distinction between indefinite and definite. %The same is the case for the quantum world versus classical world distinction of the Copenhagen interpretation. We then outline a novel form of presentism based on a phenomonology of events, where an event is defined as an instance of transition between indefinite and definite. Neither the past nor the future fully exist, but for different reasons. We finally suggest reformulating physics in terms of a new class of time coordinates in which the present time of a future event measures a countdown to the present moment in which that event will happen.
McTaggart's ideas on the unreality of time as expressed in "The Nature of Existence" have retained great interest for many years for scholars, academics and other philosophers. In this essay, there is a brief discussion which mentions some of the high points of this philosophical interest, and goes on to apply his ideas to modern physics and neuroscience. It does not discuss McTaggart's C and D series, but does emphasise how the use of derived versions of both his A and B series can be of great virtue in discussing both the abstract physics of time, and the present and future importance of McTaggart's ideas to the subject of time. Indeed an experiment using human volunteers and dynamic systems modelling which was carried out is described, which illustrates this fact. The Many Bubble Interpretation, which also derives from McTaggart's ideas, is discussed and various examples of its use and effectiveness are referred to. The Schrodinger Cat paradox is essentially resolved in principle, the quantum Zeno effect interpretable, Kwiat's recent result referred to, and the newly discovered reverse Stickgold effect described. \n