Advances in the development of quantum technologies force to create new methods of secure information transfer over insecure networks and channels. In this article, we analyze some important properties of secure group messaging resilient to quantum computer attacks: message authentication and asynchronous key update. We consider options for ensuring message authentication and detect the difference between the requirements for this property in group communications and point-to-point channels. We define the structure of key information and preshared key packages for the new protocol based on the classic X3DH protocol.
Advances in the development of quantum technologies force to create new methods of secure information transfer over insecure networks and channels. In this article, we analyze some important properties of secure group messaging resilient to quantum computer attacks: message authentication and asynchronous key update. We consider options for ensuring message authentication and detect the difference between the requirements for this property in group communications and point-to-point channels. We define the structure of key information and preshared key packages for the new protocol based on the classic X3DH protocol.
Due to development in quantum computing, we need to create and implement new cryptographic protocols, which are resistant to attacks using a quantum computer, in all practical cases. Last years humans became using messengers to transfer far more important information than earlier, so it is necessary to create new post-quantum secure messaging protocols for peer-to-peer and group communications. In this article, we describe needed security properties, existing ways for the creation of group chats, and our suggestions. We described ways and needed primitives for the creation of a group key establishment scheme based on isogenies of elliptic curves. We describe such protocol as an extended Double Ratchet protocol.
Quantum cryptography offers a way of key agreement, which is unbreakable by any external adversary. Authentication is of crucial importance, as perfect secrecy is worthless if the identity of the addressee cannot be ensured before sending important information. Message authentication has been studied thoroughly, but no approach seems to be able to explicitly counter meet-in-the-middle impersonation attacks. The goal of this paper is the development of an authentication scheme being resistant against active adversaries controlling the communication channel. The scheme is built on top of a key-establishment protocol and is unconditionally secure if built upon quantum cryptographic key exchange. In general, the security is the same as for the key-agreement protocol lying underneath.
Widely used communication and messaging protocols, e.g., TLS 1.3 and Signal, are insecure against an adversary with a quantum computer. We expect that post-quantum security will become mandatory for a new generation of cryptographic protocols in the nearest 10-15 years. The analysis of existing post-quantum secure cryptographic tools for key exchange, encryption and message authentication based on hard problems in codes, lattices, ring learning with errors and elliptic curve isogenies revealed their advantages and drawbacks. In particular, we conclude, that the main threat to communication and messaging protocols is only pre-quantum security of currently used Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols. We summarize efficiency and safety results for each class of post-quantum cryptographic schemes and present an experimental implementation of isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol as an illustration of their applicability.
Recent advances in quantum technology and the potential that practical quantum computers may become a reality in the future have led to renewed interest in developing cryptographic technologies that are secure against conventional and quantum attacks. Currently, virtually all asymmetric cryptographic schemes in use are threatened by the potential development of powerful quantum computers. Post-quantum cryptography is one of main the ways to combat this threat. Its security is based on the complexity of mathematical problems that are currently considered unsolvable efficiently, even with the help of quantum computers. The security of information systems is ensured through protection against various threats that use system vulnerabilities. Security protocols are the building blocks of secure communication. They implement security mechanisms to provide security services. Security protocols are considered abstract when analyzed, but may have additional vulnerabilities in implementation. This work contains a holistic study of security protocols. Basics of security protocols, taxonomy of attacks on security protocols and their implementation are considered, as well as various methods and models of protocol security analysis. In particular, the differences between information-theoretic and computational security, computational and symbolic models are specified. In addition, an overview of the computational security models for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) and Password Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols is provided. The most important security models for the AKE and PAKE protocols were also described. With the emergence of new technologies that may have different security requirements, as well as with increased opportunities for competition, there is always a need to develop new protocols. Thus, the purpose of this article is to review, classify, analyze, and research the vulnerabilities of information systems from classical, quantum, and special attacks, performed taking into account the forecast regarding the possibilities of attacks on post-quantum cryptographic transformations; studying security assessment models for existing cryptographic protocols, as well as reviewing and benchmarking security models and providing suggestions for protection against existing potential attacks.
This paper presents a detailed examination of Group Key Establishment methods, pivotal in securing group communication over public networks. We classify Group Key Establishment into three key categories: classical, quantum-safe, and quantum-based, each tailored to address distinct challenges in key management, particularly under the constraints of member dynamics and resource efficiency. Highlighting the critical influence of emerging quantum technologies, our study emphasizes the growing importance of quantum-resistant approaches to safeguard group communications against quantum threats. This paper traverses the evolution of Group Key Establishment protocols, shedding light on the shifting cryptographic paradigms and future prospects in the era of quantum advancement.
In this article, we investigate the issue of authenticating the classical post-processing components of a QKD protocol through an insecure channel. Our analysis starts with state-of-the-art solutions and subsequently introduces an authentication scheme aiming at both Information Theoretic Security and resiliency from particular denial-of-service attacks targeting the authentication procedure. The proposed strategy combines -Almost Strongly Universal hashing for unconditional protection and computationally-secure Message Authentication Codes for DoS detection capability. Specifically, we consider the protocol security in a typical QKD scenario, taking into account partially weak authentication keys. Moreover, we add practical considerations related to authentication parameters and experimentally evaluate the performance of the proposed system in terms of computational complexity and key consumption in a reasonable use case.