Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) utilizes the laws of quantum mechanics to enable a verifiably secure distribution of cryptographic key material between distant parties. When properly implemented alongside a one-time pad encryption scheme, QKD can provide unconditional security which is not possible with modern cryptographic systems. One of the most common QKD protocols, the Gaussian-modulated coherent state (GMCS) protocol can never be truly realized due to the stringent requirements of a true Gaussian modulation. This thesis outlines a method for testing a discrete Gaussian-modulated (DGM) QKD protocol which accounts for the discrete nature of its practical implementation. A proof-of-principle experiment for measuring its performance is presented, and a field programmable gate array (FPGA) controlled phase compensation system is designed for practical implementations.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) utilizes the laws of quantum mechanics to enable a verifiably secure distribution of cryptographic key material between distant parties. When properly implemented alongside a one-time pad encryption scheme, QKD can provide unconditional security which is not possible with modern cryptographic systems. One of the most common QKD protocols, the Gaussian-modulated coherent state (GMCS) protocol can never be truly realized due to the stringent requirements of a true Gaussian modulation. This thesis outlines a method for testing a discrete Gaussian-modulated (DGM) QKD protocol which accounts for the discrete nature of its practical implementation. A proof-of-principle experiment for measuring its performance is presented, and a field programmable gate array (FPGA) controlled phase compensation system is designed for practical implementations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables the establishment of secret keys between users connected via a channel vulnerable to eavesdropping, with information-theoretic security, that is, independently of the power of a malevolent party [1]. QKD systems based on the encoding of the key information on continuous variables (CV), such as the values of the quadrature components of coherent states [2], [3], present the major advantage that they only require standard telecommunication technology. However, the most general security proofs for CVQKD required until now the use of Gaussian modulation by the transmitter, complicating practical implementations [4]–[6]. Here, we experimentally implement a protocol that allows for arbitrary, Gaussian-like, discrete modulations, whose security is based on a theoretical proof that applies generally to such situations [7]. These modulation formats are compatible with the use of powerful tools of coherent optical telecommunication, allowing our system to reach an estimated performance of tens of megabit per second secret key rates over 25 km
Abstract Gaussian-modulated coherent-state (GMCS) continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) protocol can allow authenticated users to share secret key with unconditional security. So far, all previous experimental implementations of GMCS CVQKD schemes are based on active modulations, i.e. amplitude and phase modulators and quantum random number generator (QRNG) are required. However, high-speed modulation with high extinction ratio and stability is challenging, which is extremely remarkable in chip-scale silicon photonic realization. While the passive-state-preparation (PSP) CVQKD scheme, which explores the intrinsic field fluctuations of a thermal source, avoids the uses of active modulations and QRNG. In this paper, we experimentally realize the intact PSP CVQKD through a realistic optical fiber channel using off-the-shelf amplified spontaneous emission source. In particular, specially designed frame synchronization method is used to build the correlation between the data measured from the two legitimate parties, and excess noise are synthetically controlled to generate secure secret keys at the metro-area distances when considering the practical and non-negligible finite-size effects under collective Gaussian attacks. Due to the avoidance of modulators and QRNG, the passive state encoding scheme provides a promising direction of applicable high-speed, chip-based and even sunlight-based CVQKD with less cost and complexity.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a promising solution by providing information-theoretic security based on the principles of quantum mechanics. Beyond theoretical experiments, QKD network construction and verification are actively progressing in various locations worldwide. Continuousvariable QKD (CVQKD) has emerged as a strong candidate for integration into optical networks, particularly due to its compatibility with coherent detection schemes used in existing optical communication systems. Gaussian-modulated (GM) CVQKD enables simpler security analysis through covariance matrices, but its practical implementation typically requires highperformance optical components, leading to increased cost and complexity. In contrast, discrete-modulated (DM) CVQKD using modulation formats, such as quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM), can reduce implementation costs by utilizing the existing optical components. However, its security analysis requires more advanced techniques due to the non-Gaussian nature of the quantum states involved. This study evaluates the performance of GM- and DM-CVQKD under a common optical fiber channel model. Our results show that the secure key rates (SKRs) of DM-CVQKD with probabilistic constellation shaping (PCS) 64QAM and PCS-256QAM drop below zero at transmission distances of 277 km and 399 km, respectively. The results confirm the feasibility of DM-CVQKD for long-distance secure communication over optical fiber networks when appropriate modulation formats and PCS are employed.
Abstract A quantum key distribution (QKD) system must fulfill the requirement of universal composability to ensure that any cryptographic application (using the QKD system) is also secure. Furthermore, the theoretical proof responsible for security analysis and key generation should cater to the number N of the distributed quantum states being finite in practice. Continuous-variable (CV) QKD based on coherent states, despite being a suitable candidate for integration in the telecom infrastructure, has so far been unable to demonstrate composability as existing proofs require a rather large N for successful key generation. Here we report a Gaussian-modulated coherent state CVQKD system that is able to overcome these challenges and can generate composable keys secure against collective attacks with N ≈ 2 × 10 8 coherent states. With this advance, possible due to improvements to the security proof and a fast, yet low-noise and highly stable system operation, CVQKD implementations take a significant step towards their discrete-variable counterparts in practicality, performance, and security.
Discrete-modulated coherent-state continuous-variable quantum key distribution (DMCS-CVQKD) is of great value for its simple implementation. However, the traditional DMCS-CVQKD scheme cannot tolerate the high channel excess noise and channel loss, compared to the Gaussian-modulated scheme, and its error correction is still difficult. In this paper, we propose a discrete-modulated coherent-state basis-encoding quantum key distribution (DMCS-BE-QKD) protocol, where the secret keys are encoded in the random choice of 2 measurement bases, i.e., the conjugate quadratures X and P of discrete-modulated coherent states, and it only needs simple binary sequence error correction. We analyze the secret key rate of DMCS-BE-QKD protocol under individual and collective attacks in the linear Gaussian channel. The results show that DMCS-BE-QKD can greatly enhance the ability to tolerate the channel loss and excess noise compared to the original DMCS-CVQKD protocol, which can tolerate approximately 40 dB more channel loss compared to the original DMCS-CVQKD for the realistic value of noise. Finally, a proof-of-principle experiment is conducted under a 50.5-km optical fiber to verify the feasibility of DMCS-BE-QKD. It is based on the consistent physical procedures of the traditional DMCS-CVQKD, which makes it perfectly compatible to deployed terminals and can serve as a multiplier for the practical secure quantum cryptography communication in harsh environments.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide unconditional security based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. Unfortunately, real-life implementations of a QKD system may contain overlooked imperfections and thus violate the practical security of QKD. It is vital to explore these imperfections. In this thesis, I study two practical imperfections in QKD: i) Discovering security loophole in a commercial QKD system: I perform a proof-of-principle experiment to demonstrate a technically feasible quantum attack on top of a commercial QKD system. The attack I utilize is called phase-remapping attack. ii) Generating high-speed truly random numbers: I propose and experimentally demonstrate an ultrafast QRNG at a rate over 6 Gb/s, which is based on the quantum phase fluctuations of a laser. Moreover, I consider a potential adversary who has partial knowledge of the raw data and discuss how one can rigorously remove such partial knowledge with post-processing.