Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Credential Authenticated Identication and Key Exchange

Jan L. Camenisch, Nathalie Casati, Thomas Groß, Victor Shoup

Published Jan 1, 2013• 7 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This paper initiates a study of two-party identication and key-exchange protocols in which users authenticate themselves by prov- ing possession of credentials satisfying arbitrary policies, instead of using the more traditional mechanism of a public-key infrastructure. Deni- tions in the universal composability framework are given, and practical protocols satisfying these denitions, for policies of practical interest, are presented. All protocols are analyzed in the common reference string model, assuming adaptive corruptions with erasures, and no random or- acles. The new security notion includes password-authenticated key ex- change as a special case, and new, practical protocols for this problem are presented as well, including the rst such protocol that provides re- silience against server compromise (without random oracles).

Related papers

Authenticated key exchange protocol with selectable identities

Hua Guo, Yi Mu, Xiyong Zhang +1 more

Abstract In the traditional identity‐based cryptography, a user, who holds multiple identities, has to manage multiple private keys, where each private key is associated with an identity. In this paper, we present a key agreement protocol, which allows a single private key to map multiple public keys (identities) that are selectable by the user. That is, the established session key is associated with an arbitrary subset of identities held by the user, while the unselected identities remain secret to other participants. As a bonus, our scheme can be considered as a credential‐based key agreement, where the unique private key can be treated as a credential of the user and the user only proves that his credential is associated with some selected identities. We prove that our scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing•Apr 15, 2010•3 citations

An ID-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol

Susmita Mandal, Sujata Mohanty, Banshidhar Majhi

Key exchange protocols enable two parties to communicate securely over an untrusted network by exchanging a shared secret among them.Authentication and privacy are the two primary objectives of network security where privacy ensures that transmitted messages cannot eavesdrop.On the other hand, authentication assures that no unauthorized user can gain access maliciously.These two goals can be achieved simultaneously, using authenticated key exchange scheme where two or more parties can share a common secret to transmit a message securely in an open network.Abundant work has been done in 3PAKErelevant to password-based authentication, traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC) and without server's public key Research

ACCENTS Transactions on Information Security•Jan 1, 2017•1 citation

A Universally Composable PAKE with Zero Communication Cost

Lawrence Roy, Jiayu Xu

A Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two parties to agree upon a cryptographic key, when the only information shared in advance is a low-entropy password. The standard security notion for PAKE (Canetti et al., Eurocrypt 2005) is in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. We show that unlike most UC security notions, UC PAKE does not imply correctness. While Canetti et al. has briefly noticed this issue, we present the first comprehensive study of correctness in UC PAKE: We show that TrivialPAKE, a no-message protocol that does not satisfy correctness, is a UC PAKE; We propose nine approaches to guaranteeing correctness in the UC security notion of PAKE, and show that seven of them are equivalent, whereas the other two are unachievable; We prove that a direct solution, namely changing the UC PAKE functionality to incorporate correctness, is impossible; Finally, we show how to naturally incorporate correctness by changing the model—we view PAKE as a three-party protocol, with the man-in-the-middle adversary as the third party. In this way, we hope to shed some light on the very nature of UC-security in the man-in-the-middle setting.

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2023•8 citations

Universally Composable Attribute-based Group Key Exchange

Xie Hui, Yongjie Yan, Sihui Shu

Several protocols implementing attribute-based group key exchange, which allows users with certain set of attributes to establish a session key, have been proposed in recent years.However, attacks on attribute-based group key exchange in current research have been considered only in stand-alone fashion.Thus these protocols may be vulnerable when run with other protocol sessions concurrently.We treat the security of attribute-based group key exchange in the universal composability framework to ensure that a protocol remains secure when run with arbitrary protocol sessions concurrently.More specifically, we define an ideal functionality for attribute-based group key exchange first, then propose a two-round protocol based on a primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism.In addition, a complete security proof of our protocol in the universal composability framework under random oracle model is given.

International Journal of Security and Its Applications•Jan 31, 2015•0 citations

Universally Composable Authentication and Key-exchange with Global PKI

Ran Canetti, Daniel Shahaf, Margarita Vald

Message authentication and key exchange are two of the most basic tasks of cryptography. Solutions based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) are prevalent. Still, the state of the art in composable security analysis of PKI-based authentication and key exchange is somewhat unsatisfactory. Specifically, existing treatments either (a) make the unrealistic assumption that the PKI is accessible only within the confines of the protocol itself, thus failing to capture real-world PKI-based authentication, or (b) impose oftenunnecessary requirements—such as strong on-line non-transferability—on candidate protocols, thus ruling out natural candidates. We give a modular and universally composable analytical framework for PKI-based message authentication and key exchange protocols. This framework guarantees security even when the PKI is pre-existing and globally available, without being unnecessarily restrictive. Specifically, we model PKI as a global set-up functionality within the Global UC security model [Canetti et al., TCC 2007] and relax the ideal authentication and key exchange functionalities accordingly. We then demonstrate the security of basic signature-based authentication and key exchange protocols. Our modeling makes minimal security assumptions on the PKI in use; in particular, “knowledge of the secret key” is not needed.

•Jan 1, 2014•2 citations

Efficient Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange

Hongyong Jia, Sihan Qing, Li-Ze Gu +1 more

In this article, we propose an improvement on the universally composable password-based key exchange protocol. We replace one-time signature with message authentication codes which reduce the bandwidth consumption. For typical security parameters our improvement saves as much as 12 Kbytes of bandwidth in a protocol execution. Our protocol can be efficiently instantiated using either the DDH or the N-residuosity Assumption. A complete security proof of the proposed protocol is given in the universally composable framework under common reference string model.

International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS)•Dec 1, 2008•1 citation
This paper initiates a study of two-party identication and key-exchange protocols in which users authenticate themselves by prov- ing possession of credentials satisfying arbitrary policies, instead of using the more traditional mechanism of a public-key infrastructure. Deni- tions in the universal composability framework are given, and practical protocols satisfying these denitions, for policies of practical interest, are presented. All protocols are analyzed in the common reference string model, assuming adaptive corruptions with erasures, and no random or- acles. The new security notion includes password-authenticated key ex- change as a special case, and new, practical protocols for this problem are presented as well, including the rst such protocol that provides re- silience against server compromise (without random oracles).
Abstract In the traditional identity‐based cryptography, a user, who holds multiple identities, has to manage multiple private keys, where each private key is associated with an identity. In this paper, we present a key agreement protocol, which allows a single private key to map multiple public keys (identities) that are selectable by the user. That is, the established session key is associated with an arbitrary subset of identities held by the user, while the unselected identities remain secret to other participants. As a bonus, our scheme can be considered as a credential‐based key agreement, where the unique private key can be treated as a credential of the user and the user only proves that his credential is associated with some selected identities. We prove that our scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Key exchange protocols enable two parties to communicate securely over an untrusted network by exchanging a shared secret among them.Authentication and privacy are the two primary objectives of network security where privacy ensures that transmitted messages cannot eavesdrop.On the other hand, authentication assures that no unauthorized user can gain access maliciously.These two goals can be achieved simultaneously, using authenticated key exchange scheme where two or more parties can share a common secret to transmit a message securely in an open network.Abundant work has been done in 3PAKErelevant to password-based authentication, traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC) and without server's public key Research
A Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol allows two parties to agree upon a cryptographic key, when the only information shared in advance is a low-entropy password. The standard security notion for PAKE (Canetti et al., Eurocrypt 2005) is in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. We show that unlike most UC security notions, UC PAKE does not imply correctness. While Canetti et al. has briefly noticed this issue, we present the first comprehensive study of correctness in UC PAKE: We show that TrivialPAKE, a no-message protocol that does not satisfy correctness, is a UC PAKE; We propose nine approaches to guaranteeing correctness in the UC security notion of PAKE, and show that seven of them are equivalent, whereas the other two are unachievable; We prove that a direct solution, namely changing the UC PAKE functionality to incorporate correctness, is impossible; Finally, we show how to naturally incorporate correctness by changing the model—we view PAKE as a three-party protocol, with the man-in-the-middle adversary as the third party. In this way, we hope to shed some light on the very nature of UC-security in the man-in-the-middle setting.
Several protocols implementing attribute-based group key exchange, which allows users with certain set of attributes to establish a session key, have been proposed in recent years.However, attacks on attribute-based group key exchange in current research have been considered only in stand-alone fashion.Thus these protocols may be vulnerable when run with other protocol sessions concurrently.We treat the security of attribute-based group key exchange in the universal composability framework to ensure that a protocol remains secure when run with arbitrary protocol sessions concurrently.More specifically, we define an ideal functionality for attribute-based group key exchange first, then propose a two-round protocol based on a primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based key encapsulation mechanism.In addition, a complete security proof of our protocol in the universal composability framework under random oracle model is given.
Message authentication and key exchange are two of the most basic tasks of cryptography. Solutions based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) are prevalent. Still, the state of the art in composable security analysis of PKI-based authentication and key exchange is somewhat unsatisfactory. Specifically, existing treatments either (a) make the unrealistic assumption that the PKI is accessible only within the confines of the protocol itself, thus failing to capture real-world PKI-based authentication, or (b) impose oftenunnecessary requirements—such as strong on-line non-transferability—on candidate protocols, thus ruling out natural candidates. We give a modular and universally composable analytical framework for PKI-based message authentication and key exchange protocols. This framework guarantees security even when the PKI is pre-existing and globally available, without being unnecessarily restrictive. Specifically, we model PKI as a global set-up functionality within the Global UC security model [Canetti et al., TCC 2007] and relax the ideal authentication and key exchange functionalities accordingly. We then demonstrate the security of basic signature-based authentication and key exchange protocols. Our modeling makes minimal security assumptions on the PKI in use; in particular, “knowledge of the secret key” is not needed.
In this article, we propose an improvement on the universally composable password-based key exchange protocol. We replace one-time signature with message authentication codes which reduce the bandwidth consumption. For typical security parameters our improvement saves as much as 12 Kbytes of bandwidth in a protocol execution. Our protocol can be efficiently instantiated using either the DDH or the N-residuosity Assumption. A complete security proof of the proposed protocol is given in the universally composable framework under common reference string model.