Abstract This chapter surveys various proposals to interpret—that is, make sense of—quantum mechanics. We could attempt to think of quantum mechanics in purely instrumentalist terms, as an algorithm to predict observed experimental results. But this fits badly with scientific practice and is probably not viable. We could attempt to modify quantum mechanics itself to resolve the paradoxes, and there are some simple models that attempt to do that: some are ‘hidden-variable’ theories that add extra properties to the theory, some are ‘dynamical-collapse’ theories that modify the theory’s equations. But none of these models succeed in reproducing quantum theory’s predictions outside a relatively narrow range of applications. Or we could try to take the apparent indefiniteness of quantum mechanics literally, and interpret it as a theory of many parallel worlds. The correct interpretation of quantum mechanics remains controversial, but the search for understanding and interpretation of the theory has led to very substantial scientific results and is likely to lead to more.
Abstract This chapter surveys various proposals to interpret—that is, make sense of—quantum mechanics. We could attempt to think of quantum mechanics in purely instrumentalist terms, as an algorithm to predict observed experimental results. But this fits badly with scientific practice and is probably not viable. We could attempt to modify quantum mechanics itself to resolve the paradoxes, and there are some simple models that attempt to do that: some are ‘hidden-variable’ theories that add extra properties to the theory, some are ‘dynamical-collapse’ theories that modify the theory’s equations. But none of these models succeed in reproducing quantum theory’s predictions outside a relatively narrow range of applications. Or we could try to take the apparent indefiniteness of quantum mechanics literally, and interpret it as a theory of many parallel worlds. The correct interpretation of quantum mechanics remains controversial, but the search for understanding and interpretation of the theory has led to very substantial scientific results and is likely to lead to more.
Why does such a successful theory like Quantum Mechanics have so many mysteries? The history of this theory is replete with dubious interpretations and controversies, and yet a knowledge of its predictions, however, contributed to the amazing technological revolution of the last hundred years. In its very beginning Einstein pointed out that there was something missing, due to contradictions with the relativity theory. So, even though Quantum Mechanics explains all the nanoscale physical phenomena, there were many attempts to find a way to “complete” it, e.g. hidden-variable theories. In this paper, we discuss some of those enigmas, with special attention to the concepts of physical reality imposed by quantum mechanics, the role of the observer, prediction limits, a definition of collapse, and how to deal with correlated states (the basic strategy for quantum computers and quantum teleportation). That discussion is carried out within the framework of accepting that there is in fact nothing important missing, rather we are just restricted by the limitations imposed by quantum mechanics. The mysteries are thus explained by a proper interpretation of those limitations, which is achieved by introducing two interpretation rules within the Copenhagen paradigm.
Abstract This chapter introduces the central mysteries of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is an enormously successful theory that lies at the heart of modern physics, but there is no agreement on how to understand it. Simple experiments with light demonstrate why: in understanding those experiments, we have to shift inconsistently back and forth between thinking of the theory as assigning indefinite, delocalized, but known properties to a system, and assigning definite, localized, but unknown properties (this is called the ‘problem of measurement’). Furthermore, when we break a system into subsystems, the state of the system is not determined by the states of the subsystem (this is called ‘entanglement’), and simple arguments seem to tell us that the physical properties of entangled subsystems can influence one another non-locally—faster than light. These three mysteries—measurement, entanglement, non-locality—need to be addressed by any attempt to make sense of quantum theory.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.
This paper explores how experiments influence the reception of interpretations of quantum mechanics, and also other relations between experiments and interpretations in that field. We start by surveying the struggle of different schools of philosophy of science in the 19th and early 20th centuries to adapt to the scientific advances, and then give a brief overview of realist and antirealist interpretations in quantum mechanics. Eight different types of relations between interpretations and experiments are then examined, with case studies from the history of quantum mechanics. (1) Many interpretations agree with all of the predictions of the instrumentalist interpretation, which is a good strategy for survival. (2) Some interpretations make different predictions that are not testable. (3) Other interpretations constitute ‘a different theory’ and are testable, although sometimes this is not anticipated by the interpretation. (4) Some interpretations have generated many variations, by adjustment of parameters or hypotheses, and part of these variations have been tested and ruled out by experiment. (5) At times experiments reinforce an interpretation. (6) Some experiments lead to a refinement of the interpretation. (7) There are experiments that suggest the creation of an interpretation. (8) And there are cases in which experiments are suggested by an interpretation, while not affecting its rivals.
This brief survey analyzes the epistemological implications about the role of observer in the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. As we know, the goal of most interpretations of quantum mechanics is to avoid the apparent intrusion of the observer into the measurement process. In the same time, there are implicit and hidden assumptions about his role. In fact, most interpretations taking as ontic level one of these fundamental concepts as information, physical law and matter bring us to new problematical questions. We think, that no interpretation of the quantum theory can avoid this intrusion until we do not clarify the nature of observer.