Pragmatism: a natural home for information-theoretic interpretations of quantum theory?

Leah Henderson

Claudio Garola

Reza Maleeh

In this paper I give a new information-theoretic analysis of the formalisms and interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) in general, and of two mainstream interpretations of quantum mechanics in particular: The Copenhagen interpretation and David Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Adopting Juan G. Roederer’s reading of the notion of pragmatic information, I argue that pragmatic information is not applicable to the Copenhagen interpretation since the interpretation is primarily concerned with epistemology rather than ontology. However it perfectly fits Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics in the realms of biotic and artificial systems. Viewing Bohm’s interpretation of QM in the context of pragmatic information imposes serious limitations to the qualitative aspect of such an interpretation, making his extension of the notion active information to every level of reality illegitimate. Such limitations lead to the idea that, contrary to Bohm’s claim, mind is not a more subtle aspect of reality via the quantum potential as active information, but the quantum potential as it affects particles in the double-slit experiment represents the non-algorithmic aspect of the mind as a genuine information processing system. This will provide an information-based ground, firstly, for refreshing our views on quantum interpretations and secondly, for a novel qualitative theory of the relationship of mind and matter in which mind-like properties are exclusive attributes of living systems. To this end, I will also take an information-theoretic approach to the notion of intentionality as interpreted by John Searle.

Manuel Bächtold

Ali Barzegar, Daniele Oriti

Reza Maleeh, Parisa Amani

In this paper it is claimed that Bohm’s holistic, realistic, causally deterministic, non-local theory of the relationship of mind and matter which is based on the key notion of “active information” suffers from an ill inductive reasoning. It is shown that the notion is a special case of the notion of pragmatic information as posed by Roederer which applies merely to natural living systems and artifacts (unnatural nonliving systems). So, the extension of the thesis of active information to the natural nonliving world would count as a violation of the key constituent concepts of pragmatic information and as an ill generalization of Bohm’s thesis itself. Active information as ‘mind’ will be found in biological systems and in some artifacts which represent the biological mind. There is no reason to think of inanimate nature being driven by information. This, in turn, would lead to the substitution of empirical realism for realism which will modify Bohm’s ideas to come even closer to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. NeuroQuantology | June 2012 | Volume 10 | Issue 2 | Page 150-163