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中国科学通报：英文版

The security of decoy state protocol in the partial photon number splitting attack

Liu, Dong, Wang, Shuang, Yin, Zhenqiang, Chen, Wei Nie, Han, Zheng-fu

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

圈套状态协议被建议克服切开攻击的原始光子数字。当使用更好的策略时，攻击者能保证信号状态的全面获得的比率几乎不对圈套状态脉搏变化搏动，到甚至保留信号状态脉搏平等者的全面获得到没有攻击者，获得了那。在这份报纸，我们首先给切开包含原来的攻击的部分光子数字的一个模型，然后发现圈套状态协议仍然在切开攻击的部分光子数字下面有效地工作。

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For a start, Quantum Key Distribution offers security not depending on any fundamental assumption. However, actual realizations choose to use weak coherent pulses as photon sources, rather than the ideal single-photon state, which bears security weaknesses due to the emission of sporadic multi-photon states. These states can be used in Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) attacks, where the attacker intercepts and buffers photons of multi-photon pulses and forwards the rest, enabling partial recovery of the key without inducing detectable perturbations. This article presents a simulation-based approach to analyze PNS attacks with realistic channel conditions like losses, detector imperfections, and finite key lengths. The research also examines the performance of decoy-state countermeasures, that use variable-intensity pulses to statistically reveal eavesdropping and Simulation results confirm the dominant character of PNS on raw key rates for the no-countermeasure scenario and ensure optimal decoy-state schemes restore security by cutting single-photon contributions. Results establish that although WCP QKD is vulnerable to PNS attacks in theory, strict adoption of decoy-state protocols aided with monitoring and finite-key analysis can provide immunity against an adversary. The paper emphasizes the need for simulation-based, implementation-dependent security analysis in direction towards well-designed practical quantum cryptographic systems. [1] [2] [3] [4] [10] [8]

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圈套状态协议被建议克服切开攻击的原始光子数字。当使用更好的策略时，攻击者能保证信号状态的全面获得的比率几乎不对圈套状态脉搏变化搏动，到甚至保留信号状态脉搏平等者的全面获得到没有攻击者，获得了那。在这份报纸，我们首先给切开包含原来的攻击的部分光子数字的一个模型，然后发现圈套状态协议仍然在切开攻击的部分光子数字下面有效地工作。
The decoy state protocol was proposed to overcome the primitive photon number splitting attack. When using a better strategy, the attacker can ensure that the ratio of the overall gain of the signal state pulse against the decoy state pulse changes very little, even to keep the overall gain of the signal state pulses equal to that obtained without attacker. In this paper we first give a model of the partial photon number splitting attack which contains the original one, and then find that the decoy state protocol still works effectively under the partial photon number splitting attack.
Decoy-state protocols provide a way to defeat photon-number-splitting attacks in quantum cryptography implemented with weak coherent pulses. We point out that previous security analyses of such protocols relied on assumptions about eavesdropping attacks that considered treating each pulse equally and independently. We give an example to demonstrate that, without such assumptions, the security parameters of previous decoy-state implementations could be worse than the ones claimed. Next we consider more general photon-number-splitting attacks, which correlate different pulses, and give an estimation procedure for the number of single-photon signals with rigorous security statements. The impact of our result is that previous analyses of the number of times a decoy-state quantum cryptographic system can be reused before it makes a weak key must be revised.
For a start, Quantum Key Distribution offers security not depending on any fundamental assumption. However, actual realizations choose to use weak coherent pulses as photon sources, rather than the ideal single-photon state, which bears security weaknesses due to the emission of sporadic multi-photon states. These states can be used in Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) attacks, where the attacker intercepts and buffers photons of multi-photon pulses and forwards the rest, enabling partial recovery of the key without inducing detectable perturbations. This article presents a simulation-based approach to analyze PNS attacks with realistic channel conditions like losses, detector imperfections, and finite key lengths. The research also examines the performance of decoy-state countermeasures, that use variable-intensity pulses to statistically reveal eavesdropping and Simulation results confirm the dominant character of PNS on raw key rates for the no-countermeasure scenario and ensure optimal decoy-state schemes restore security by cutting single-photon contributions. Results establish that although WCP QKD is vulnerable to PNS attacks in theory, strict adoption of decoy-state protocols aided with monitoring and finite-key analysis can provide immunity against an adversary. The paper emphasizes the need for simulation-based, implementation-dependent security analysis in direction towards well-designed practical quantum cryptographic systems. [1] [2] [3] [4] [10] [8]