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Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences

An Efficient Two-Party Key Exchange Protocol with Strong Security

Deng, Shaofeng, LI ., Yifa, Yiqun

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

联合公钥(CPK ) 密码学不需要证书保证公钥的真实性并且避免基于身份的密码学的固有的关键附带条件契约问题。基于有效 CPK 计划，我们在场一把有效三回合的两大政党的证实的钥匙与强壮的安全交换协议，它在在 decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH ) 假设下面的标准模型是 provably 安全的。除了一个人狂欢之外，协议能阻止会议钥匙秘密对手短暂私人关键、静态的私人钥匙都被揭示到对手。比作存在协议，这个协议不仅保证强壮的安全而且是更有效的。

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联合公钥(CPK ) 密码学不需要证书保证公钥的真实性并且避免基于身份的密码学的固有的关键附带条件契约问题。基于有效 CPK 计划，我们在场一把有效三回合的两大政党的证实的钥匙与强壮的安全交换协议，它在在 decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH ) 假设下面的标准模型是 provably 安全的。除了一个人狂欢之外，协议能阻止会议钥匙秘密对手短暂私人关键、静态的私人钥匙都被揭示到对手。比作存在协议，这个协议不仅保证强壮的安全而且是更有效的。
给出了一个无双线性对的无证书两方密钥协商方案,并演示了这些不安全无证书方案存在的攻击.只要每方至少有1 个未泄露的秘密值,该方案在最强的安全模型下就是安全的.即使密钥生成中心知道双方的临时私钥或显示双方的秘密值/替换公钥(但不能同时),但只要计算Diffie-Hellman 假设成立,该方案在随机预言机模型下也被证明是安全的.该方案消除了对运算,与其他无证书密钥协商方案相比,该方案是己知无证书安全协商方案中计算复杂度最低的.该方案尤其适合于带宽受限的通信环境中使用,如Ad Hoc 网络、无线传感器网络等.
Combined public key (CPK) cryptography does not need certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and avoids the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. Based on the efficient CPK scheme, we present an efficient three-round two-party authenticated key exchange protocol with strong security, which is provably secure in the standard model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. The protocol can keep the session key secret from the adversary except that one party’s ephemeral private key and static private key are all revealed to the adversary. Compared to the existing protocols, this protocol not only assures strong security but also is more efficient.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to introduce a scalable group key exchange (GKE) protocol with provable security, which is used to establish a confidential channel. Design/methodology/approach The protocol in this paper uses line structure, rather than formal ring structure or tree structure, to reduce the amount of calculation and communication. Findings In the protocol, every participant just need send two messages. The security can be proved under the Decisional Diffie‐Hellman (DDH) problem. Originality/value Using the protocol provides an efficient and secure method to allow group users to share a common key.
无证书的公钥密码学(CL-PKC ) 避免固有的 escrowof 基于身份的密码学并且不要求证书保证真实性得到 ofpublic 钥匙。基于 CL-PKC，我们在场一把有效的经常回合的组钥匙交换协议，它在计算 Diffie-Hellman 的难驾驭下面是 provably 安全的问题。Ourprotocol 是有完美的前面的秘密的贡献关键交换并且有仅仅二 communicationrounds。它因此比另外的协议更有效。而且，我们的协议提供有效的经常回合的组钥匙交换协议和很秘密的分享计划 couldbe 采用了构造我们的协议的方法 todesign。
The Chou-Orlandi batch oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is a particularly attractive OT protocol that bridges the gap between practical efficiency and strong security guarantees and is especially notable due to its simplicity. The security analysis provided by Chou and Orlandi bases the security of their protocol on the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in prime-order groups. Concretely, in groups in which no better-than-generic algorithms are known for the CDH problem, their security analysis yields that an attacker running in time t and issuing q random-oracle queries breaks the security of their protocol with probability at most ϵ ≤ q 2 · t / 2 κ / 2 , where κ is the bit-length of the group's order. This concrete bound, however, is somewhat insufficient for 256-bit groups (e.g., for κ = 256 , it does not provide any guarantee already for t = 2 48 and q = 2 40 ). In this work, we establish a tighter concrete security bound for the Chou-Orlandi protocol. First, we introduce the list square Diffie-Hellman problem and present a tight reduction from the security of the protocol to the hardness of solving the list square Diffie-Hellman problem. That is, we completely shift the task of analyzing the concrete security of the protocol to that of analyzing the concrete hardness of the list square Diffie-Hellman problem. Second, we reduce the hardness of the list square Diffie-Hellman problem to that of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem without incurring a multiplicative loss. Our key observation is that although CDH and DDH have the same assumed concrete hardness, relying on the hardness of DDH enables our reduction to efficiently test the correctness of the solutions it produces. Concretely, in groups in which no better-than-generic algorithms are known for the DDH problem, our analysis yields that an attacker running in time t and issuing q ≤ t random-oracle queries breaks the security of the Chou-Orlandi protocol with probability at most ϵ ≤ t / 2 κ / 2 (i.e., we eliminate the above multiplicative q 2 term). We prove our results within the standard real-vs-ideal framework considering static corruptions by malicious adversaries, and provide a concrete security treatment by accounting for the statistical distance between a real-model execution and an ideal-model execution.