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IEEE/IFIP International Conference on VLSI and System-on-Chip (VLSI-SoC)

100 Gbit/s authenticated encryption based on quantum key distribution

Michael Muehlberghuber, Christoph Keller, N. Felber, Christian Pendl

Published Oct 1, 2012• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/vlsi-soc.2012.6379017

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In this section, I wish to put quantum key distribution (QKD) in the wider context of a cryptosystem. I shall discuss informally some aspects that are considered important. The questions I wish to answer here are: “What are the ingredients needed to make a QKD-based cryptosystem work? What services does it bring? What are its limitations?” As I shall detail below, QKD may be used to provide the users with confidential communications. This can be achieved when we combine QKD and the one-time pad. For the quantum modulation, QKD needs a source of truly random numbers. Also, QKD requires a classical authenticated channel to work, so authentication plays an essential role. As a consequence, QKD must start with a secret key, making it a secret-key encryption scheme. I will also discuss what happens if classical cryptography is introduced in the system. Finally, I will describe the implementation of a simple cryptosystem on top of QKD. A key distribution scheme The first function of QKD is to distribute a secret key between two parties. The use of this key is outside the scope of this first section – the need for a secret key is omnipresent in cryptography. As depicted in Fig. 5.1, QKD relies on a classical authenticated channel for sifting and secret-key distillation and on random bits for the modulation of quantum states. The key produced by QKD can be intended for encryption purposes – this will be discussed in Section 5.2 – but is also required by authentication. A part of the distributed key is used for authentication. When QKD is run for the first time, however, an initial secret key must be used instead.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables unconditionally secure communication between distinct parties using a quantum channel and an authentic public channel. Reducing the portion of quantum-generated secret keys, that is consumed during the authentication procedure, is of significant importance for improving the performance of QKD systems. In the present work, we develop a lightweight authentication protocol for QKD based on a `ping-pong' scheme of authenticity check for QKD. An important feature of this scheme is that the only one authentication tag is generated and transmitted during each of the QKD post-processing rounds. For the tag generation purpose, we design an unconditionally secure procedure based on the concept of key recycling. The procedure is based on the combination of almost universal2polynomial hashing, XOR universal2Toeplitz hashing, and one-time pad (OTP) encryption. We demonstrate how to minimize both the length of the recycled key and the size of the authentication key, that is required for OTP encryption. As a result, in real case scenarios, the portion of quantum-generated secret keys that is consumed for the authentication purposes is below 1%. Finally, we provide a security analysis of the full quantum key growing process in the framework of universally composable security.