Clarifications and specifications. A conversation with Henry Stapp

Yu Watanabe

Matthew J. Donald

For many years, Henry Stapp and I have been working separately and independently on mind-centered interpretations of quantum theory. In this review, I discuss his work and contrast it with my own. There is much that we agree on, both in the broad problems we have addressed and in some of the specific details of our analyses of neural physics, but ultimately we disagree fundamently in our views on mind, matter, and quantum mechanics. In particular, I discuss our contrasting opinions about the nature and randomness of quantum events, about relativity theory, and about the many-minds idea. I also suggest that Stapp's theories are inadequately developed.

Abner Shimony, Howard Stein

A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.

Fei Yan, Salvador Elías Venegas-Andraca

Ivan Hubač, Stephen S. Wilson

Paavo Pylkkänen

This paper briefly discusses some of David Bohm’s views on mind and matter and suggests that they allow for a stronger possibility for conscious free will to influence quantum dynamics than Henry Stapp’s approach.