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Communications in Theoretical Physics

Cascading attack on trusted-relay quantum key distribution networks

Jian Wang, Xingtong Liu

Published Mar 16, 2021• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Trusted relays are the main state-of-the-art way to realize quantum key distribution networks. However, it is hard to require that all nodes in the network are fully trusted. In a multipath key-transmission mechanism, the nodes can be weakly trusted because the secret key can be split into many parts and each part is transmitted to the receiver through a different path. However, if the capacity of a node’s quantum key pool is poorly designed, an attacker, Eve may eavesdrop on the communicating parties’ secret message by initiating a redirection attack. In this paper, we show that Eve can trigger a cascading collapse effect by collapsing one of the edges in the network and forcing the communication parties to transmit the message through the nodes controlled by Eve. The influence of the traffic transfer ratio and the control parameters of the edge load on the breakdown probability of the edge are analyzed using a simulation. In order to effectively defend against the cascading attack, it is important for the designer to handle the relationship between the traffic and the capacity of the quantum key pool of each node in the network.

DOI
10.1088/1572-9494/abeedc

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Abstract Trusted relays are the main state-of-the-art way to realize quantum key distribution networks. However, it is hard to require that all nodes in the network are fully trusted. In a multipath key-transmission mechanism, the nodes can be weakly trusted because the secret key can be split into many parts and each part is transmitted to the receiver through a different path. However, if the capacity of a node’s quantum key pool is poorly designed, an attacker, Eve may eavesdrop on the communicating parties’ secret message by initiating a redirection attack. In this paper, we show that Eve can trigger a cascading collapse effect by collapsing one of the edges in the network and forcing the communication parties to transmit the message through the nodes controlled by Eve. The influence of the traffic transfer ratio and the control parameters of the edge load on the breakdown probability of the edge are analyzed using a simulation. In order to effectively defend against the cascading attack, it is important for the designer to handle the relationship between the traffic and the capacity of the quantum key pool of each node in the network.
We study the significance of the common trusted relay assumption in quantum networks. While most practical implementations of quantum networks rely on trusted devices, the question of security without this assumption has been rarely addressed. Device independent security attempts to minimize the assumptions made on the quantum hardware, entanglement based methods try to avoid relays to the extent possible, and multipath transmission improves robustness and security by enforcing the attacker to conquer more than just a single intermediate node. Common to all these past studies is their focus on the physical layer and direct connections. We describe an attack from the networking and routing layer. Assuming at least one node that is not perfectly tamper-proof, meaning that an attacker has established a foothold to read traffic from the inside, we show how to exploit the eavesdropping detection mechanisms of the quantum key distribution (QKD) devices to cause traffic redirection over the vulnerable node, thus defeating security under the trusted node assumption. We experimentally demonstrate how the attack works on networks of different size and topology, and thereby further substantiate the significance of the trust assumptions for end-to-end security of QKD networks.
Quantum networks are communication networks in which adjacent nodes enjoy perfectly secure channels thanks to quantum key distribution (QKD). Drawing end- to-end security from QKD-supported point-to-point security can be done by virtue of multipath transmission. This concept buys security at the cost of strongly connected networks and perfect routing. Particularly the latter is hard to ensure, since congestions or (passive) may cause QKD key- buffers to run empty, thus enforcing local re-routing of packets. Hence, the adversary may use not to extract information, but to redirect the information flow towards a relay-node that he controls. Such attacks can readily invalidate the stringent requirements of multipath transmission protocols and thus defeat any formal arguments for perfect secrecy. Moreover, this form of indirect eavesdropping seems to be unconsidered in the literature so far. We investigate whether or not unconditional security in a quantum network with non- reliable routing is possible. Using Markov-chains, we derive various sufficient criteria for retaining perfect secrecy under imperfect packet relay. In particular, we explicitly do not assume trusted relay or quantum repeaters available. Keywords-Quantum Cryptography, Markov-Chain, Secure
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can protect the exchange process of confidential information between communicating parties. By using the basic principles of quantum mechanics and combined with “one-time pad” cipher encryption, information can be unconditionally secure. The BB84 protocol first describes the method of transmitting information by photon polarization state, and it expounds the transmission process of services between trusted relays. However, due to the defects of real experimental devices, there are security vulnerabilities in QKD in a real system. The birth of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol solves the problem, providing immunity to hacker attacks at the end of the detector. It can enable both sides of the transmission service to establish a connection and generate secret keys through an untrusted relay node to ensure information security. However, the types and properties of link nodes in quantum key distribution network (QKDN) based on partially trusted relay are more complex, which can easily result in network fault. Therefore, how to prevent the impact of failure on QKDN has become an urgent problem. In this paper, we propose a protection scheme for QKDN with partially trusted relays. The method deals with trusted and untrusted relays differently and constructs the working and protection paths of the secret key for each service. It reduces resource conflict between the protection and working paths by establishing a key protection threshold, which realizes the resource trade-off between the two factors. Simulation results show that the scheme provides effective protection to the services, and it improves the stability and reliability of QKDN based on partially trusted relay.
As a promising application of quantum information technology, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) can provide information-theoretically secure key exchange for adjacent communication parties. To achieve long-distance secure communication and scale expansion against inherent channel loss, trusted relays, which are assumed to be absolutely secure, are introduced into QKD networks. However, in practice, trusted relays may be compromised by attacks from ubiquitous eavesdroppers even protected by powerful hardware. Thus, how to ensure the security of end-to-end key distribution in partially-trusted relay QKD networks with the coexistence of trusted relays and untrusted relays becomes a challenging but urgent problem to be solved. To address this critical problem, in this article, we design a segment-based multipath key distribution method. The basic idea of the method is to maximize the security of the end-to-end key distribution through the segment-based multipath key distribution. Under the premise of security level requirements, we further propose a flexible key reconstruction scheme to improve the efficiency of key distribution and obtain available secret keys as many as possible. The extensive simulations are conducted and the results reveal that our method significantly outperforms the traditional multipath QKD method in terms of both security and efficiency.
In a quantum key distribution (QKD) network based on trusted relays, quantum key fragments may be lost due to the unreliability of network transmission during the transmission of quantum keys for end-to-end cryptographic applications through these relays. Consequently, the keys at both ends are out of sync. A self-synchronization scheme of quantum key transmission is proposed to address this issue and to ensure consistent quantum keys between non-adjacent network nodes. In this scheme, each network node establishes two types of key pools: the neighbor pool (NP) and the cross pool (CP). The keys of the CP in the sending node are divided into key fragments, and each fragment is encrypted with the keys in the NP using the one-time pad (OTP) method before being transmitted to the receiving node. The receiving node only stores the key fragments that are correctly received in the corresponding locations of the CP, ensuring key consistency between the sending and receiving nodes through error handling mechanisms. Under this scheme, if the receiving node does not receive the key fragments due to errors or packet loss during the key transmission process, it will no longer initiate data retransmission and other operations, thereby avoiding multiple interactions between the sending and receiving nodes and improving the efficiency of key transmission.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols generate a same secret key at two nodes which are at different locations. Such key is used to encrypt and decrypt messages for unconditionally secure communications through a classical channel. Originally, QKD protocols are designed to work between two nodes which are directly connected through a point-to-point quantum channel. Currently, commercial QKD systems have limited range and key rate. To increase key rate and extend range, the key generated by QKD at one end node is relayed hop-by-hop to the other end node through multiple trusted nodes. In a QKD network with multiple pairs of communicating nodes, routing deals with the issue of deciding for each pair, which trusted nodes are used to form a path connecting the end nodes. This paper presents an overview of QKD and highlights the differences between QKD routing as compared to classical routing. The challenges of QKD routing are presented. Existing works dealing with the challenges are surveyed. This paper ends with a discussion on remaining research issues.