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Physics World

Thirty years of ‘against measurement’

Jim Baggott

Published Feb 1, 2021• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Despite its many successes, physicists are still struggling to nail down a coherent interpretation of quantum mechanics, as it best represents “reality”. Jim Baggott explores the arguments first put forth by John Bell three decades ago, and looks at theoretical and experimental evidence accumulated since
DOI
10.1088/2058-7058/33/12/28

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Despite its enormous practical success, quantum theory is so contrary to intuition that, even after 45 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed?
Despite its enormous practical success, quantum theory is so contrary to intuition that, even after 45 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed?
(A point-by-point response to a comment (quant-ph/0509130) on our paper (quant-ph/0509089) is added as Appendix C. We find the comment incorrect.) Einstein's criticism of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is an important part of his legacy. Although most physicists consider Einstein's criticism technically unfounded, we show that the Copenhagen interpretation is actually incorrect, since Born's probability explanation of the wave function is incorrect due to a false assumption on "continuous probabilities" in modern probability theory. "Continuous probability" means a "probability measure" that can take every value in a subinterval of the unit interval (0, 1). We prove that such "continuous probabilities" are invalid. Since Bell's inequality also assumes "continuous probabilities", the result of the experimental test of Bell's inequality is not evidence supporting the Copenhagen interpretation. Although successful applications of quantum mechanics and explanation of quantum phenomena do not necessarily rely on the Copenhagen interpretation, the question asked by Einstein 70 years ago, i.e., whether a complete description of reality exists, still remains open.
Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact formulation of some serious part of quantum mechanics? By ‘exact’ I do not of course mean ‘exactly true’. I mean only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist...until workable approximations are needed in applications. By ‘serious’ I mean that some substantial fragment of physics should be covered. Nonrelativistic ‘particle’ quantum mechanics, perhaps with the inclusion of the electromagnetic field and cut-off interaction, is serious enough. For it covers ‘a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry’ (P A M Dirac 1929 Proc. R. Soc.A 123 714). I mean too, by ‘serious’, that ‘apparatus’ should not be separated off from the rest of the world into black boxes, as if it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum mechanics.
In loving memory of Asher Peres, we discuss a most important and influential paper written in 1935 by his thesis supervisor and mentor Nathan Rosen, together with Albert Einstein and Boris Podolsky. In that paper, the trio known as EPR questioned the completeness of quantum mechanics. The authors argued that the then-new theory should not be considered final because they believed it incapable of describing physical reality. The epic battle between Einstein and Bohr intensified following the latter's response later the same year. Three decades elapsed before John S. Bell gave a devastating proof that the EPR argument was fatally flawed. The modest purpose of our paper is to give a critical analysis of the original EPR paper and point out its logical shortcomings in a way that could have been done 70 years ago, with no need to wait for Bell's theorem. We also present an overview of Bohr's response in the interest of showing how it failed to address the gist of the EPR argument.