Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s 1916 derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure.
Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s 1916 derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure.
Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld's ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac's 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger-Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld's theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld's success a 'miracle', which rather makes a joke of the so-called 'no miracles argument'. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist Commitment Required?3Enter the Physicists4A New Approach to the Non-relativistic Success5Relativity and Spin6Structure and Realist Commitment7Conclusion.
Niels Bohr’s model of the hydrogen and hydrogen-like atoms, in which the electron is allowed to revolve in certain circular orbits around the nucleus, was extended by Arnold Sommerfeld to allow for the possibility of elliptical orbits. Each elliptical orbit was constrained by two quantization conditions specified by a positive integer nφ and a non-negative integer nr. If, in the presence of the attractive Coulomb force between the electron and the nucleus, the dynamics of the atom were taken to be governed by the Newtonian laws of motion, the energy Ɛ of the two-particle system was found to be a function of the positive integer n = nr + nφ. The atomic energy levels thus exhibited an n-fold degeneracy, which would be lifted in the presence of external electric or magnetic fields, thus accounting for the fine-structure of the spectral lines emitted by the atom—phenomena observed, respectively, in the Stark effect and the Zeeman effect. Sommerfeld also examined the behavior of his elliptical orbits by allowing the revolving electron to obey Einstein’s relativistic dynamics. In this case, the energy-level degeneracies were lifted (even in the absence of external perturbations), and the elliptical orbits were found to precess around the nucleus—similarly to the precession of, say, the orbit of the planet Mercury around the Sun. What is astonishing about Sommerfeld’s relativistic expression of the energy Ɛ as a function of nφ and nr is that it is precisely the same expression as obtained for hydrogen and hydrogen-like atoms from Dirac’s equation, which came more than a decade later. Recall that the spin of the electron was not yet discovered when Sommerfeld developed his model, and that in Dirac’s fully-relativistic quantum mechanics, the spectral fine-structure arises from the coupling of the electron’s spin to its orbital motion. The present paper provides a streamlined yet detailed account of Sommerfeld’s elliptical orbits in hopes of bringing about a deeper appreciation for the miraculous coincidence of Sommerfeld’s result with that derived from Dirac’s equation.
Scientific realists often say that there should be belief in the approximate truth of ‘our best scientific theories.’ It is hard to hear the phrase ‘our best scientific theories’ without thinking of quantum mechanics and quantum field theories. But as numerous chapters in this collection make clear, it is unclear that some experts even know how to make sense of being a realist about quantum theories. They provide recipes for calculating incredibly precise predictions for observations, but beyond the recipes, they do not seem to offer a clear-cut or unambiguous picture of what physical reality is like at the fundamental level. After giving an overview of the problems that beset any attempt to believe in the truth or approximate truth of quantum theories, Chapter 2 turns to the question of how to protect scientific realism from the ills of the quantum. The aim is to show that it is possible to quarantine the worst of those ills, freeing us to adopt a robustly realistic attitude toward many other extremely successful areas of contemporary science, such as (parts of) geology, microbiology, and chemistry. The quarantine barrier may be imperfect and permeable in places, but is strong enough (the chapter argues) to help the cause of scientific realism.
Despite scholarly consensus on the empirical facts, ever since its inception in the 1920s there has been deep disagreement about how to interpret quantum theory. “To interpret a physical theory is to say what the world would be like, if the theory were true.” All scientific theories require interpretation, since strictly speaking what they describe are our experiences of the world rather than the world itself. Thus, whether we are trying to explain or merely describe the world, we are always engaged in inference. To make inferences we need a context for interpretation. For any given claim this context is provided locally by related theories, more broadly by disciplinary paradigms, and ultimately by worldview claims about the nature of reality. The challenge in interpreting scientific theories is to integrate them into this hierarchy of knowledge. Usually this is not too difficult. New theories often require adjustments to nearby theories, but in doing so we can rely on paradigms to make them cohere. More rarely paradigmatic assumptions are themselves challenged, but in that case scientists can fall back on their worldview to make sense of the needed changes. By implication, the most difficult interpretive problems arise when our worldview is called into question, which leaves us without any frame of reference on which to fall back. Quantum theory poses a worldview problem. Prior to the quantum revolution the classical worldview could not be tested scientifically and so it was essentially metaphysical. Even though it corresponded to our experience of material objects, we lacked proof that it adequately represented the deep structure of reality. By giving us access to that deep structure for the first time, quantum mechanics made it possible to do such a test, or “experimental metaphysics.” Unfortunately, the results seemed to contradict classical assumptions, at least on the sub-atomic level.
Scientific realists believe, of successful scientific theories, that they’re at least approximately true. Quantum mechanics (QM) lays credible claim to being the most successful theory in the history of human science. But what does a scientific realist believe when she believes QM? And what can we learn about the scientific realism debate from the fact that that debate, conducted in abstraction, appears incapable of settling what a realist about QM should believe when she believes QM? This contribution explores both questions.
Much has been discussed in the philosophy of science about how we should understand the scientific enterprise. On the one hand, scientific realists believe that empirically adequate theories can be supplemented by interpretations that can mirror reality-as-it-is; on the other hand, anti-realists argue that this is not the case, as long as scientific theories make sufficiently accurate experimental predictions the addition of narratives is irrelevant for the scientific enterprise, and regarding narratives, it is preferable to remain agnostic. In this paper, we argue that realism was never really at stake in this debate.