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The Scope and Generality of Bell's Theorem

James Owen Weatherall

Published Jan 1, 2012• 3 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

I present a local, deterministic model of the EPR-Bohm experiment, inspired by recent work by Joy Christian, that appears at first blush to be in tension with Bell-type theorems. I argue that the model ultimately fails to do what a hidden variable theory needs to do, but that it is interesting nonetheless because the way it fails helps clarify the scope and generality of Bell-type theorems. I formulate and prove a minor proposition that makes explicit how Bell-type theorems rule out models of the sort I describe here.

Related papers

Whither All the Scope and Generality of Bell's Theorem?

Joy Christian

In a recent preprint James Owen Weatherall has attempted a simple local-deterministic model for the EPR-Bohm correlation and speculated about why his model fails when my counterexample to Bell's theorem succeeds. Here I bring out the physical, mathematical, and conceptual reasons why his model fails. In particular, I demonstrate why no model based on a tensor representation of the rotation group SU(2) can reproduce the EPR-Bohm correlation. I demonstrate this by calculating the correlation explicitly between measurement results A = +1 or -1 and B = +1 or -1 in a local and deterministic model respecting the spinor representation of SU(2). I conclude by showing how Weatherall's reading of my model is misguided at best and bring out a number of misconceptions and unwarranted assumptions in his imitation of my model, as it relates to Bell-CHSH inequalities.

arXiv:1301.1653•Jan 4, 2013•1 citation

Non-Viability of a Counter-Argument to Bell's Theorem

M. Holman

It is demonstrated that a recently suggested model for the EPR-Bohm spin experiment, based on Clifford algebra valued local variables and observables, runs into very serious difficulties and can therefore not be taken as constituting a viable counter-example to Bell's theorem.

arXiv:0704.2038•Apr 16, 2007•1 citation

The EPR Experiment: A Prelude to Bohr's Reply to EPR

Michael Dickson

Recent work on Bohr's reply to EPR has helped improve our understanding of Bohr's reply, but further work is needed. In this paper I do two things towards that end. First, I make some elementary points about EPR's argument, which help to clear the air of some minor criticisms of Bohr's reply. Second, I argue that Bohr's thought experiment is a reasonable realization of EPR's argument, and I briefly suggest how to understand that experiment. I finish with a brief remark about Bohm's version of the experiment, and its relation to Bohr's.

arXiv:quant-ph/0102053•Feb 9, 2001•0 citations

Bell theorem

Franck Laloë

The Bell theorem [103] can be seen in several different ways, as the EPR argument. Initially, Bell invented it as a direct logical continuation of the EPR theorem: the idea is to take the existence of the EPR elements of reality seriously, and to push it further by introducing them explicitly into the mathematics with the notation λ; one then proceeds to study all possible kinds of correlations that can be obtained from the fluctuations of one or several variables λ, making the condition of locality explicit in the mathematics (locality was already useful in the EPR theorem, but not used in equations). The reasoning develops within determinism (considered as proved by the EPR reasoning) and classical probabilities; it studies in a completely general way all kinds of correlations that can be predicted from the fluctuations of some classical common cause in the past – if one prefers, from some random choice concerning the initial state of the system. This leads to the famous inequalities. But subsequent studies have shown that the scope of the Bell theorem is not limited to determinism; for instance, the λ variables may determine the probabilities of the results of future experiments, instead of the results themselves (see Appendix B), without canceling the theorem. We postpone the discussion of the various possible generalizations to §4.2.3. For the moment, we just emphasize that the essential condition for the validity of the Bell theorem is locality: all kinds of fluctuations can be assumed, but their effect must affect physics only locally.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 30, 2012•0 citations

On the logical structure of Bell theorems

Anne Broadbent, Hilary A. Carteret, André Allan Méthot +1 more

Bell theorems show how to experimentally falsify local realism. Conclusive falsification is highly desirable as it would provide support for the most profoundly counterintuitive feature of quantum theory—nonlocality. Despite the preponderance of evidence for quantum mechanics, practical limits on detector efficiency and the difficulty of coordinating space-like separated measurements have provided loopholes for a classical worldview; these loopholes have never been simultaneously closed. A number of new experiments have recently been proposed to close both loopholes at once. We show these novel designs fail in the most basic way, by not ruling out local hidden variable models, and we provide an explicit classical model to demonstrate this. These experiments share a common flaw, which reveals a basic misunderstanding of how nonlocality proofs work. Given the time and resources now being devoted to such experiments, theoretical clarity is essential. Our explanation is presented in terms of simple logic and should serve to correct misconceptions and avoid future mistakes.

arXiv:quant-ph/0512201•New Journal of Physics•Dec 5, 2006•3 citations

On the failure of Bell's theorem

Gyula Bene

Using a new approach to quantum mechanics we revisit Hardy's proof for Bell's theorem and point out a loophole in it. We also demonstrate on this example that quantum mechanics is a local realistic theory.

arXiv:quant-ph/9706054•Jun 24, 1997•0 citations
I present a local, deterministic model of the EPR-Bohm experiment, inspired by recent work by Joy Christian, that appears at first blush to be in tension with Bell-type theorems. I argue that the model ultimately fails to do what a hidden variable theory needs to do, but that it is interesting nonetheless because the way it fails helps clarify the scope and generality of Bell-type theorems. I formulate and prove a minor proposition that makes explicit how Bell-type theorems rule out models of the sort I describe here.
In a recent preprint James Owen Weatherall has attempted a simple local-deterministic model for the EPR-Bohm correlation and speculated about why his model fails when my counterexample to Bell's theorem succeeds. Here I bring out the physical, mathematical, and conceptual reasons why his model fails. In particular, I demonstrate why no model based on a tensor representation of the rotation group SU(2) can reproduce the EPR-Bohm correlation. I demonstrate this by calculating the correlation explicitly between measurement results A = +1 or -1 and B = +1 or -1 in a local and deterministic model respecting the spinor representation of SU(2). I conclude by showing how Weatherall's reading of my model is misguided at best and bring out a number of misconceptions and unwarranted assumptions in his imitation of my model, as it relates to Bell-CHSH inequalities.
Recent work on Bohr's reply to EPR has helped improve our understanding of Bohr's reply, but further work is needed. In this paper I do two things towards that end. First, I make some elementary points about EPR's argument, which help to clear the air of some minor criticisms of Bohr's reply. Second, I argue that Bohr's thought experiment is a reasonable realization of EPR's argument, and I briefly suggest how to understand that experiment. I finish with a brief remark about Bohm's version of the experiment, and its relation to Bohr's.
The Bell theorem [103] can be seen in several different ways, as the EPR argument. Initially, Bell invented it as a direct logical continuation of the EPR theorem: the idea is to take the existence of the EPR elements of reality seriously, and to push it further by introducing them explicitly into the mathematics with the notation λ; one then proceeds to study all possible kinds of correlations that can be obtained from the fluctuations of one or several variables λ, making the condition of locality explicit in the mathematics (locality was already useful in the EPR theorem, but not used in equations). The reasoning develops within determinism (considered as proved by the EPR reasoning) and classical probabilities; it studies in a completely general way all kinds of correlations that can be predicted from the fluctuations of some classical common cause in the past – if one prefers, from some random choice concerning the initial state of the system. This leads to the famous inequalities. But subsequent studies have shown that the scope of the Bell theorem is not limited to determinism; for instance, the λ variables may determine the probabilities of the results of future experiments, instead of the results themselves (see Appendix B), without canceling the theorem. We postpone the discussion of the various possible generalizations to §4.2.3. For the moment, we just emphasize that the essential condition for the validity of the Bell theorem is locality: all kinds of fluctuations can be assumed, but their effect must affect physics only locally.
Bell theorems show how to experimentally falsify local realism. Conclusive falsification is highly desirable as it would provide support for the most profoundly counterintuitive feature of quantum theory—nonlocality. Despite the preponderance of evidence for quantum mechanics, practical limits on detector efficiency and the difficulty of coordinating space-like separated measurements have provided loopholes for a classical worldview; these loopholes have never been simultaneously closed. A number of new experiments have recently been proposed to close both loopholes at once. We show these novel designs fail in the most basic way, by not ruling out local hidden variable models, and we provide an explicit classical model to demonstrate this. These experiments share a common flaw, which reveals a basic misunderstanding of how nonlocality proofs work. Given the time and resources now being devoted to such experiments, theoretical clarity is essential. Our explanation is presented in terms of simple logic and should serve to correct misconceptions and avoid future mistakes.