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Bayesian Nash Equilibria and Bell Inequalities

Taksu Cheon, Azhar Iqbal

Published Nov 21, 2012• 32 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract—Games with incomplete information are formulated in a multi-sector probability matrix formalism that can cope with quantum as well as classical strategies. An analysis of classical and quantum strategy in a multi-sector extension of the game of Battle of Sexes clarifies the two distinct roles of nonlocal strategies that break Bell inequalities. Index Terms—Quantum game, Nonlocality, Entanglement, Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

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arXiv:2509.02947•Sep 3, 2025•0 citations
Abstract—Games with incomplete information are formulated in a multi-sector probability matrix formalism that can cope with quantum as well as classical strategies. An analysis of classical and quantum strategy in a multi-sector extension of the game of Battle of Sexes clarifies the two distinct roles of nonlocal strategies that break Bell inequalities. Index Terms—Quantum game, Nonlocality, Entanglement, Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria of a variety of two-player quantum games and compare the results to the solutions of the corresponding classical games. We then analyze Bayesian games where there is uncertainty about the player types in two-player conflicting interest games. The solutions to the Bayesian games are found to have a phase diagram-like structure where different equilibria exist in different parameter regions, depending both on the amount of uncertainty and the degree of entanglement. We find that in games where a Pareto-optimal solution is not a Nash equilibrium, it is possible for the quantized game to have an advantage over the classical version. In addition, we analyze the behavior of the solutions as the strategy choices approach an unrestricted operation. We find that some games have a continuum of solutions, bounded by the solutions of a simpler restricted game. A deeper understanding of Bayesian quantum game theory could lead to novel quantum applications in a multi-agent setting.
A joint probability formalism for quantum games with noise is proposed, inspired by the formalism of non-factorizable probabilities that connects the joint probabilities to quantum games with noise. Using this connection, we show that the joint probabilities are non-factorizable; thus, noise does not generically destroy entanglement. This formalism was applied to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Chicken Game, and the Battle of the Sexes, where noise is coupled through a single parameter μ. We find that for all the games except for the Battle of the Sexes, the Nash inequalities are maintained up to a threshold value of the noise. Beyond the threshold value, the inequalities no longer hold for quantum and classical strategies. For the Battle of the sexes, the Nash inequalities always hold, no matter the noise strength. This is due to the symmetry and anti-symmetry of the parameters that determine the joint probabilities for that game. Finally, we propose a new correlation measure for the games with classical and quantum strategies, where we obtain that the incorporation of noise, when we have quantum strategies, does not affect entanglement, but classical strategies result in behavior that approximates quantum games with quantum strategies without the need to saturate the system with the maximum value of noise. In this manner, these correlations can be understood as entanglement for our game approach.
Claude Shannon's zero-error communication paradigm reshaped our understanding of fault-tolerant information transfer. Here, we adapt this notion into game theory with incomplete information. We ask: can players with private information coordinate on a Nash equilibrium with zero probability of error? We identify Bayesian games in which such coordination is impossible classically, yet achievable by harnessing Bell nonlocal correlations. We formalize this requirement as zero-error Nash equilibrium coordination, establishing a new bridge between information theory, game theory, and quantum nonlocality. Furthermore, we construct a tripartite Bayesian game that admits zero-error Nash equilibrium coordination with genuine entanglement, and a two-player game where a stronger notion of coordination can be achieved using every two-qubit pure entangled state except the maximally one. Crucially, the advantage persists under experimentally relevant noise, demonstrating nonlocality as a robust resource for near-zero error decision-making under uncertainty.