By making use of Schwinger’s oscillator model of angular momentum, we put forward an interesting connection among three solvable Hamiltonians, widely used for discussions on the quantum measurement problem. This connection implies that a particular macroscopic limit has to be taken for these models to be physically sensible. PACS: 03.65.Fd; 03.80.+r; 42.52.+x; 03,65.BzThe quantum measurement problem [1] [2] has been a central issue in the foundations and interpretation of quantum mechanics, and is profoundly related to the investigation of the internal consistency of quantum theory. In order to find a resolution within the quantum mechanical framework, one usually describes a quantum measurement process in the following way: An elementary particle Q, on which the measurement is performed, interacts with a detection system D, which is considered to be made up of N elementary constituents. Generally, it is not easy to handle such a complicated system like Q + D, however, it is also true that several solvable models of measurement processes are now at hand. Among these are the Cini [3] and Coleman-Hepp [4] Hamiltonians and its modified version [5], which were all proposed
By making use of Schwinger’s oscillator model of angular momentum, we put forward an interesting connection among three solvable Hamiltonians, widely used for discussions on the quantum measurement problem. This connection implies that a particular macroscopic limit has to be taken for these models to be physically sensible. PACS: 03.65.Fd; 03.80.+r; 42.52.+x; 03,65.BzThe quantum measurement problem [1] [2] has been a central issue in the foundations and interpretation of quantum mechanics, and is profoundly related to the investigation of the internal consistency of quantum theory. In order to find a resolution within the quantum mechanical framework, one usually describes a quantum measurement process in the following way: An elementary particle Q, on which the measurement is performed, interacts with a detection system D, which is considered to be made up of N elementary constituents. Generally, it is not easy to handle such a complicated system like Q + D, however, it is also true that several solvable models of measurement processes are now at hand. Among these are the Cini [3] and Coleman-Hepp [4] Hamiltonians and its modified version [5], which were all proposed
Introduction In a very elegant and rigorous paper, K. Hepp has discussed quantum measurement theory. He uses the C * algebra description of infinite quantum systems. Here an attempt is made to give a more popular account of some of his reasoning. Such an attempt seems worthwhile because many people not familiar with the C * algebra approach, and even somewhat intimidated by it, have been intrigued by the following statement in Hepp's abstract: In several explicitly soluble models, the measurement leads to macroscopically different ‘pointer positions’ and to a rigorous ‘reduction of the wave packet’ with respect to all local observables. This could look like a clean solution at last to the infamous measurement problem. But it is not so, nor thought by Hepp to be so. Here we will take one of his models and analyse it in elementary text-book terms. It will be insisted that the ‘rigorous reduction’ does not occur in physical time but only in an unattainable mathematical limit. It will be argued that the distinction is an important one. We will work at first in the Schrödinger picture, but later, with the extension to relativistic systems in mind, it will be argued that such considerations become particularly clear in the Heisenberg picture.
In most textbooks, measurement does not receive the full attention it deserves and sometimes is even not treated at all, apart a brief and cryptic mention of the “reduction of the wave packet.” However, in the last decades, the situation has profoundly changed and it is time to consider measurement a fundamental part of quantum mechanics, even, to a certain extent, an important generalization of the traditional theory (see also Chs. 14–15). This chapter consists of three major parts. In the first block (Secs. 9.1–9.4) we develop the main physical features of the measurement process: the heart of the argument is here represented by the aspects related to the interpretation. In the second part (Secs. 9.5–9.8) we discuss several special (and partly interdependent) topics of measurement: the heart here is represented by experimental aspects. In the third part (Secs. 9.9–9.12) we deal with the measurement process on a more formal plane, making use, in particular, of the generalization represented by the concepts of effect and positive operator valued measure (POVM). As we have said, the measurement problem is one of the most fundamental issues in the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics (as described in Sec. 9.1) and has a long history that will be examined in Sec. 9.2. In this context, the existence of apparently paradoxical quantum states comes about: the so-called Schrödinger cat states (see Sec. 9.3).
Long ago, and almost in parallel with the “orthodox” Copenhagen/standard interpretation, other interpretations of quantum mechanics were proposed. Giving an exhaustive discussion of all points of view that have been put forward since then would probably be an impossible task. Moreover, while one can distinguish big families among the interpretations, it is also possible to combine them in many ways, with an almost infinite number of nuances. The Copenhagen/standard interpretation itself, as we have seen, is certainly not a monolithic construction, but can be declined in various forms. In this chapter, we will therefore limit ourselves to a general description of the major families of interpretations. We will begin with a brief description of some frequent attitudes observed among scientists in laboratories, who do not necessarily pay extreme attention to the foundations of quantum mechanics, even when they do experiments in quantum physics. In practice, they often use pragmatic rules, which are sufficient to interpret all their experiments, and prefer to avoid difficult questions about the very nature of the measurement process. For instance, one popular point of view is the “correlation interpretation”, which can be considered as a “minimal interpretation” – minimal but sufficient for all practical purposes; it is accepted as a valid rule by a large majority of physicists, even those who prefer to supplement it with other elements in order to reach a more precise interpretation for the whole theory. We will then proceed to discuss various families of interpretations that are less common, including additional variables, modified Schrödinger dynamics, consistent histories, Everett interpretation, etc.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.