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Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia

Interpretation Misunderstandings about Elementary Quantum Mechanics

Federico G. Lopez Armengol, Gustavo Esteban Romero

Published Apr 1, 2017• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum Mechanics is a fundamental physical theory about atomic-scale processes. It was built between 1920 and 1940 by the most distinguished physicists of that time. The accordance between the predictions of the theory and experimental results is remarkable. The physical interpretation of its mathematical constructs, however, raised unprecedented controversies. Ontological, semantic, and epistemic vagueness abound in the orthodox interpretations and have resulted in serious misunderstandings that are often repeated in textbooks and elsewhere. In this work, we identify, criticize, and clarify the most spread ones.

DOI
10.48160/18532330me7.154

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Quantum Mechanics is a fundamental physical theory about atomic-scale processes. It was built between 1920 and 1940 by the most distinguished physicists of that time. The accordance between the predictions of the theory and experimental results is remarkable. The physical interpretation of its mathematical constructs, however, raised unprecedented controversies. Ontological, semantic, and epistemic vagueness abound in the orthodox interpretations and have resulted in serious misunderstandings that are often repeated in textbooks and elsewhere. In this work, we identify, criticize, and clarify the most spread ones.
Quantum Mechanics is a fundamental physical theory about atomic-scale processes. It was built between 1920 and 1940 by the most distinguished physicists of that time. The accordance between the predictions of the theory and experimental results is remarkable. The physical interpretation of its mathematical constructs, however, raised unprecedented controversies. Ontological, semantic, and epistemic vagueness abound in the orthodox interpretations and have resulted in serious misunderstandings that are often repeated in textbooks and elsewhere. In this work, we identify, criticize, and clarify the most spread ones.
Quantum mechanics, the physical theory describing the microworld, is one of science's greatest triumphs. Remarkably, however, after more than 100 years it is still unclear what quantum mechanics means in terms of basic philosophical questions about the nature of reality. While there are many interpretations of the mathematical machinery of quantum physics, there remain no experimental means to distinguish between most of them. In this contribution, I wish to consider the ways in which the enduring lack of an agreed-upon interpretation of quantum physics influences a number of critical philosophical debates about physics and reality. I briefly review two problems affected by quantum interpretations: the meaning of the term universe and the nature of consciousness.
Some philosophers of physics have addressed criticisms of the so-called Received View (RV) of non-individual quantum objects, also called the orthodox view. Dennis Dieks made a very good resume of these criticisms in [1] and Tomasz Bigaj in [2] has a more detailed account. In considering (mainly) these works and with some additional mentions, we hope to dissipate some misunderstandings about the RV and clarify what is happening with such a view. According to Dieks, the RV doesn’t fit the practice of physics since in some situations the physicist assumes that quantum objects can be treated individually, imitating standard objects (individuals) of classical physics. Dieks also proposes an Alternative View (AV), generally called the heterodox view, which would give a view of the fundamental ontology of quantum physics and which would be more by the way physicists usually proceed. In my view, the AV cannot be viewed as the fundamental ontological theory despite being suitable for practical purposes. Furthermore, we think that it does not conflate the RV, but is complementary to it, substituting it when quantum objects are sufficiently apart and can be treated in conformity with the classical way. From our point of view, in the practice of physics, we can adopt AV. Still, the RV is more adequate when we are looking for logical and foundational analyses, at least when the supposed metaphysics comprises non-individuals.
In his book, Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin provides a wonderfully lucid and fascinating account of the development of quantum mechanics in the twentieth century and argues that the baffling puzzles of the quantum world can be understood in terms of Whitehead's process metaphysics. 1 Malin thus joins an ever-growing number of physicists who see in Whitehead's theories a useful framework for understanding contemporary physics, including for example, Henry Stapp, Timothy Eastman, Lawrence Fagg, Basil Hiley and David Finkelstein.Nature Loves to Hide is divided into three parts: "e Quandary," "From a Universe of Objects to a Universe of Experiences," and "Physics and the One."Malin also includes three appendices on the relativity of simultaneity, the proof of Bell's inequalities, and interpretations of quantum theory (i.e., quantum ontologies)."e Quandary" examines the debate between Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein regarding the completeness of quantum mechanics.Einstein believed that quantum mechanics violates both local realism and determinism and therefore fails as a complete, fundamental theory of nature while Bohr held that quantum mechanics was complete regardless of its violations.Bohr's radical thesis was that a single model cannot adequately describe the atomic and subatomic realms.His complementarity framework of wave/particle applies to different conditions, but even here Bohr is not describing nature itself, but rather what we can know about nature.Malin distinguishes between Einstein's ontic approach and Bohr's epistemic approach (39).e latter, which became the orthodox "Copenhagen Interpretation," is often described as pragmatic or instrumentalist since quantum theory is to be viewed as merely a set of rules for calculating correlations among observations.As the Einstein-Bohr controversy continued through their disciples, John Bell demonstrated in 1964 that the issue was not merely philosophical but rather scientific when his theorem led to an experiment that proved nature violates local realism.At this round, Bohr wins, Einstein loses.Malin understands "the quandary" to be the fact that local realism must be abandoned even if it is the "eminently reasonable" world-view to which we continue to cling.Physics (post Bell's theorem) has suffered a type of "schizophrenia" since physicists adhere to Bohr's view as the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, yet, at the same time, rely on Einstein's paradigm at some fundamental level.Malin's
Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logical or Bayesian conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox and Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks concerning the implications for the concept of physical reality.