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CRC Press eBooks

The postulates of quantum mechanics

Nils O. Petersen

Published Apr 7, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Much of our understanding of the physical world we live in rests on some key fundamental principles, sometimes we call them laws, from which we can derive expressions for observable phenomena, the observations in turn supporting the validity of our fundamental principles.
DOI
10.1201/9781315381381-4

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