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Refutation of Pre-Measurement, Decoherence, and Multiverse Quantum Mechanics

Colin James

Published Jul 1, 2019• 0 citations
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Abstract: This paper challenges the widely held belief in the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics, which posits that an infinite multiverse guarantees the repetition of identical universes. Instead, we draw on principles from chaos theory, combinatorics, and measure theory, to argue that even within an infinite multiverse, the probability of encountering an identical universe is effectively zero. Instead, we propose a multiverse characterized by infinite variety, where each universe evolves uniquely due to the sensitivity of initial conditions. This argument not only refutes the MWI's concept of repetition but also has profound implications for the philosophy of identity, individuality, and free will.
In the current debate on the concept of probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics Saunders and Wallace argue for a notion of pre-measurement uncertainty whilst Greaves and Myrvold attempt to do without uncertainty altogether. Both these approaches are controversial and I suggest a middle way. I develop in detail an argument which Wallace has hinted at and Greaves has seen as beside the point in order to show that Vaidman’s concept of post-measurement uncertainty has more relevance to pre-measurement decision making than has hitherto been generally recognised. Further, Vaidman uncertainty leads naturally to another form of post-measurement uncertainty which clarifies the process of experimental confirmation of quantum mechanics in the Everett picture. I also stress the importance of Sider’s theory of transtemporal identity in making Everett’s multiverse intelligible.