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Lecture notes in computer science

Anonymous End to End Encryption Group Messaging Protocol Based on Asynchronous Ratchet Tree

Kaiming Chen, Jiageng Chen

Published Jan 1, 2020• 6 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-61078-4_33

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In the past few years secure messaging has become mainstream, with over a billion active users of end-to-end encryption protocols such as Signal. The Signal Protocol provides a strong property called post-compromise security to its users. However, it turns out that many of its implementations provide, without notification, a weaker property for group messaging: an adversary who compromises a single group member can read and inject messages indefinitely. We show for the first time that post-compromise security can be achieved in realistic, asynchronous group messaging systems. We present a design called Asynchronous Ratcheting Trees (ART), which uses tree-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange to allow a group of users to derive a shared symmetric key even if no two are ever online at the same time. ART scales to groups containing thousands of members, while still providing provable security guarantees. It has seen significant interest from industry, and forms the basis for two draft IETF RFCs and a chartered working group. Our results show that strong security guarantees for group messaging are practically achievable in a modern setting.
As messaging applications are becoming increasingly popular, it is of utmost importance to analyze their security and mitigate existing weaknesses. This paper focuses on one of the most acclaimed messaging applications: Signal. Signal is a protocol that provides end-to-end channel security, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security. These features are achieved thanks to a key-ratcheting mechanism that updates the key material at every message. Due to its high security impact, Signal's key-ratcheting has recently been formalized, along with an analysis of its security. In this paper, we revisit Signal, describing some attacks against the original design and proposing SAID: Signal Authenticated and IDentity-based. As the name indicates, our protocol relies on an identity-based setup, which allows us to dispense with Signal's centralized server. We use the identity-based long-term secrets to obtain persistent and explicit authentication, such that SAID achieves higher security guarantees than Signal. We prove the security of SAID not only in the Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) model (as done by previous work), but also in the Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) model, which we adapted and redefined for SAID and asynchronous messaging protocols in general into a model we call identity-based Multistage Asynchronous Messaging (iMAM). We believe our model to be more faithful in particular to the true security of Signal, whose use of the message keys prevents them from achieving the composable guarantee claimed by previous analysis.
Signal is a new security protocol and accompanying app that provides end-to-end encryption for instant messaging. The core protocol has recently been adopted by WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Google Allo among many others, the first two of these have at least 1 billion active users. Signal includes several uncommon security properties (such as "future secrecy" or "post-compromise security"), enabled by a novel technique called ratcheting in which session keys are updated with every message sent. Despite its importance and novelty, there has been little to no academic analysis of the Signal protocol. We conduct the first security analysis of Signal's key agreement and double ratchet as a multi-stage key exchange protocol. We extract from the implementation a formal description of the abstract protocol, and define a security model which can capture the "ratcheting" key update structure. We then prove the security of Signal's core in our model, demonstrating several standard security properties. We have found no major flaws in the design, and hope that our presentation and results can serve as a starting point for other analyses of this widely adopted protocol.