Quantum theory and parapsychology.

Arthur I. Fine, Mario Bunge

Chris J. Clarke

An account is given of a recent proposal to complete modern quantum theory by adding a characterisation of consciousness. The resulting theory is applied to give mechanisms for typical parapsychological phenomena, and ways of testing it are discussed.

Hartmann Römer, Walter von Lucadou, Harald Walach

Scientific facts are constituted as consensus about observable phenomena against the background of an accepted, or at least plausible, theory. Empirical data without a theoretical framework are at best curiosities and anomalies, at worst they are neglected. The problem of parapsychological research since its inception with the foundation of the Society of Psychical Research in 1882 was that no sound theoretical basis existed. On the contrary, the proponents of the SPR often indulged in a theoretical model that ran contrary to the perceived materialism of mainstream science, and many tried to use the data of parapsychological research to bolster the case of “mind over matter,” yet without producing a good model of how such effects could be conceptualized. In general, parapsychological (PSI) research has been rather devoid of theorizing and, if anything, assumed a tacit signaltheoretical, local-causal model of some sort of subtle energy that would be vindicated, once enough empirical data were amassed. History, and data, proved this stance wrong. We will present a theoretical approach that challenges this local-causal, signal-theoretical approach by proposing that parapsychological phenomena are instances of a larger class of phenomena that are examples of nonlocal correlations. These are predicted by Generalized Quantum Theory (GQT) and can be expected to occur, whenever global descriptions of a system are complementary to or incompatible with local descriptions of elements of such a system. We will analyze the standard paradigms of PSI-research along those lines and describe how they can be reconceptualized as instances of such generalized nonlocal correlations. A direct consequence of this conceptual framework is that misrepresentations of these phenomena as local causes, as is done in direct experimentation, is bound to fail long-term. Strategies to escape this problem are discussed. Journal of Scientifi c Exploration, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 605–631, 2014 0892-3310/14 606 Harald Walach, Walter von Lucadou, and Hartmann Romer

Shan Gao

Valeriy Kotenko

Brian Millar

In parapsychology, unlike psychology, there is no known way to determine whether any measured effect comes from the (so-called) subjects - S, or the (nominal) experimenter - E. In each generation parapsychology has been dominated by a mere handful of experimenters who report regular extra-chance results, while the great mass of experimenters encounter, at best, only sporadic success. This paper pursues the view that parapsychology's elite are themselves particularly endowed with psi ability: they attribute scoring to subjects, in line with the psychological tradition, while it actually comes from their own psi. The Geiger counter of the radioactive man ticks everywhere! It is suggested that the experiment using subjects is a ritual tailored to maximize experimenter-psi. Today the experiment with subjects seems to replace the Juju of former times. The E-centric view explains why parapsychological experiments can rarely be repeated by different experimenters. Skeptics maintain that many parapsychology results are due to the experimenter affecting his results in an improper way: the E-centric model agrees, but suggests that he does so with his mind rather than with his hands. What has been lacking until now are systematic methods to measure how much of a psi effect is due to subjects, and how much to the experimenter. The physics-based Observational Theories break this impasse. An outline is given of the author's take on these theories as Minimalistic Observational Theory (MOT). The parapsychological experiment is physically no more than a source of (informational) entropy which is acted on by psi. If the subject is the source of psi then he affects the result at the level of the trial. On the other hand, if the experimenter is the source of psi he (typically) affects the experiment as a single global unit. The consequences of this elementary dichotomy are remarkably wide-reaching and testable. Only two examples are noted here: for E-psi a small experiment is as good as a big one and the usual measure of effect size (based on the trial) is inappropriate; another is that the error mean squares in ANOVA will be depressed by E-psi. The effects predicted by the MOT allow partitioning of the effect into S and E components. Typically Psi effects are small and differences between models are smaller still; so a great deal of data is required. Recourse must be taken to meta-analysis as well as the modern ultra-large experiment.