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Lecture notes in computer science

Semi-Adaptively Secure Offline Witness Encryption from Puncturable Witness PRF

Tapas Pal, Ratna Dutta

Published Jan 1, 2020• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-62576-4_9

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Puncturable digital signatures, enable fine-grained revocation of signing authority but typically offer security only against static adversaries. To address this limitation, this paper construct a lattice-based signature scheme that supports private puncturing and achieves adaptive security in the random oracle model. This paper design integrates a private puncturable pseudorandom function (Private PRF), which allows secure secret key updates without revealing any information about the punctured messages or their corresponding signatures. This ensures existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks. The results demonstrate the feasibility of achieving adaptively secure, privacy-preserving puncturable signatures under post-quantum assumptions.
We give the first proof of security for an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme in the quantum random oracle model. This is the first proof of security for any scheme in this model that does not rely on the assumed existence of so-called quantum-secure pseudorandom functions (PRFs). Our techniques are quite general and we use them to obtain security proofs for two random oracle hierarchical IBE schemes and a random oracle signature scheme, all of which have previously resisted quantum security proofs, even assuming quantum-secure PRFs. We also explain how to remove quantum-secure PRFs from prior quantum random oracle model proofs. We accomplish these results by developing new tools for arguing that quantum algorithms cannot distinguish between two oracle distributions. Using a particular class of oracle distributions that we call semi-constant distributions, we argue that the aforementioned cryptosystems are secure against quantum adversaries.