SodsMPC is a quantum-safe smart contract system. SodsMPC permissioned servers (verification nodes) execute contracts by secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols. MPC ensures the contract execution correctness while trivially keeping the data privacy. Moreover, SodsMPC accomplishes the contract business logic privacy while protecting the contract user anonymous identity simultaneously. We express the logic of a contract by a finite state machine (FSM). A state transition of the FSM is represented by a blind polynomial with secret-shared coefficients. When using MPC to compute this blind polynomial, the contract business logic privacy is obtained. These coefficients which control the logic are binary secret shares. We also propose a base conversion method among binary and integer secret shares by MPC. Our contract anonymity comes from the “mixing-then-contract” paradigm. The online phase of the SodsMPC mixing is a multiplication between a preprocessed permutation matrix and an input vector in the form of secret sharing, which accomplishes a fully randomized shuffle of the inputs and keeps the secret share form for the following contract execution. All SodsMPC components, including a verifiable secret sharing scheme, are quantum-safe, asynchronous, coping with t <; n/3 compromised servers, and robust (tolerates Byzantine servers) in both preprocessing and online phases.
SodsMPC is a quantum-safe smart contract system. SodsMPC permissioned servers (verification nodes) execute contracts by secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols. MPC ensures the contract execution correctness while trivially keeping the data privacy. Moreover, SodsMPC accomplishes the contract business logic privacy while protecting the contract user anonymous identity simultaneously. We express the logic of a contract by a finite state machine (FSM). A state transition of the FSM is represented by a blind polynomial with secret-shared coefficients. When using MPC to compute this blind polynomial, the contract business logic privacy is obtained. These coefficients which control the logic are binary secret shares. We also propose a base conversion method among binary and integer secret shares by MPC. Our contract anonymity comes from the “mixing-then-contract” paradigm. The online phase of the SodsMPC mixing is a multiplication between a preprocessed permutation matrix and an input vector in the form of secret sharing, which accomplishes a fully randomized shuffle of the inputs and keeps the secret share form for the following contract execution. All SodsMPC components, including a verifiable secret sharing scheme, are quantum-safe, asynchronous, coping with t <; n/3 compromised servers, and robust (tolerates Byzantine servers) in both preprocessing and online phases.
In the last few years the efficiency of secure multi-party computation (MPC) increased in several orders of magnitudes. However, this alone might not be enough if we want MPC protocols to be used in practice. A crucial property that is needed in many applications is that everyone can check that a given (secure) computation was performed correctly – even in the extreme case where all the parties involved in the computation are corrupted, and even if the party who wants to verify the result was not participating. This is especially relevant in the clients-servers setting, where many clients provide input to a secure computation performed by a few servers. An obvious example of this is electronic voting, but also in many types of auctions one may want independent verification of the result. Traditionally, this is achieved by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs during the computation.A recent trend in MPC protocols is to have a more expensive preprocessing phase followed by a very efficient online phase, e.g., the recent so-called SPDZ protocol by Damgård et al. Applications such as voting and some auctions are perfect use-case for these protocols, as the parties usually know well in advance when the computation will take place, and using those protocols allows us to use only cheap information-theoretic primitives in the actual computation. Unfortunately no protocol of the SPDZ type supports an audit phase.In this paper, we show how to achieve efficient MPC with a public audit. We formalize the concept of publicly auditable secure computation and provide an enhanced version of the SPDZ protocol where, even if all the servers are corrupted, anyone with access to the transcript of the protocol can check that the output is indeed correct. Most importantly, we do so without significantly compromising the performance of SPDZ i.e. our online phase has complexity approximately twice that of SPDZ.
parties to securely compute an agreed function f over some finite field in the presence of a computationally unbounded adversary, who can maliciously corrupt any t out of the n parties. Most of the known efficient MPC protocols are designed in the offline- online framework introduced in a seminal work by Beaver in CRYPTO 1991. In this framework, the parties generate shared random and private multiplication-triples during the offline phase, which are used later in the online phase for securely evaluating the multiplication gates in the circuit representing f . The efficiency of the MPC protocols in this framework then relies on efficient ways of implementing the offline phase. In this paper, we propose a new and simple framework for generating shared and private random multiplication triples with unconditional security. The existing protocols approach this problem by first producing shared pairs of private and random values, followed by securely computing the shared product of each pair of values. The latter task involves a multiplication protocol for shared values that are typically communication intensive. Our framework takes a completely different approach and shuns the use of multiplication protocol. Namely, we ask the parties to verifiably share random multiplication triples and then securely extract shared random multiplication triples unknown to the adversary, from the shared triples. Realizing our framework in the asynchronous and hybrid network setting,1 we present the first ever MPC protocols with a linear (in the number of parties) communication overhead per multiplication gate in the circuit representing f . These are significant improvements over the best known existing MPC protocols in the asynchronous and hybrid network setting with communication complexity O(n2) and O(n3), respectively. Our framework when applied to the synchronous setting results in round-efficient MPC protocols.
This paper explores the design and implementation of distributed smart contracts leveraging the principles of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum Secure Multi-Party Computation (QSMPC). Traditional smart contracts are vulnerable to various attacks due to the inherent limitations of classical cryptography. This research proposes a novel architecture that integrates QKD for secure key exchange among contract participants and QSMPC for secure execution of contract logic. The core claim is that this combined approach offers a significantly enhanced level of security and reliability compared to existing smart contract systems. The underlying mechanism relies on establishing a quantum-secured channel for key distribution followed by a quantum-resistant multi-party computation protocol. We outline the technical aspects of this system, highlighting the challenges and potential solutions in building a truly quantum-safe distributed smart contract ecosystem. This work addresses a critical need for robust security in decentralized systems and paves the way for applications requiring the highest levels of trust and confidentiality.
Quantum Secure Multiparty Computation (QMPC) is a new way to use cryptography that lets a lot of people work together to compute a function over their private inputs while keeping those inputs secret, even if attackers have quantum computing power. As AI becomes more common in fields like healthcare, banking, and self- driving cars, secure collaborative learning becomes more and more important. But the rise of quantum computers is a big threat to the encryption methods that are commonly used in modern multiparty computation protocols. QMPC is a very secure and scalable way to protect privacy in AI. It does this by combining quantum-safe oblivious transfer (QOT), quantum key distribution (QKD), and quantum oblivious linear evaluation (qOLE). This study shows a full QMPC architecture for AI systems that are both federated and decentralized. It lets you train and use private neural networks and is safe from quantum attacks because it uses safe aggregation and encrypted processing protocols. The architecture lets AI do a lot of things, like private set intersection, federated learning, and collaborative model training, without giving away user data. A thorough security analysis based on postquantum assumptions and the universal composability paradigm makes sure that the system can withstand attackers who are adaptive, colluding, or quantum-capable. When tested against datasets like MNIST and CIFAR-10, the protocol gets results that are as accurate as plaintext models with very little extra work on the computer or network. Experiments show that when the accuracy of the model drops by less than 1%, all data privacy is still protected. This study looks at how QMPC might help make AI safer in sensitive areas like medical diagnostics and financial forecasts, as well as how it might help companies follow data protection laws like GDPR and HIPAA. Auditability and consent procedures are two of the legal and moral issues that need to be thought about. The study also talks about problems with scalability and suggests an ideal communication plan and methods like circuit pruning, quantization, and hybrid classical-quantum communication models. We look at what QMPC could do in relation to secure federated analytics, real-time collaborative robotics, and processing encrypted smart contracts. In conclusion, QMPC for privacy-preserving AI is no longer just a theory; it is now a necessary, possible, and realistic way of doing things in a world that is quickly moving toward quantum supremacy. By using quantum-resistant encryption and distributed machine learning together, QMPC creates a way to get to safe, understandable, and decentralized AI that will work in the future. This study sets the stage for future progress at the crossroads of postquantum security and collaborative intelligence.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic framework that enables multiple parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping those inputs private. MPC has found applications in privacy-preserving data analytics, secure voting, private machine learning, and secure financial transactions. This article provides a comprehensive survey of recent advances in MPC protocols, including fully homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and oblivious transfer. It also explores the challenges in efficiency, scalability, and real-world deployment of MPC and discusses future research directions to enhance its practicality and security.
Abstract. Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) is a fundamental primitive used in many distributed cryptographic tasks, such as Multiparty Computation (MPC) and Byzantine Agreement (BA). It is a two phase (sharing, reconstruction) protocol. The VSS and MPC protocols are carried out among n parties, where t out of n parties can be under the influence of a Byzantine (active) adversary, having unbounded computing power. It is well known that protocols for perfectly secure VSS and perfectly secure MPC exist in an asynchronous network iff n ≥ 4t+1. Hence, we call any perfectly secure VSS (MPC) protocol designed over an asynchronous network with n = 4t + 1 as optimally resilient VSS (MPC) protocol. A secret is d-shared among the parties if there exists a random degreed polynomial whose constant term is the secret and each honest party possesses a distinct point on the degree-d polynomial. Typically VSS is used as a primary tool to generate t-sharing of secret(s). In this paper, we present an optimally resilient, perfectly secure Asynchronous VSS (AVSS)