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Efficient quantum key distribution secure against no-signalling eavesdroppers

Acin, A, Serge Massar, Pironio, S

Published May 30, 2006• 84 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

By carrying out measurements on entangled states, two parties can generate a secret key which is secure not only against an eavesdropper bound by the laws of quantum mechanics, but also against a hypothetical "post-quantum" eavesdroppers limited by the no-signalling principle only. We introduce a family of quantum key distribution protocols of this type, which are more efficient than previous ones, both in terms of key rate and noise resistance. Interestingly, the best protocols involve large number of measurements. We show that in the absence of noise, these protocols can yield one secret bit per entanglement bit, implying that the key rates in the no-signalling post-quantum scenario are comparable to the key rates in usual quantum key distribution.

Related papers

Efficient quantum key distribution secure against no-signalling eavesdroppers

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American Journal of Applied Sciences•Feb 1, 2008•1 citation
By carrying out measurements on entangled states, two parties can generate a secret key which is secure not only against an eavesdropper bound by the laws of quantum mechanics, but also against a hypothetical "post-quantum" eavesdroppers limited by the no-signalling principle only. We introduce a family of quantum key distribution protocols of this type, which are more efficient than previous ones, both in terms of key rate and noise resistance. Interestingly, the best protocols involve large number of measurements. We show that in the absence of noise, these protocols can yield one secret bit per entanglement bit, implying that the key rates in the no-signalling post-quantum scenario are comparable to the key rates in usual quantum key distribution.
By carrying out measurements on entangled states, two parties can generate a secret key which is secure not only against an eavesdropper bound by the laws of quantum mechanics, but also against a hypothetical 'post-quantum' eavesdroppers limited by the no-signalling principle only. We introduce a family of quantum key distribution protocols of this type, which are more efficient than previous ones, both in terms of key rate and noise resistance. Interestingly, the best protocols involve large number of measurements. We show that in the absence of noise, these protocols can yield one secret bit per entanglement bit, implying that the key rates in the no-signalling post-quantum scenario are comparable to the key rates in usual quantum key distribution.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) refers to specific quantum strategies which permit the secure distribution of a secret key between two parties that wish to communicate secretly. Quantum cryptography has proven unconditionally secure in ideal scenarios and has been successfully implemented using quantum states with finite (discrete) as well as infinite (continuous) degrees of freedom. Here, we analyze the efficiency of QKD protocols that use as a resource entangled gaussian states and gaussian operations only. In this framework, it has already been shown that QKD is possible [1] but the issue of its efficiency has not been considered. We propose a figure of merit (the efficiency E) to quantify the number of classical correlated bits that can be used to distill a key from a sample of N entangled states. We relate the efficiency of the protocol to the entanglement and purity of the states shared between the parties.
We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.
A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol describes how two remote parties can establish a secret key by communicating over a quantum and a public classical channel that both can be accessed by an eavesdropper. QKD protocols using energy-time entangled photon pairs are of growing practical interest because of their potential to provide a higher secure key rate over long distances by carrying multiple bits per entangled photon pair. We consider a system where information can be extracted by measuring random times of a sequence of entangled photon arrivals. Our goal is to maximize the utility of each such pair. We propose a discrete time model for the photon arrival process, and establish a theoretical bound on the number of raw bits that can be generated under this model. We first analyse a well known simple binning encoding scheme, and show that it generates significantly lower information rate than what is theoretically possible. We then propose three adaptive schemes that increase the number of raw bits generated per photon, and compute and compare the information rates they offer. Moreover, the effect of public channel communication on the secret key rates of the proposed schemes is investigated.
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use postquantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling. Its security stems from violation of a Bell inequality.