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Would Bohr be born if Bohm were born before Born?

Hrvoje Nikolić

Published Jan 1, 2008• 12 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

I discuss a hypothetical historical context in which a Bohm-like deterministic interpretation of the Schrödinger equation could have been proposed before the Born probabilistic interpretation and argue that in such a context the Copenhagen (Bohr) interpretation would probably have never achieved great popularity among physicists. 1

Related papers

Would Bohr be born if Bohm were born before Born?

Hrvoje Nikolić

I discuss a hypothetical historical context in which a Bohm-like deterministic interpretation of the Schrödinger equation is proposed before the Born probabilistic interpretation and argue that in such a context the Copenhagen (Bohr) interpretation would probably have not achieved great popularity among physicists.

arXiv:physics/0702069•American Journal of Physics•Jan 12, 2008•19 citations

Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory

Norwood Russell Hanson

The theoretical and experimental context within which the “Copenhagen Interpretation” of quantum theory was generated is underemphasized by recent critics of the Bohr-Heisenberg philosophy. When an interpretation of a theory has been as successful as this one has been, there is little practical warrant for the “alternative interpretations” which have, since Bohm, been receiving prominence. Indeed, these are not even genuine alternatives; although rich in provocative prose, they provide not a scrap of algebra with which to organize the practical physicist's thinking. Several objections to the Bohr interpretation are critically examined, as is also a particular use of the correspondence principle which has seemed to cast doubt on the Copenhagen ideas.

American Journal of Physics•Jan 1, 1959•50 citations

Constructing the Myth of the Copenhagen Interpretation

Kristian Camilleri

According to the standard view, the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum mechanics originated in discussions between Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927, and was defended by Bohr in his classic debate with Einstein. Yet recent scholarship has shown Bohr's views were never widely accepted, let alone properly understood, by his contemporaries, many of whom held divergent views of the ‘Copenhagen orthodoxy’. This paper examines how the ‘myth of the Copenhagen interpretation’ was constructed by situating it in the context of Soviet Marxist critique of quantum mechanics in the 1950s and the response by physicists such as Heisenberg and Rosenfeld.

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The Historical Necessity of Probability in Quantum Mechanics: A Reassessment of Bohr's Measurement Theory and the Born Rule

Akihito Sugawara

This paper reexamines the role of probability in quantum mechanics from a historical and conceptual perspective, focusing on Bohr’s measurement theory and the origin of the Born rule. It argues that probabilistic interpretation did not arise as a mathematical necessity of the wave equation, but as a practical bridge between deterministic wave evolution and discrete measurement outcomes. By distinguishing continuous quantum dynamics from observational statistical rules, the work proposes a layered interpretative framework. The study respects the historical motivations behind complementarity and classical measurement description while clarifying that probability functions primarily at the measurement interface. This perspective aims to provide conceptual clarity and support future reinterpretations of quantum foundations and measurement theory.

•Feb 8, 2026•0 citations

Historical perspective

Franck Laloë

The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 30, 2012•1 citation

Five Cautions for the Copenhagen Interpretation's Critics

Norwood Russell Hanson

Within the past decade there has grown an acute and highly articulate group of critics of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,—the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The writings of people like Bopp, Janossy, and particularly Bohm and Feyerabend, must be taken very seriously indeed. The future of some important discussions in the philosophy and the logic of science rests with these individuals. But they have, in their own writings, occasionally matched the inelegancies of Bohr and Heisenberg with as many inelegancies of their own. The present paper is meant to present a quintet of considerations which may possibly lead to a reassessment of the issues between Bohr, Heisenberg, and their critics, especially Bohm and Feyerabend.

Philosophy of Science•Oct 1, 1959•9 citations
The theoretical and experimental context within which the “Copenhagen Interpretation” of quantum theory was generated is underemphasized by recent critics of the Bohr-Heisenberg philosophy. When an interpretation of a theory has been as successful as this one has been, there is little practical warrant for the “alternative interpretations” which have, since Bohm, been receiving prominence. Indeed, these are not even genuine alternatives; although rich in provocative prose, they provide not a scrap of algebra with which to organize the practical physicist's thinking. Several objections to the Bohr interpretation are critically examined, as is also a particular use of the correspondence principle which has seemed to cast doubt on the Copenhagen ideas.
According to the standard view, the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum mechanics originated in discussions between Bohr and Heisenberg in 1927, and was defended by Bohr in his classic debate with Einstein. Yet recent scholarship has shown Bohr's views were never widely accepted, let alone properly understood, by his contemporaries, many of whom held divergent views of the ‘Copenhagen orthodoxy’. This paper examines how the ‘myth of the Copenhagen interpretation’ was constructed by situating it in the context of Soviet Marxist critique of quantum mechanics in the 1950s and the response by physicists such as Heisenberg and Rosenfeld.
This paper reexamines the role of probability in quantum mechanics from a historical and conceptual perspective, focusing on Bohr’s measurement theory and the origin of the Born rule. It argues that probabilistic interpretation did not arise as a mathematical necessity of the wave equation, but as a practical bridge between deterministic wave evolution and discrete measurement outcomes. By distinguishing continuous quantum dynamics from observational statistical rules, the work proposes a layered interpretative framework. The study respects the historical motivations behind complementarity and classical measurement description while clarifying that probability functions primarily at the measurement interface. This perspective aims to provide conceptual clarity and support future reinterpretations of quantum foundations and measurement theory.
The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.
Within the past decade there has grown an acute and highly articulate group of critics of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,—the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The writings of people like Bopp, Janossy, and particularly Bohm and Feyerabend, must be taken very seriously indeed. The future of some important discussions in the philosophy and the logic of science rests with these individuals. But they have, in their own writings, occasionally matched the inelegancies of Bohr and Heisenberg with as many inelegancies of their own. The present paper is meant to present a quintet of considerations which may possibly lead to a reassessment of the issues between Bohr, Heisenberg, and their critics, especially Bohm and Feyerabend.