The present form of quantum mechanics is based on the Copenhagen school of interpretation. Einstein did not belong to the Copenhagen school, because he did not believe in probabilistic interpretation of fundamental physical laws. This is the reason why we are still debating whether there is a more deterministic theory. One cause of this separation between Einstein and the Copenhagen school could have been that the Copenhagen physicists thoroughly ignored Einstein's main concern: the principle of relativity. Paul A. M. Dirac was the first one to realize this problem. Indeed, from 1927 to 1963, Paul A. M. Dirac published at least four papers to study the problem of making the uncertainty relation consistent with Einstein's Lorentz covariance. It is interesting to combine those papers by Dirac to make the uncertainty relation consistent with relativity. It is shown that the mathematics of two coupled oscillators enables us to carry out this job. We are then led to the question of whether the concept of localized probability distribution is consistent with Lorentz covariance.
The present form of quantum mechanics is based on the Copenhagen school of interpretation. Einstein did not belong to the Copenhagen school, because he did not believe in probabilistic interpretation of fundamental physical laws. This is the reason why we are still debating whether there is a more deterministic theory. One cause of this separation between Einstein and the Copenhagen school could have been that the Copenhagen physicists thoroughly ignored Einstein's main concern: the principle of relativity. Paul A. M. Dirac was the first one to realize this problem. Indeed, from 1927 to 1963, Paul A. M. Dirac published at least four papers to study the problem of making the uncertainty relation consistent with Einstein's Lorentz covariance. It is interesting to combine those papers by Dirac to make the uncertainty relation consistent with relativity. It is shown that the mathematics of two coupled oscillators enables us to carry out this job. We are then led to the question of whether the concept of localized probability distribution is consistent with Lorentz covariance.
The present form of quantum mechanics is based on the Copenhagen school of interpretation. Einstein did not belong to the Copenhagen school, because he did not believe in probabilistic interpretation of fundamental physical laws. This is the reason why we are still debating whether there is a more deterministic theory. One cause of this separation between Einstein and the Copenhagen school could have been that the Copenhagen physicists thoroughly ignored Einstein’s main concern: the principle of relativity. Paul A. M. Dirac was the first one to realize this problem. Indeed, from 1927 to 1963, Paul A. M. Dirac published at least four papers to study the problem of making the uncertainty relation consistent with Einstein’s Lorentz covariance. It is interesting to combine those papers by Dirac to make the uncertainty relation consistent with relativity. It is shown that the mathematics of two coupled oscillators enables us to carry out this job. We are then led to the question of whether the concept of localized probability distribution is consistent with Lorentz covariance.
Although Dirac rarely participated in the interpretational debates over quantum theory, it is traditionally assumed that his views were aligned with Heisenberg and Bohr in the so-called Copenhagen-Göttingen camp. However, an unpublished—and apparently unknown—lecture of Dirac's reveals that this view is mistaken; in the famous debate between Einstein and Bohr, Dirac sided with Einstein. Surprisingly, Dirac believed that quantum mechanics was not complete, that the uncertainty principle would not survive in the future physics, and that a deterministic description of the microworld would be recovered. In this paper I show how we can make sense of this unpublished lecture in the context of Dirac's broader philosophy of quantum mechanics, and how our present understanding of Dirac's philosophical views must be revised.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory. THE COMPLETENESS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS Although the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (Section 20.4) and the lack of absolute predictive power are an inherent feature of quantum mechanics, there have been attempts to preserve an in principle completely deterministic structure for physics. Even classically, in a macroscopic sample of gas there are so many molecules that it would be hopeless, as a practical matter, to predict the future locations of all these molecules from Newton's laws of motion.
Paul Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the central figures of the last century physics, contributing in several and remarkable ways to the development of quantum mechanics; he was also at the centre of an active community of physicists, with whom he had extensive interactions and correspondence. In particular, Dirac was in close contact with Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli. For this reason, among others, Dirac is generally considered a supporter of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Similarly, he was considered a physicist sympathetic with the positivistic attitude which shaped the development of quantum theory in the 1920s. Against this background, the aim of the present essay is twofold: on the one hand, we will argue that, analyzing specific examples taken from Dirac's published works, he can neither be considered a positivist nor a physicist methodologically guided by the observability doctrine. On the other hand, we will try to disentangle Dirac's figure from the mentioned Copenhagen interpretation, since in his long career he employed remarkably different—and often contradicting—methodological principles and philosophical perspectives with respect to those followed by the supporters of that interpretation. Quanta 2019; 8: 68–87.
Quantum mechanics, one of the most successful theories in the history of science, was created to account for physical systems not describable by classical physics. Though it is consistent with all experiments conducted thus far, many of its core concepts (amplitudes, global phases, etc.) can not be directly accessed and its interpretation is still the subject of intense debate, more than 100 years since it was introduced. So, a fundamental question is why this particular mathematical model is the one that nature chooses, if indeed it is the correct model. In the past two decades there has been a renewed effort to determine what physical or informational principles define quantum mechanics. In this paper, recent attempts at establishing reasonable physical principles are reviewed and their degree of success is tabulated. An alternative approach using joint quasi-probability distributions is shown to provide a common basis of representing most of the proposed principles. It is argued that having a common representation of the principles can provide intuition and guidance to relate current principles or advance new principles. The current state of affairs, along with some alternative views are discussed.
In previous chapters we presented and discussed the standard, generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which there exists in nature at the most fundamental level an irreducible and ineliminable indeterminism. Although we saw that what historically constituted the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is difficult to specify with precision, three central commitments do characterize it. (1) In general, no particle trajectories can exist in a space–time background. (2) No deterministic description of fundamental physical phenomena is possible. (3) There exists in the laws of the fundamental physical phenomena of nature an essential and ineliminable indeterminism or probability (unlike the probability of classical physics, that there reflects our ignorance of the finer details of complex physical phenomena). A flavor of these features of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can be gotten from the quotations at the beginning of Part VIII ( Some philosophical lessons from quantum mechanics ). On this view, it is in principle impossible to predict, say, the exact future behavior of an electron (that is, to give its position and velocity as functions of the time). According to the Copenhagen school, there can be no causal description of microphenomena in terms of a continuous space–time background (as there is in classical physics). It is generally believed that a causal interpretation of quantum mechanics is impossible, although no proof of this exists.