We explain the quantum structure as due to the presence of two effects, (a) a real change of state of the entity under influence of the measurement and, (b) a lack of knowledge about a deeper deterministic reality of the measurement process. We present a quantum machine, where we can illustrate in a simple way how the quantum structure arises as a consequence of the two mentioned effects. We introduce a parameter epsilon that measures the size of the lack of knowledge on the measurement process, and by varying this parameter, we describe a continuous evolution from a quantum structure (maximal lack of knowledge) to a classical structure (zero lack of knowledge). We show that for intermediate values of epsilon we find a new type of structure, that is neither quantum nor classical. We apply the model that we have introduced to situations of lack of knowledge about the measurement process appearing in other regions of reality. More specifically we investigate the quantum-like structures that appear in the situation of psychological decision processes, where the subject is influenced during the testing, and forms some of his opinions during the testing process. Our conclusion is that in the light of this explanation, the quantum probabilities are epistemic and not ontological, which means that quantum mechanics is compatible with a determinism of the whole.
We explain the quantum structure as due to the presence of two effects, (a) a real change of state of the entity under influence of the measurement and, (b) a lack of knowledge about a deeper deterministic reality of the measurement process. We present a quantum machine, where we can illustrate in a simple way how the quantum structure arises as a consequence of the two mentioned effects. We introduce a parameter epsilon that measures the size of the lack of knowledge on the measurement process, and by varying this parameter, we describe a continuous evolution from a quantum structure (maximal lack of knowledge) to a classical structure (zero lack of knowledge). We show that for intermediate values of epsilon we find a new type of structure, that is neither quantum nor classical. We apply the model that we have introduced to situations of lack of knowledge about the measurement process appearing in other regions of reality. More specifically we investigate the quantum-like structures that appear in the situation of psychological decision processes, where the subject is influenced during the testing, and forms some of his opinions during the testing process. Our conclusion is that in the light of this explanation, the quantum probabilities are epistemic and not ontological, which means that quantum mechanics is compatible with a determinism of the whole.
In a earlier work [1, 2, 3, 4] we have put forward the hypothesis that two layers of thought can be identified in the human thought process, which we have called the ‘classical logical ’ layer and the ‘quantum conceptual ’ layer. In the classical logical layer thought processes are given form by an underlying Boolean logical conceptual process, its non deterministic ‘lack of knowledge ’ version modeled by Kolmogorovian probability and in an idealized form by a stochastic process. In the quantum conceptual layer, the thought process gets form under the influence of the totality of the surrounding conceptual landscape. The key event within this layer is that different concepts figure as individual entities, even when they are combinations of other concepts. A phenomenon of conceptual emergence is taking place in the quantum conceptual layer mathematically described by superposition within the quantum formalism used to model this layer. The quantum conceptual thought process is indeterministic in essence; i.e. there is not necessarily an underlying deterministic process. It is however an equally well structured layer than the classical logical one, and we belief that it is mainly the lack of insight about the structure of this quantum conceptual layer that often leads to the idea that the thought processes described in it are mainly unstructured and correspond to intuitive or irrational thought. In the present paper we analyze more in detail the cognitive and mathematical structures of these two layers of thought. More specifically we put forward a concrete
The aim of the article is to analyze the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics and the relationship of various interpretations of quantum mechanics with the question of truth in scientific knowledge. The theoretical material (various interpretations of quantum mechanics) was analyzed. The research methods were analysis, comparative-historical and institutional approaches. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that physicists are only able to predict the probabilities of physical phenomena or processes, without any knowledge of the structure of entity in itself. The study helps to complement the theoretical picture of the ontology of quantum mechanics and to get an idea about the development prospects of the methodology of physical sciences. We should not ascribe properties that are unobservable in experience to the entity because science can truly interpret only the representation of entity in itself in experience and the ways of dealing with it, not future events or possible states of the entity. Otherwise, science “slides” down to the level of dialectical (rhetorical) exercises based not on true premises, but on generally accepted or “authoritative” biases, which gives room to extreme forms of relativism and takes natural scientists away from studying nature to inventing empirically unsupported hypotheses. When, in accordance with the Cartesian ontology, the scientist assumes that the entity is as the “subject” observes it (that is, the “reflection” of the entity in consciousness is identified with entity in itself), this assumption leads the scientist to attempts to “scientifically” describe the future events or the possible states of the entity. The criterion for the truth of a scientific theory put forward by Einstein in his dispute with Bohr remains a fundamentally unattainable ideal. Cognition of nature is probabilistically and fundamentally incomplete since a person can consciously comprehend natural phenomena only within the framework of their representation in the existing being. The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is due to the impossibility of knowing things as they exist by themselves, that is, as they exist outside of representation in the mind of the observer. This does not mean that physical entities did not exist before their knowledge: they existed potentially, but were not valid for the observer, that is, conscious. Quantum physics is as incomplete as any other physical theory when compared with an unattainable ideal, but this fact does not negate its truth for modern scientists since quantum theory is based on the results of verified experiments.
Modern quantum theory describes physical systems by means of complex-valued state structures whose full dynamical content cannot be reduced to directly observable quantities. While observables are necessarily real-valued, they arise from a richer formal organization that includes phase-sensitive and non-directly accessible structure. This paper argues that the distinction between “real” and “imaginary” components is therefore best understood as epistemic rather than ontological. What appears in measurement is not a separate domain of being, but a selective disclosure of a unified physical reality. On this basis, the “space of possibilities” is reinterpreted not as a second world beyond the real, but as the non-reduced domain of dynamically admissible structure encoded in the state description of a system. Recent results reported in Measuring spin correlation between quarks during QCD confinement provide an empirical illustration of this view by showing that correlations which later become directly observable may originate in non-directly accessible structure and remain dynamically effective across transformation. The observable is thus not the whole of the real, but one mode through which it becomes accessible.
The fundamental deterministic nature of quantum mechanics (QM) is mathematically demonstrated by the modeling of the quantum (multiple) slit experiments; hence this paper is written from a deterministic perspective (DP) in quantum mechanics. Due to approximately 90 years of indeterminism and probabilistic statistical results, the theory consists of many interpretations and is often regarded as counterintuitive. The latter is in the deterministic perspective not the case and is illustrated with some examples. After a brief historic perspective, ‘invisible’ i.e. invisible entities of reality in mathematical treatment, are introduced. These entities are handled by mathematics indirectly i.e. are described in a transformed domain without variables violating the Heisenberg relation. In nature, i.e. on micro and macro levels, causality is fully ‘entangled’ with energy, information - in the meaning of ordering or coding - as well as time. In contrast with the macro scale with many forms and types of memory functions, without a memory property of quanta, causality is the bearer of information symmetry on the quantum scale. Further on in this DP paper: mathematical and philosophical consequences and influences in several paragraphs, regarding subjects such as ‘free will’ and expected ‘threats to science’, the Bell inequalities, Alice and Bob & entanglement, causality, information, retro-causality, spooky action, encryption and computing, teleportation, and in general interpretations rooted in indeterminacy in QM as well as associated topics on independence, fine-tuning. The last paragraph outlines the mathematical treatment of QM more extensively and may clarify references to the above-mentioned topics of discussion in QM further.
In the first part of this two-part article (Aerts & Sassoli de Bianchi, 2014), we have introduced and analyzed a multidimensional model, called the general tension-reduction (GTR) model, able to describe general quantum-like measurements with an arbitrary number of outcomes, and we have used it as a general theoretical framework to study the most general possible condition of lack of knowledge in a measurement, so defining what we have called a universal measurement. In this second part, we present the formal proof that universal measurements, which are averages over all possible forms of fluctuations, produce the same probabilities as measurements characterized by uniform fluctuations on the measurement situation. Since quantum probabilities can be shown to arise from the presence of such uniform fluctuations, we have proven that they can be interpreted as the probabilities of a first-order non-classical theory, describing situations in which the experimenter lacks complete knowledge about the nature of the interaction between the measuring apparatus and the entity under investigation. This same explanation can be applied–mutatis mutandis–to the case of cognitive measurements, made by human subjects on conceptual entities, or in decision processes, although it is not necessarily the case that the structure of the set of states would be in this case strictly Hilbertian. We also show that universal measurements correspond to maximally robust descriptions of indeterministic reproducible experiments, and since quantum measurements can also be shown to be maximally robust, this adds plausibility to their interpretation as universal measurements, and provides a further element of explanation for the great success of the quantum statistics in the description of a large class of phenomena.
We consider a conception of reality that is the following: An object is 'real' if we know that if we would try to test whether this object is present, this test would give us the answer 'yes' with certainty. If we consider a conception of reality where probability plays a fundamental role it can be shown that standard probability theory is not well suited to substitute 'certainty' by means of 'probability equal to 1'. The analysis of this problem leads us to propose a new type of probability theory that is a generalization of standard probability theory. This new type of probability is a function to the set of all subsets of the interval [0, 1] instead of to the interval [0, 1] itself, and hence its evaluation happens by means of a subset instead of a number. This subset corresponds to the different limits of sequences of relative frequency that can arise when an intrinsic lack of knowledge about the context and how it influences the state of the physical entity under study in the process of experimentation is taken into account. The new probability theory makes it possible to define probability on the whole set of experiments within the Geneva-Brussels approach to quantum mechanics, which was not possible with standard probability theory. We introduce the structure of a 'state experiment probability system' and derive the state property system as a special case of this structure. The category SEP of state experiment probability systems and their morphisms is linked with the category SP of state property systems and their morphisms