Abstract The dual-aspect monist conjecture launched by Pauli and Jung in the mid-20th century will be couched in somewhat formal terms to characterize it more concisely than by verbal description alone. After some background material situating the Pauli–Jung conjecture among other conceptual approaches to the mind–matter problem, the main body of this paper outlines its general framework of a basic psychophysically neutral reality with its derivative mental and physical aspects and the nature of the correlations that connect these aspects. Some related approaches are discussed to identify key similarities to and deviations from the Pauli–Jung framework that may be useful for cross-fertilization.
Abstract The dual-aspect monist conjecture launched by Pauli and Jung in the mid-20th century will be couched in somewhat formal terms to characterize it more concisely than by verbal description alone. After some background material situating the Pauli–Jung conjecture among other conceptual approaches to the mind–matter problem, the main body of this paper outlines its general framework of a basic psychophysically neutral reality with its derivative mental and physical aspects and the nature of the correlations that connect these aspects. Some related approaches are discussed to identify key similarities to and deviations from the Pauli–Jung framework that may be useful for cross-fertilization.
Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both as-sume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the 20th century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due to Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and material aspects is specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but en-tails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other
In the mid 19th century, the physicist Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung developed a philosophical position for the mind-matter problem that is today called dual-aspect monism. They conjectured a picture in which the mental and the material arise as two complementary aspects of one underlying psychophysically neutral reality to which they cannot be reduced and to which direct empirical access is impossible. This picture suggests structural, persistent,re-producible mind-matter correlations by splitting the underlying reality into aspects. In addition, it suggests induced, occasional, evasive mind-matter correlations above and below, respectively, those stable baseline correlations. These correlations, and the way they arise, suggest that the domain of the physical is not completely independent of the domain of the mental, and both are not independent from the assumed reality underlying them. Some ideas are presented of how these relationships might be conceived.
Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism oer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also dier in denitive ways. In the 20th century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due to Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and material aspects is specied in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other approaches.
Abstract A key ingredient of the metaphysical doctrine of dual-aspect monism is a psychophysically neutral domain, of which mental and physical aspects arise as epistemic descendants that manifest themselves by decomposition. This primer first introduces some elementary notions to define the basic concepts needed to understand the approach, such as those of states, state spaces, observables, partitions and correlations. Using these notions, the concepts of decomposition and manifestation are explained, and a differentiated view of the mereological distinction of wholes and parts is outlined. Next, a number of historical and contemporary accounts of psychophysical neutrality with philosophical (Plato, Spinoza, Schelling, Kant), scientific (Bohm, Pauli, Jung, Connes, Gibson), and artistic (sculpture, music) flavor are given as illustrative examples. Finally, correlations between the psychophysically neutral, the mental, and the physical domain of reality are discussed, in which these correlations are substantiated by meaning.
Related to the key areas of Pauli''s and Jung''s joint interests, the book covers overlapping issues from the perspectives of physics, philosophy, and psychology. Of primary significance are epistemological questions connected to issues such as realism, measurement, observation, consciousness, and the unconscious. The contributions assess the extensive material that we have about Pauli''s and Jung''s ideas today, with particular respect to concrete research questions and projects based on and re...
UBLICATION OF the Pauli-Jung correspondence (Pauli & Jung, 1992) leaves no doubt that Wolfgang Pauli devoted much thought to the concept of synchronicity, or the acausal synchronicity of meaningful events.This concept was introduced by C. G. Jung (Jung & Pauli, 1952/1973) in a book that also includes Pauli's contribution.Despite many discussions of synchronicity that Pauli had with scientists working at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, USA (where he spent his war years), the idea was somehow abandoned.Physicists were not ready to discuss acausal coincidences between events distant in time and space, mental experiences (dreams, intentions, thoughts), and meaning.Pauli himself was famous for creating trouble in laboratories he visited, and apparently he