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EPISTEMOLOGY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS.

Eugene Paul Wigner

Published Oct 31, 1970• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

The general consequences of quantum mechanics are discussed and the open questions are outlined, with some of the author’s views.

Related papers

An unorthodox view on quantum mechanics

Gerard ’t Hooft

The author's opinion on the interpretation of quantum mechanics is further elucidated. Not only may quantum mechanics be a description of the sub-microscopic world that is profoundly different from what is often asserted, particularly concerning 'what is really going on', but questions such as these may well be essential for finding new ways of constructing models beyond what is now called the Standard Model of the sub-atomic particles.

arXiv:2104.03179•Apr 7, 2021•0 citations

Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics

David Wallace

This is a general introduction to and review of the philosophy of quantum mechanics, aimed at readers with a physics background and assuming no prior exposure to philosophy. It is a draft version of an article to appear in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Physics.

•Nov 25, 2016•68 citations

A Present Day Perspective on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Its Consequences

Jeremy Dunning-Davies

Ever since it first appeared in 1935, the famous paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, questioning the completeness of quantum mechanics as a theory, has courted controversy. The initial arguments with Bohr have never been forgotten or gone away; the ideas of Bell have remained; many experiments have been performed purporting to support the stance of Bohr. More recently, however, an experiment performed by a group in Basel has questioned this accepted position and, theoretically, this new perspective has received support from at least two sources. It is the work behind these two sources, especially the second, together with the experimental work at Basel, which form the basis for this examination of the present position as far as this extremely important position for physical science is concerned. Needless to say, considering the views expressed in these two approaches, it is also necessary and appropriate to consider some possible consequences if this new view becomes accepted. Due to the fact that the recent support for the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen argument makes use of results in iso-mathematics, iso-mechanics and iso-chemistry, these possible consequences include the exact representation of nuclear data, the achievement of an attractive force between identical valence electrons with the ensuing exact representation of molecular data, the prediction of new clean energies and the prediction of the possible recycling of nuclear waste via stimulated decay—none of which is allowable utilising traditional quantum mechanics. Hence here, as well as discussing the resolution of the long standing issue provoked by the well-known Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen article, some of these consequences will be discussed with a view to provoking more general, open-minded discussion within the scientific community.

Journal of Modern Physics•Jan 1, 2021•1 citation

Relativity and quantum mechanics

B. G. Sidharth

We first deduce Special Relativity from Quantum Mechanics. Then we discuss the implications and ramifications.

Journal of Physics Conference Series•May 14, 2015•1 citation

The Temporally Open Systems View

Emily Adlam

Abstract We argue that there is a temporal analogue of the open systems view expounded by Cuffaro and Hartmann (2024), suggesting that we should not think of the universe as breaking down into autonomous time-slices whose instantaneous evolution is always independent from events at other times. Employing the definitions proposed by Cuffaro and Hartmann, we argue that there are good reasons to think that the temporally open systems view should be regarded as ontically fundamental. We use the failure of narratability in quantum mechanics to demonstrate that generically, quantum histories cannot be decomposed into autonomous temporal slices; we discuss the status of temporal closure 39in several interpretations of quantum mechanics; and finally, we consider the consequences of the temporally open systems view for the question about whether the state of the universe as a whole is pure.

•Apr 15, 2026•0 citations

The Quantum Theory of Measurement (2nd edn)

John M. Myers

The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.

Measurement Science and Technology•May 1, 1997•45 citations
Ever since it first appeared in 1935, the famous paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, questioning the completeness of quantum mechanics as a theory, has courted controversy. The initial arguments with Bohr have never been forgotten or gone away; the ideas of Bell have remained; many experiments have been performed purporting to support the stance of Bohr. More recently, however, an experiment performed by a group in Basel has questioned this accepted position and, theoretically, this new perspective has received support from at least two sources. It is the work behind these two sources, especially the second, together with the experimental work at Basel, which form the basis for this examination of the present position as far as this extremely important position for physical science is concerned. Needless to say, considering the views expressed in these two approaches, it is also necessary and appropriate to consider some possible consequences if this new view becomes accepted. Due to the fact that the recent support for the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen argument makes use of results in iso-mathematics, iso-mechanics and iso-chemistry, these possible consequences include the exact representation of nuclear data, the achievement of an attractive force between identical valence electrons with the ensuing exact representation of molecular data, the prediction of new clean energies and the prediction of the possible recycling of nuclear waste via stimulated decay—none of which is allowable utilising traditional quantum mechanics. Hence here, as well as discussing the resolution of the long standing issue provoked by the well-known Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen article, some of these consequences will be discussed with a view to provoking more general, open-minded discussion within the scientific community.
Abstract We argue that there is a temporal analogue of the open systems view expounded by Cuffaro and Hartmann (2024), suggesting that we should not think of the universe as breaking down into autonomous time-slices whose instantaneous evolution is always independent from events at other times. Employing the definitions proposed by Cuffaro and Hartmann, we argue that there are good reasons to think that the temporally open systems view should be regarded as ontically fundamental. We use the failure of narratability in quantum mechanics to demonstrate that generically, quantum histories cannot be decomposed into autonomous temporal slices; we discuss the status of temporal closure 39in several interpretations of quantum mechanics; and finally, we consider the consequences of the temporally open systems view for the question about whether the state of the universe as a whole is pure.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.