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Lecture notes in computer science

The Round Complexity of Secure Computation Against Covert Adversaries

Arka Rai Choudhuri, Vipul Goyal, Abhishek Jain

Published Jan 1, 2020• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_30

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Secure set intersection protocols confronting with covert adversary are efficient and guarantee correctness with a non-negligible probability, which is smaller than 1. However, they are not desirable when correctness is required to be achieved with probability 1, since correctness may be broken when the covert adversary successfully cheats. In order to get desirable result about correctness, we introduce a rational adversary instead of a covert adversary into the secure set-intersection protocol using smartcard tokens. The rational adversary has the same “deterrence factor” as a covert adversary but additionally has utilities defined as in the game theory. The main target of the rational adversary is to maximize his utilities by cheating in the protocol. Note that cheating does not bring him optimal utility, thus he has no incentives to cheat. We prove that given proper utilities, the strategy not to cheat induces Nash equilibrium for the rational adversary. Therefore, correctness can be guaranteed with probability 1. Furthermore, our protocol has the same round complexity as the secure setintersection protocol using smartcard tokens since the introduction of a rational adversary does not increase the round complexity.
A Practical Framework for ttt -Out-of- nnn Oblivious Transfer With Security Against Covert Adversaries
Oblivious transfer plays a fundamental role in the area of secure distributed computation. In particular, this primitive is used to search items in decentralized databases. Using a variant of smooth projective hash previously presented by Zeng , we construct a practical framework fort-out-of-noblivious transfer in the plain model without any set-up assumption. It can be implemented under a variety of standard intractability assumptions, including the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, the decisionalN-th residuosity assumption, the decisional quadratic residuosity assumption, and the learning with error problem. It is computationally secure in the presence of covert adversaries and only requires four rounds of communication. Compared to existing practical protocols with fully-simulatable security against covert adversaries or malicious adversaries, our framework is generally more efficient.