Quantum mechanics is usually formulated with an implicit assumption that agents who can observe and interact with the world are external to it and have a classical memory. Quantum measurement theory has consequently been formally defined with such external agents in mind, and its predictions match our classical experience. There is however no accepted way to define the quantum-classical cut and (if quantum theory is universal) no a priori reason to rule out fully quantum agents with coherent quantum memories. In this work we extend the definition of measurement to account for observers with quantum memories who need not experience the world in the way we do. We define measurements without probabilities, and show that information gain and uncertainty can still be quantified in a meaningful way. The results demonstrate how quantum agents observe the world in a way that cannot be accounted for in the usual language of observables and POVMs. This approach to measurements could lead to a new understanding of quantum theory in general and to new results in the context of quantum networks.
Quantum mechanics is usually formulated with an implicit assumption that agents who can observe and interact with the world are external to it and have a classical memory. Quantum measurement theory has consequently been formally defined with such external agents in mind, and its predictions match our classical experience. There is however no accepted way to define the quantum-classical cut and (if quantum theory is universal) no a priori reason to rule out fully quantum agents with coherent quantum memories. In this work we extend the definition of measurement to account for observers with quantum memories who need not experience the world in the way we do. We define measurements without probabilities, and show that information gain and uncertainty can still be quantified in a meaningful way. The results demonstrate how quantum agents observe the world in a way that cannot be accounted for in the usual language of observables and POVMs. This approach to measurements could lead to a new understanding of quantum theory in general and to new results in the context of quantum networks.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is usually formulated with an implicit assumption that agents who can observe and interact with the world are external to it and have a classical memory. However, there is no accepted way to define the quantum–classical cut and no a priori reason to rule out fully quantum agents with coherent quantum memories. In this work, we introduce an entirely quantum notion of measurement, called a sensation, to account for quantum agents that experience the world through quantum sensors. Sensations eschew probabilities and instead describe a deterministic flow of quantum information. We quantify the information gain and disturbance of a sensation using concepts from quantum information theory and find that sensations always disturb at least as much as they inform. Viewing measurements as sensations could lead to a new understanding of quantum theory in general and to new results in the context of quantum networks.
Abstract The traditional formalism of quantum measurement (hereafter ‘TQM’) describes processes where some properties of quantum states are extracted and stored as classical information. While TQM is a natural and appropriate description of how humans interact with quantum systems, it is silent on the question of how a more general, quantum , agent would do so. How do we describe the observation of a system by an agent with the ability to store not only classical information but quantum states in its memory? In this paper, we extend the idea of measurement to a more general class of sensors for quantum agents which interact with a system in such a way that the agent’s memory stores information (classical or quantum) about the system under study. For appropriate sensory interactions, the quantum agent may ‘learn’ more about the system than would be possible under any set of classical measurements—but as we show, this comes at the cost of additional measurement disturbance. We experimentally demonstrate such a system and characterize the tradeoffs by considering the channel capacity required to erase the effect of a measurement.
Ultimately, any explanation of quantum measurement must be extendable to relativistic quantum mechanics (RQM), since many precisely confirmed experimental results follow from quantum field theory (QFT), which is based on RQM. Certainly, the traditional "collapse" postulate for quantum measurement is problematic in a relativistic context, at the very least because, as usually formulated, it violates the relativity of simultaneity. The present paper addresses this with a relativistic model of measurement in which the state of the universe is decomposed into decoherent histories of measurements recorded within it. The approach is essentially Everettian, in the sense that it uses the unmodified, unitary quantum formalism of RQM. But it addresses the difficulty with typical "many worlds" interpretations on how to even define probabilities over different possible ``worlds''. To do this, Zurek's concept of envariance is generalized to the context of relativistic spacetime, giving an objective definition of the probability of any one of the quantum histories, consistent with Born's rule. It is then shown that the statistics of any repeated experiment within the universe also tend to follow the Born rule as the number of repetitions increases. The wave functions that we actually use for such experiments are local reductions of very coarse-grained superpositions of universal eigenstates, and their "collapse" can be re-interpreted as simply an update based on additional incremental knowledge gained from a measurement about the "real" eigenstate of our universe.
In this paper, we do not try to solve the measurement problem, but rather to properly formulate it. One of the reasons why it still lacks a precise, agreed definition is that the problem may take very different aspects depending on the interpretation of quantum mechanics embraced. Inspired by the methodology of theory-independent results like Bell's theorem, we propose to identify the common root of the puzzle in an interpretation-independent way i.e. as a property of the empirical statistics only, before deriving its philosophical consequences. The key observation is that quantum matter can not be described by a Kolmogorovian probabilistic theory. Arguing that the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory are the postulates of epistemic uncertainty leads us to reformulate the measurement problem as the impossibility to build an ontology independent of epistemology for quantum matter. Said differently, there exists no God's-eye view on quantum systems. Although it is meaningless to solve the measurement problem as defined in this way, insofar as it is a feature of the universe's statistics, such a formulation may on the other hand bring side benefits. In particular, we argue that it allows to: (i) shed a new light on the variety of interpretations; (ii) propose a fundamental reason why quantum mechanics and general relativity are so incompatible, not relying on purely mathematical or technical arguments; (iii) guide the quest for quantum gravity.
In this paper, we will see that we can reformulate the purely classical probability theory, using similar language to the one used in quantum mechanics. This leads us to reformulate quantum mechanics itself using this different way of understanding probability theory, which in turn will yield a new interpretation of quantum mechanics. In this reformulation, we still prove the existence of none classical phenomena of quantum mechanics, such as quantum superposition, quantum entanglement, the uncertainty principle and the collapse of the wave packet. But, here, we provide a different interpretation of these phenomena of how it is used to be understood in quantum physics. The advantages of this formulation and interpretation are that it induces the same experimental results, solves the measurement problem, and reduces the number of axioms in quantum mechanics. Besides, it suggests that we can use new types of Q-bits which are more easily to manipulate.
QBism has long recognized quantum states, POVM elements, Kraus operators, and even unitary operations to be cut from the same cloth: They express aspects of an agent's belief system concerning the consequences (for her) of actions she might take upon her external world. Such action-consequence pairs have conventionally been called "quantum measurements." The calculus of quantum theory is then viewed as an empirically motivated addition to Bayesian decision theory when brought to this notion of measurement. This radical approach has allowed QBism to eliminate conceptual problems that plague other interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, one issue has remained elusive: If a QBist does not believe in the existence of an ontic (agent-independent) dynamical variable evolving over time, why would there be any constraints on her quantum-state assignment in the absence of performing a measurement? Why would she introduce unitary or open-system quantum dynamics at all? Here, we present a representation theorem based on van Fraassen's reflection principle to answer these questions. Simply put, an agent's assignment of quantum dynamics represents her belief that a measurement action she is contemplating would not change her current odds for future gambles. A corollary to this approach is that one can make sense of "open-system dynamics" without the need to introduce an "environment with a measurement record," as is common in decoherence accounts of quantum measurement. QBism's understanding instead rests more fundamentally on an agent's beliefs about the system of interest (not system plus environment) and her judgments about measurements she might perform on that system. More broadly, this result establishes QBism's contention that measurement itself is the central concept of quantum theory and thus the framework upon which any future QBist ontology must hang.