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Журнал технической физики

Анализ эффективности методов защиты от атак активного оптического зондирования на волоконные системы квантового распределения ключей в спектральном диапазоне 1260-1650 nm

А. В. Борисова, B. D. Garmaev, И.Б. Бобров, Sergei Negodiaev, I. V. Sinil’shchikov

Published Jan 1, 2020• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, the results of research of spectral features of several passive fiber optic components are presented. There are spectra of isolators, circulators, spectral filters, and WDM, that are used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, and contribute to the protection of these systems against active optical probing attacks. We also provide an estimate of the degree of isolation required to protect the QKD system from Trojan-horse attacks. Based on the isolation requirements and measurement data we analyzed the efficiency of the QKD system protection through the use passive isolating components. As an example, we have shown the achievement of the required isolation level (150 dB) in the considered spectral range in the system presented in the article.

DOI
10.21883/os.2020.11.50182.4-20

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In this paper, the results of research of spectral features of several passive fiber optic components are presented. There are spectra of isolators, circulators, spectral filters, and WDM, that are used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, and contribute to the protection of these systems against active optical probing attacks. We also provide an estimate of the degree of isolation required to protect the QKD system from Trojan-horse attacks. Based on the isolation requirements and measurement data we analyzed the efficiency of the QKD system protection through the use passive isolating components. As an example, we have shown the achievement of the required isolation level (150 dB) in the considered spectral range in the system presented in the article.
Abstract The results of investigation of the spectral characteristics of some passive fiber-optic components, such as optical isolators, circulators, spectral filters and multiplexers, used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems and contributing to the protection of QKD system from active optical probing attacks are presented. An assessment of the required degree of isolation is also given, which ensures reliable protection of the QKD system against Trojan-horse attacks under the most stringent conditions for legitimate users. Based on the formulated requirements and measurement results, the effectiveness of protection using the investigated passive insulating components is analyzed. Using the example of calculating the insulation for the QKD system scheme presented in the work, the achievement of the required level of isolation (150 dB) in the entire considered spectral range is shown.
The Trojan-horse attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are known to be a threat to secure key sharing between two parties (Alice and Bob). To protect a QKD system against such attacks a variety of passive optical and active optical devices embedded in Alice’s and Bob’s setup are widely used. However, a security analysis against the Trojan-horse attack is required to ensure the unconditional security of a QKD system. We present a security analysis against the Trojan-horse attacks on a practical fiber-based QKD phase-coding system in 400–1700 nm spectral range. The obtained results made it possible to calculate the higher limit of average photon number returned to Eve and the probabilities of Eve’s success of the attack on a particular QKD system.
Vulnerabilities of components used in quantum-key-distribution systems affect its implementation security and must be taken into consideration during system development and security analysis. In this paper, we investigate transmission of fiber optical elements, which are commonly used in quantum-key-distribution systems for designing countermeasures against Trojan-horse attacks, in the 150015001500--210021002100-nm\mathrm{nm}nm range. As a result, we find loopholes in their transmission spectra that open possibilities for eavesdropping. We also consider a simple passive countermeasure based on the violation of total internal reflection in a single-mode fiber, that provides additional insertion losses of at least 60 dB for double-pass Trojan-horse probe pulses for wavelengths longer than 1830 nm.
Implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) need vulnerability assessment against loopholes in their optical scheme. Most of the optical attacks involve injecting or receiving extraneous light via the communication channel. An eavesdropper can choose her attack wavelengths arbitrarily within the quantum channel passband to maximize the attack performance, exploiting spectral transparency windows of system components. Here we propose a wide-spectrum security evaluation methodology to achieve full optical spectrum safety for QKD systems. This technique requires transmittance characterization in a wide spectral band with a high sensitivity. We report a testbench that characterizes insertion loss of fiber-optic components in a wide spectral range of 400–2300 nm and up to 70 dB dynamic range. To illustrate practical application of the proposed methodology, we give a full Trojan-horse attack analysis for some typical QKD system configurations and discuss briefly induced-photorefraction and detector-backflash attacks. Our methodology can be used for certification of QKD systems.
In the transmitter of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, a wavelength-division multiplexer (WDM) is typically used to combine quantum and synchronization signals and is directly connected to the quantum channel. As a result, it becomes the first optical component exposed to laser-injection attacks. Therefore, understanding the behavior of WDMs under such attacks is essential for assessing the practical security of QKD systems. In this work, we systematically investigate the characteristics of WDMs under high-power laser illumination. Our experimental results show that certain WDM samples exhibit pronounced changes in their spectral features once the injected laser power surpasses a specific threshold. Taking the Trojan-horse attack as an illustrative example, we further perform a theoretical analysis of the resulting spectral side channel and show that it can reduce the maximum secure transmission distance to below 66.9%66.9\%66.9% of its original value. By combining experimental observations with theoretical modeling, this study advances the understanding of the influence of WDMs on the practical security of QKD systems.